scholarly journals Reassessing the framework for the protection of civil servant whistleblowers in the European Court of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 220-240
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Kagiaros

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) has included civil servant whistleblowers in the protective ambit of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article argues that the Court should revisit its approach to proportionality in such cases. When determining whether a restriction to a civil servant whistleblower's free speech was necessary in a democratic society, the Court weighs what the article identifies as the quasi-public watchdog function of whistleblowers (namely their role in imparting information on matters of public concern) against their duties and responsibilities as civil servants. In some instances, the Court gives primacy to whistleblowers’ duties of loyalty to the government over their contribution to the accountability of public bodies. The article challenges this approach on the basis that it fails to adequately consider the key justification that underpins the Court's recognition of whistleblowing as speech, namely the audience interest in receiving the information the whistleblower discloses. The article argues that the Court should give primacy to the watchdog function of whistleblowers. It concludes by making suggestions on how the ECtHR can adopt a more principled approach to proportionality in whistleblowing cases.

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Donoghue ◽  
Claire-Michelle Smyth

Abstract Abortion has been a controversial topic in Irish law and one which the Government has been forced to address following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in A, B and C v. Ireland. The Working Group established to make recommendations have specifically been instructed to deal only with the issues raised in the A, B and C judgment and legislate on the basic of the ‘X case’. This restricted approach calls for legalisation of abortion only where the life of the mother is at risk, a position unique only to Ireland and Andorra within Europe. The vast majority of member states to the European Convention on Human Rights allow for legal abortion on the basis of foetal abnormality and with this emerging consensus the margin of appreciation hitherto afforded by the European Court to member states is diminishing. The advancement and availability of non-invasive genetic tests that can determine foetal abnormalities together with the ruling in R. R. v. Poland leaves Ireland in a precarious position for omitting any reference to foetal abnormalities in any proposed legislation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 174-197
Author(s):  
Mark Hill ◽  
Katherine Barnes

Abstract The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its lose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of “prescribed by law”, “necessary in a democratic society”, “public safety”, “public order, health or morals” and “the rights and freedoms of others”. It seeks to divine principles from the varied jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239
Author(s):  
Matthias Jacobs ◽  
Mehrdad Payandeh

AbstractThe Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the prohibition to strike for career civil servants, as it has traditionally been part of the German legal order, is in compliance with the German Constitution. The Court thereby put a (provisional) end to a long-lasting debate on how to solve the tension between the fundamental freedom to form associations under Article 9(3) of the Basic Law, which arguably encompasses a right to strike, and Article 33(5) of the Basic Law, which protects the traditional principles of the career civil servants, which arguably encompasses the prohibition to strike. Through recognizing that the ban on strike action by career civil servants is not only allowed but required under the German Constitution, the Constitutional Court navigates the German legal order on a potential collision course with the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the Constitutional Court on the one hand reaffirms the openness of the German constitutional order towards international law in general and human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights in particular. On the other hand, the Court somehow marginalizes the role of the European Court of Human Rights and threatens to not follow the Court should it hold that the European Convention on Human Rights demands a right to strike also for career civil servants.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter Hins ◽  
Dirk Voorhoof

Access to state-held information essential in a democratic society – Traditional reluctance of the European Court of Human Rights to apply Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights in access to information cases – Positive obligations and new perspectives: initiatives within the Council of Europe – Parallel with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights – Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky decision of the European Court: the beginning of a new era?


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-343
Author(s):  
John Witte

The European Court of Human Rights has upheld Italy's policy of displaying crucifixes in its public school classrooms. In Lautsi v Italy, an atheist mother of two state school children challenged this policy, in place since 1924. After losing in the Italian courts, she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the presence of these crucifixes in schools violated her and her children's rights to religious freedom and to a secular education guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. On 3 November 2009, a unanimous seven-judge chamber of the European Court held for Ms Lautsi. On 18 March 2011, the Grand Chamber reversed this decision and held 15 to 2 in favour of the Government of Italy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Mark Hill

The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of ‘prescribed by law’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, ‘public safety’, ‘public order, health or morals’ and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.


Law and World ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-140

Due to the special importance of the European Convention on Human Rights, the article discusses the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights regarding sexual offences, which establish violations of various rights protected under the Convention. In addition, it is mentioned in the article whether the practice of the national courts complies with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights. The approaches of the ECtHR on this issue is very interesting, in particular, on the definition of the crime of rape, nonconsensual sexual intercourse and importance of protection of sexual autonomy. Furthermore, the judgments of the ECtHR related to the sexual offences are discussed, in particular violation of the right to respect for private life. As most of the violations in this category of cases are related to the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, therefore the case-law of the ECtHR in this regard, especially in terms of the definition of torture and the ineffective investigation is the important component of the present publication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the main challenges existing in the Georgian criminal law and practice regarding the implementation of the European Convention on Human rights on national level.


coercive questioning (that is, where a suspect's silence can be used in evidence against him or her) can be used in matters under s (as amended) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. There are also wide powers under the Companies Act 1985 to require officers and agents of companies to assist inspectors appointed to investigate the company. Refusal to answer questions can be sanctioned as a contempt of court 431) and as a criminal offence 447). A person can also be required to answer questions to him or her by a acceptances of them under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986. The closest English law comes to creating a duty to give one's name and address is the power given to the police under s 25(3) of PACE 1984 (above). Effective abolition of the right silence The Government ignored the recommendations of the Runciman Commission and, in ss 34-37 of the CJPO 1994, effectively abolished the right to silence. 'Abolished' may be too strong a word because everyone still has the right to remain silent in the same circumstances as they did before the 1994 Act; what has changed is the entitlement of a judge or prosecuting counsel to make adverse comment on such a silence. The issue has now been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The leading case is Condron v UK [2000] Crim 679. In 2000, two convicted drug dealers won a landmark ruling in Europe that the UK Government's curbs on the right to silence denied them a fair trial. The ECtHR in Strasbourg stated that, where juries are allowed to draw adverse inferences from silence under police questioning, they must be properly directed by the judge. In a key finding, it ruled that the Court of Appeal should look not just at whether a conviction was 'safe', but also at whether a defendant received a fair trial. The ruling will be likely to lead to other appeals. The case, backed by Liberty, the human rights group, was brought by William and Karen Condron, who were convicted of supplying drugs in 1995. The pair, who did not answer police questions, were jailed for four years. The ECtHR said that the jury had not been properly directed. As a result, the couple's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was breached. It awarded each defendant £15,000. Silence could not be regarded as 'an absolute right', the court said, and drawing inferences was not itself in breach of the right to a fair trial, but caution was needed. The jury should have been directed that, ' .. .if it was satisfied that the applicants' silence...could not sensibly be attributed to their having no answer, or none that would stand up to cross-examination, it should not draw an adverse inference'. The law report from Times appears below.

2012 ◽  
pp. 415-419

Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

This chapter discusses whether there is a non-religious justification for limiting religiously offensive speech. The most commonly used argument is that the right to freedom of religion includes a more specific right to be protected from offence to one’s religious sensibilities. If this is correct, it provides a non-religious reason for censorship: even those who are hostile to religion can accept that religious freedom is an important right and that the government is justified in giving effect to rights. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld restrictions on expression which insults religious feelings, reasoning that religious freedom, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, protects the religious sensibilities of believers from offence. I suggest that this interpretation is mistaken. After exploring how rights give rise to claims, I argue that there is no right-based claim to be protected from the unpleasant feelings caused by religious insults. Therefore, it is unpersuasive to describe cases of religious offence as involving the conflict of two fundamental rights—speech and religion—which require a balancing exercise to decide which one will prevail each time.


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