Conflict Management Trajectories in Militarized Interstate Disputes: A Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Foundations

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew P. Owsiak
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-511
Author(s):  
Emir Yazici
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Majority Group ◽  
Ethnic Language ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Which third parties are more likely to manage interstate conflicts? Once they do, what kind of conflict management methods do they use? I argue that ethnic, language, and/or religious ties between a potential third party and disputant states can affect both the likelihood and the type of conflict management. If there are strong identity ties (ethnic, language, and/or religious) between the majority group in a potential third-party state and the majority group in one of the disputant states, both the likelihood of conflict management in general and the likelihood of economic conflict management in particular should increase. Equally stronger identity ties between a potential third party and both disputants should also increase the likelihood of conflict management in which third parties use verbal and diplomatic conflict management methods since they do not harm any of the disputants. Empirical findings based on a dataset covering the militarized interstate disputes between 1946 and 2011 support my theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to the literature by exploring the role of transborder identities—in addition to material factors such as alliance, trade partnership, or joint regime type—in management of interstate conflicts by third parties.

scholarly journals Institutions and Pastoralist Conflicts in Africa: A Conceptual Framework

2021 ◽  
pp. 154231662199573
Author(s):  
Dennis Amego Korbla Penu ◽  
Sebastian Angzoorokuu Paalo
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
State Level ◽  
Typical Case ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Policy Documents ◽  
Institutional Pluralism ◽  
Development Outcomes ◽  
New Institutions

Pastoralist conflicts are important global development outcomes, especially in Africa. Analysing relevant literature on this phenomenon, we identify “institutions” as a key but fragmented theme. This blurs a composite understanding of how institutions affect these conflicts and their management. Hence, this article proposes a conceptual framework that brings harmony to this discourse by analysing 172 relevant publications. The framework was then tested using evidence from interviews and policy documents collected on a typical case in Agogo, Ghana. The findings show that pastoralist conflicts in Africa are shaped from three main dimensions: institutional change, institutional pluralism, and institutional meanings. Thus, state-level institutional changes create different institutions at the community level, and stakeholders using these institutions place different evaluations on them based on obtained outcomes. These dynamics contribute to conflict management dilemmas. Hence, the study recommends that intervention efforts examine whether new institutions contradict existing ones and to resolve them before implementation.

Heterogeneity in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), 1816–2001: What Fatal MIDs Cannot Fix

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas M. Gibler ◽  
Erin K. Little
Keyword(s):  
Measurement Bias ◽  
Additional Measurement ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Private Citizens ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Dispute ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

We examine a major source of heterogeneity across cases in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset, 1816–2001, and demonstrate that this variation across cases biases most analyses of conflict. Disputes are coded using two logics—the familiar state-to-state militarized action represents one case while the second relies on sponsor governments to protest state targeting of private citizens. We show that the latter introduces additional measurement bias and does not match well the original conceptualization of what constituted a dispute. The protest-dependent cases are caused by different processes, and omitting them from analyses provides truer estimates of the effects of most conflict predictors. We find that previous controls for heterogeneity in the dispute data—such as using fatal militarized interstate disputes only—substantially underestimates the dangerous effects of contiguity and the pacifying effects of regime similarity. We also show that governments are seldom willing to risk militarized conflict for private citizens during these unique cases. We provide a list of the protest-dependent cases for future conflict analyses.

Same Evidences, Different Interpretations – A Comparison of the Conflict Index between the Interstate Dyadic Events Data and Militarized Interstate Disputes Data in Peace-Conflict Models

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 347-372
Author(s):  
Scott Y. Lin ◽  
Carlos Seiglie
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

AbstractStudying the determinants of international conflict, researchers have found a series of influential variables, but few have addressed the robustness of the results to changes in the definition of the dependent variable, conflict. The two main sources for operationalizing conflict in empirical work are data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and events data. In this paper, we find that a χ2-test indicates a correlation between events data and MIDs data. However, detailed regression analysis indicates that there are some contradictory findings depending on whether we use events data as opposed to MIDs data to measure conflict.

Self-Monitoring, US Presidents, and International Crises

2018 ◽  
pp. 67-102
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
The Self ◽  
International Crises ◽  
Self Monitoring ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter looks at original surveys of sixty-eight presidential historians on the president each had studied in depth. The historians’ survey suggests that American presidents exhibit variation in their self-monitoring dispositions. The chapter then leverages this variation to test statistically whether US presidents’ behavior during international crises is consistent with the expectations of the theory presented in this book. The self-monitoring disposition of a US president is a significant predictor of his likelihood of employing and initiating military instruments to demonstrate resolve during international conflict. Low self-monitor presidents not only engage in less militarized interstate disputes, but they are also significantly less likely to initiate such disputes, compared to high self-monitor presidents. The chapter also presents findings indicating that high self-monitor presidents are more likely to prevail in militarized interstate disputes compared to their low self-monitor counterparts.

Ideology, Institutions, Power, and Militarized Disputes

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-129
Author(s):  
Erik Voeten
Keyword(s):  
Territorial Dispute ◽  
Regression Analyses ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Militarized Disputes ◽  
Intergovernmental Organization ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Democratic Communities ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

This chapter examines if and how intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships shape participation in militarized interstate disputes. Theorists have argued that IGOs solve informational problems, socialize states, or constitute democratic communities that prevent a resort to violence. The distributive ideological approach suggests that IGOs institutionalize ideologically cohesive coalitions that ameliorate conflicts with insiders but can exacerbate conflict with outsiders. The effect of IGOs on militarized disputes should be present only if the distributional stakes have global ideological implications as opposed to when disputes are purely over particularistic stakes, such as territory. Regression analyses support this insight. Both ideological differences and IGO membership patterns affect dispute participation in dyads that include a major power but not among neighboring states or states involved in a territorial dispute. One implication is that IGO memberships affect the distribution of militarized disputes, but it is unclear whether IGOs in the aggregate reduce militarized conflict.

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