Conflict Management of Territorial Disputes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista E. Wiegand
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Management Tools ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Maritime Disputes ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations

Despite the decline in interstate wars, there remain dozens of interstate disputes that could erupt into diplomatic crises and evolve into military escalation. By far the most difficult interstate dispute that exists are territorial disputes, followed by maritime and river boundary disputes. These disputes are not only costly for the states involved, but also potentially dangerous for states in the region and allies of disputant states who could become entrapped in armed conflicts. Fortunately, though many disputes remain unresolved and some disputes endure for decades or more than a century, many other disputes are peacefully resolved through conflict management tools. Understanding the factors that influence conflict management—the means by which governments decide their foreign policy strategies relating to interstate disputes and civil conflicts—is critical to policy makers and scholars interested in the peaceful resolution of such disputes. Though conflict management of territorial and maritime disputes can include a spectrum of management tools, including use of force, most conflict management tools are peaceful, involving direct bilateral negotiations between the disputant states, non-binding third party mediation, or binding legal dispute resolution. Governments most often attempt the most direct dispute resolution method, which is bilateral negotiations, but often, such negotiations break down due to uncompromising positions of the disputing states, leading governments to turn to other resolution methods. There are pros and cons of each of the dispute resolution methods and certain factors will influence the decisions that governments make about the management of their territorial and maritime disputes. Overall, the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes is an important but complicated issue for states both directly involved and indirectly affected by the persistence of such disputes.

Islamic Law States and Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes

2019 ◽  
pp. 164-201
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Land Ownership ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Court System ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Territorial Claims

This chapter examines Islamic law states’ decisions to use international conflict management venues in the context of territorial disputes (1945–2012). The dissonance between Islamic law and international law is particularly apparent in the context of territorial claims, because Islamic notions of land ownership and territorial sovereignty are religious in nature. Not all ILS approach international conflict management in the same way. Secular—or rather shared—legal features, such as the presence of a secular court system and constitutional mentions of peaceful resolution of disputes, have the power to attract such ILS to legal approaches—arbitration and adjudication. In contrast, mediation and conciliation are most appealing to those ILS whose legal systems are deeply infused with traditional Islamic precepts. Such states are morally committed to these procedures. In an important way, there is a synergy between norms of traditional Islamic dispute resolution and international non-binding third-party mechanisms.

Preventing War and Providing the Peace?

2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Shannon
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Claims Data ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Territorial Claims ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations

I explore whether international organizations (IOs) promote peaceful conflict management. Using territorial claims data, I find that organizations with interventionist capabilities encourage disputing members to attempt peaceful conflict resolution. Then, to more fully uncover the causal relationship between IOs and conflict management, I investigate the influence of IOs on bilateral dispute settlement separately from third party settlement.The analyses reveal that institutions do not promote bilateral negotiations between members, indicating that the socialization and trust-building capabilities of IOs are limited. However, institutions foster multilateral talks, demonstrating that IOs broker bargaining with third party diplomatic intervention.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Short Version ◽  
Legal Tradition ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Scholarly Literature ◽  
Interstate Disputes

How do Islamic law states prefer to resolve their international disputes? Is it possible to identify general patterns that apply to all these states? Why are only some Islamic law states open to using international courts in attempting to solve their interstate disputes? A common Western attitude toward Islam has often served to create the assumption of a massive dichotomy between the Islamic legal tradition and international law across the entire Islamic milieu, projecting a continuing divergence between the two legal systems. Chapter 1 discusses the importance of understanding the Islamic milieu’s preferences with respect to international conflict management venues. It presents a short version of the Islamic theory of peaceful resolution (fully presented later in chapter 4) and discusses the broader significance of the project, locating it within the broader scholarly literature of interstate dispute resolution.

Islamic Law States and Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes

2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 777-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The Other ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Peaceful Settlement ◽  
International Dispute ◽  
Legal Structures ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

AbstractThis article argues that specific characteristics of the domestic legal institutions of Islamic law states shape these states' choices of peaceful resolution methods in territorial disputes. After providing original data on the characteristics of Islamic legal structures, I systematically compare pertinent rules of international dispute resolution methods and Islamic law. I demonstrate empirically that not all Islamic law states view international settlement venues in the same way. Secular legal features, such as constitutional mentions of education, supreme court, or peaceful settlement of disputes have the power to attract these states to the most formal international venues—arbitration and adjudication. On the other hand, Islamic law states whose legal system is infused with Islamic religious precepts are attracted to less-formalized venues.

Transborder identities, bias, and third-party conflict management

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-511
Author(s):  
Emir Yazici
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Majority Group ◽  
Ethnic Language ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Economic Conflict ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Which third parties are more likely to manage interstate conflicts? Once they do, what kind of conflict management methods do they use? I argue that ethnic, language, and/or religious ties between a potential third party and disputant states can affect both the likelihood and the type of conflict management. If there are strong identity ties (ethnic, language, and/or religious) between the majority group in a potential third-party state and the majority group in one of the disputant states, both the likelihood of conflict management in general and the likelihood of economic conflict management in particular should increase. Equally stronger identity ties between a potential third party and both disputants should also increase the likelihood of conflict management in which third parties use verbal and diplomatic conflict management methods since they do not harm any of the disputants. Empirical findings based on a dataset covering the militarized interstate disputes between 1946 and 2011 support my theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to the literature by exploring the role of transborder identities—in addition to material factors such as alliance, trade partnership, or joint regime type—in management of interstate conflicts by third parties.

How Democracies Keep the Peace: Contextual Factors That Influence Conflict Management Strategies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glynn Ellis ◽  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell ◽  
Brandon C Prins
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Contextual Factors ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Issue Salience ◽  
Binding Forms ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations ◽  
Militarized Conflict ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Power Preponderance

Some studies find that democratic states are more amenable to third party forms of conflict management, while other studies indicate that democracies are able to resolve contentious issues on their own through bilateral negotiations. Using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project, the authors investigate peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies that democratic states employ to resolve contentious issues. Theoretically, the authors focus on how militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience influence the tools of conflict management that democratic states employ. Empirical analyses suggest that democratic dyads employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when they are facing an equal adversary. Democratic dyads seek out non-binding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than non-democratic dyads, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. Pairs of democracies are more likely to employ militarized conflict management strategies when they have resorted to force over the issue previously, when the issue is highly salient, and when they are evenly matched.

The Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes dataset, 1945–2015

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234331989556
Author(s):  
Krista E Wiegand ◽  
Emilia Justyna Powell ◽  
Steven McDowell
Keyword(s):  
State Level ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Linear Effect ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Quantitative Analyses ◽  
Time Changes ◽  
Third Party Dispute Resolution ◽  
Over Time

This article introduces the Peaceful Resolution of Territorial Disputes (PRTD) dataset, covering all interstate territorial disputes (1945–2015). Our dataset captures proposals for the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes made by states involved in territorial claims at the disputant-year level. These proposals provide a concrete measure of changing state preferences toward negotiations, non-binding, and binding third-party dispute resolution methods over time. In contrast to existing attempt-level data, the monadic panel design of the dataset captures not only actual attempts at peaceful resolution – the result of an agreement between disputants – but also proposals for methods that did not occur but were preferred at a particular time point. Our dataset allows for robust and generalizable quantitative analyses of the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes that are sensitive to temporal, regional, claim-based, and state-level trends. To demonstrate the utility of our dataset, we use hybrid logistic regression to examine the determinants of binding PRTD proposals. Over-time changes in characteristics such as regime type and treaty commitments influence attitudes toward binding settlement methods differently than disputant-level measurements. We also show that time has a distinctively non-linear effect.

Conflict Management in Land, River, and Maritime Claims

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew P. Owsiak ◽  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Management ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Multilateral Negotiations ◽  
Territorial Claim ◽  
Territorial Claims ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations ◽  
Legal Processes ◽  
Levels Of Control

Why do disputants favor some conflict management strategies when managing certain territorial claim types—land, river, or maritime—but not others? We propose that state interests—defined via claim characteristics and interdependence—and transaction costs (i.e., the challenges associated with aggregating state preferences over outcomes) differ across claim types. These differences then incentivize states to cede varying levels of control over claim management, ultimately encouraging them to prioritize and institutionalize certain conflict management strategies when managing particular types of territorial claims. More specifically, we theorize and find that states pursue distinct management strategies when addressing their land (informal; bilateral negotiations and arbitration), river (more formal; third-party non-binding), and maritime claims (most formal; multilateral negotiations and legal processes).

A Theory of Islamic Peaceful Resolution of Disputes

2019 ◽  
pp. 125-163
Author(s):  
Emilia Justyna Powell
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Forum Shopping ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The Third ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Space And Time

The theory of Islamic Peaceful Resolution of Disputes discusses four distinct legal features that define Islamic law states’ most preferred form of social interaction: a unique logic of Islamic justice, nonconfrontational dispute settlement (sulh), collective embeddedness of the third party, and incorporation of Islamic religious principles into the resolution process. The chapter describes characteristics of negotiations, international non-binding (conciliation, mediation) and binding methods (arbitration, adjudication). Islamic law states engage in forum shopping because of uncertainty associated with dispute resolution. Their preferences toward international resolution methods are not constant across space and time, but depend on the balance between Islamic law and secular law in their domestic legal systems. ILS whose legal systems are deeply infused with tenets of Islamic law embrace international settlement venues that resemble traditional Islamic law: conciliation and mediation. States whose domestic legal systems embrace secular features are drawn to binding resolution methods: arbitration and adjudication.

Pashtun Jirgas, Their Potential in Pak-Afghan Reconciliation and National Reconstruction

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahid Shahab Ahmed ◽  
Farooq Yousaf
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Social Recognition ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Local Stakeholder ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Bilateral Negotiations ◽  
National Reconstruction ◽  
Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have mostly been hostile since 1947. The animosity has grown in complexity from various territorial disputes to frequent allegations of cross-border terrorism in the post-9/11 era. This article first makes a case for involving Jirgas, a traditional dispute resolution mechanism among Pashtuns, for improving peace dialogues between both countries. It presents evidence of the traditional acceptability of Jirgas by Pashtuns on both sides of the border and assesses previous official bilateral attempts of using Jirgas. It then proceeds to propose some new policy recommendations focused on national reconstruction of Afghanistan, which include involvement of the Taliban as an important local stakeholder. The dual key argument then becomes, first, that since Jirgas have long-standing local legitimacy and acceptability both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, using the strength of their social recognition would allow higher-level bilateral negotiations between the neighbours, enhancing the effectiveness of new and locally more credible forms of multi-track diplomacy. Second, reinvigorating the Jirga system would allow the Afghan people themselves to engage in fuller multi-dimensional debates on sustainable modalities for their own future, on terms to be set by them, not outsiders.

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