Behavioral Consequence of Exploitation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frédérique Dubois ◽  
Philipp Heeb ◽  
Sasha R. X. Dall ◽  
Luc-Alain Giraldeau
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Population Structure ◽  
Behavioral Ecology ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Behavioral Consequence ◽  
Major Consequence ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

In behavioral ecology, the behavioral consequences of individuals (exploiters) using the investments of others (investors), rather than investing time or effort in procuring a resource themselves, has been traditionally studied using the producer–scrounger (PS) model—a simple evolutionary game theoretic model in which producers (investors) search for resources while scroungers (exploiters) use the resources found by producers. A key assumption in the PS model is that the producer remains passive toward scroungers. As the presence of scroungers is costly, evidence is reviewed that one major consequence of having exploiters is the adoption by producers of strategies that reduce the benefits of scroungers, giving rise to countermeasures by scroungers. Scroungers also affect population structure by generating consistent differences among individuals and affecting spatial preferences within groups. Reviewing the impact of scrounging on populations should help generate parallels to explore the consequences of exploitative behavior in economics and public health.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

The Impact of Ideology on Disinvestment Decisions of a Coalition

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 821-849
Author(s):  
Ritika Jain ◽  
Shubhro Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ideological Difference

We build a two-stage game theoretic model to capture the effect of ideologies of parties in a coalition on disinvestment decisions. We focus on three specific aspects of ideology—ideology score of the coalition, ideology dispersion of the coalition, and ideology difference between the center and the state where the enterprise is located. The benchmark two-party coalition predicts that a left government prefers less disinvestment than a right one more often than not. However, there may be a case where moving toward the left end of the ideology spectrum may raise disinvestment incidence. Similarly, a coalition with ideologically similar parties favors privatization more frequently than one in which parties are more diverse. However, for a narrow parametric range, the effect may be reversed. Low ideological difference between the center and the state in which the enterprise is located improves disinvestment incidence. Finally, we extend the model to three-party coalitions.

scholarly journals TRUST AS A BOOSTER

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon REIERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Incomplete Contracts ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Repeated Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Insight Into

In his book Trust. The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society, social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi (2011) states that trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. This article formalizes this idea with the help of a simple game theoretic model. The article looks at a situation where networks of personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy behaviour but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. Assuming that the anonymous market contains both trustworthy and untrustworthy types, it is demonstrated that mutual trust relations can emerge, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out. From a more practical perspective, the model provides an insight into the role trust plays for the decision to transact in networks or markets. It is also demonstrated that networks appear as mixed blessings. Networks reduce the problems arising from incomplete contracts and behavioural risk, but they also restrict individuals’ possibility to reap potential gains produced in larger markets.

scholarly journals Critical transitions in a game theoretic model of tumour metabolism

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 20140014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardeshir Kianercy ◽  
Robert Veltri ◽  
Kenneth J. Pienta
Keyword(s):  
Stromal Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tumour Cells ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Hybrid Energy ◽  
Critical Transitions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Strategies

Tumour proliferation is promoted by an intratumoral metabolic symbiosis in which lactate from stromal cells fuels energy generation in the oxygenated domain of the tumour. Furthermore, empirical data show that tumour cells adopt an intermediate metabolic state between lactate respiration and glycolysis. This study models the metabolic symbiosis in the tumour through the formalism of evolutionary game theory. Our game model of metabolic symbiosis in cancer considers two types of tumour cells, hypoxic and oxygenated, while glucose and lactate are considered as the two main sources of energy within the tumour. The model confirms the presence of multiple intermediate stable states and hybrid energy strategies in the tumour. It predicts that nonlinear interaction between two subpopulations leads to tumour metabolic critical transitions and that tumours can obtain different intermediate states between glycolysis and respiration which can be regulated by the genomic mutation rate. The model can apply in the epithelial–stromal metabolic decoupling therapy.

Advertising in a social network as a signal of quality

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Kamilla Timerbulatova
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Advertising in a social network has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers who act as “opinion leaders” in the social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about posting advertising messages on their blogs, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. The paper investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a reliable signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.

AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF CANNIBALISM

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. CUSHING ◽  
SHANDELLE M. HENSON ◽  
JAMES L. HAYWARD
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model
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