Soft-assembled human–machine perceptual systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 423-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis H Favela

Cognitive systems are highly adaptable and flexible, such that action and perception capabilities can be achieved with the body in various ways, and incorporate features of the environment and nonbiological tools. Perceptual learning refers to enduring changes to a system’s ability to perceive and respond to environmental stimuli. Here I present an integrative framework for understanding how such capabilities occur in human–machine systems comprising brain–body–tool–environment interactions. Central to this work is the claim that the capacity for high degrees of adaptation, flexibility, and learning are possible because human–machine systems are soft-assembled systems, that is, systems whose material constitution is not rigidly constrained so as to achieve goals via a variety of configurations. I begin by presenting the foundations of the framework on offer: the concepts, methods, and theories of ecological psychology; embodied cognition; dynamical systems theory; and machine intelligence. Next, I apply the framework to the case of visually-guided action. I conclude by explaining how this framework provides the explanatory and investigative tools to understand human–machine perceptual systems as soft-assembled systems that span brains-bodies-tools-environments.

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Cant ◽  
David A. Westwood ◽  
Kenneth F. Valyear ◽  
Melvyn A. Goodale

Author(s):  
Robin L. Zebrowski ◽  
Eli B. McGraw

Within artificial intelligence (AI) and machine consciousness research, social cognition as a whole is often ignored. When it is addressed, it is often thought of as one application of more traditional forms of cognition. However, while theoretical approaches to AI have been fairly stagnant in recent years, social cognition research has progressed in productive new ways, specifically through enactive approaches. Using participatory sense-making (PSM) as an approach, we rethink conceptions of autonomy and openness in AI and enactivism, shifting the focus away from living systems to allow incorporation of artificial systems into social forms of sense-making. PSM provides an entire level of analysis through an overlooked autonomous system produced via social interaction that can be both measured and modeled in order to instantiate and examine more robust artificial cognitive systems.


Author(s):  
Xiaochun Gao ◽  
Shin-Min Song

Abstract Unlike in wheeled vehicles, compliance in walking machine systems changes due to the variation of leg geometry, as its body proceeds. This variation in compliance will cause vibration, even if external loads remain constant. A theory is thus developed to predict the body vibrations of a walking machine during walking. On the other hand, dynamic foot forces under body vibrations can be computed by application of the existing numerical methods. As an example, the body vibrations of a quadrupedal walking chair under different walking conditions are simulated in terms of the developed theory. The results show that the influence of body vibrations on the foot force distribution is essential and, in some cases, the walking chair may lose its stability due to its body vibrations, even though it is identified to be stable in a quasi-static analysis. The developed theory can also be extended to other similar multi-limbed robotic systems, such as multi-fingered robot hands.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-280
Author(s):  
Rossella Breveglieri ◽  
Annalisa Bosco ◽  
Sara Borgomaneri ◽  
Alessia Tessari ◽  
Claudio Galletti ◽  
...  

Abstract Accumulating evidence supports the view that the medial part of the posterior parietal cortex (mPPC) is involved in the planning of reaching, but while plenty of studies investigated reaching performed toward different directions, only a few studied different depths. Here, we investigated the causal role of mPPC (putatively, human area V6A–hV6A) in encoding depth and direction of reaching. Specifically, we applied single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left hV6A at different time points while 15 participants were planning immediate, visually guided reaching by using different eye-hand configurations. We found that TMS delivered over hV6A 200 ms after the Go signal affected the encoding of the depth of reaching by decreasing the accuracy of movements toward targets located farther with respect to the gazed position, but only when they were also far from the body. The effectiveness of both retinotopic (farther with respect to the gaze) and spatial position (far from the body) is in agreement with the presence in the monkey V6A of neurons employing either retinotopic, spatial, or mixed reference frames during reach plan. This work provides the first causal evidence of the critical role of hV6A in the planning of visually guided reaching movements in depth.


1997 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 224-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick O. Gilmore ◽  
Mark H. Johnson

The extent to which infants combine visual (i e, retinal position) and nonvisual (eye or head position) spatial information in planning saccades relates to the issue of what spatial frame or frames of reference influence early visually guided action We explored this question by testing infants from 4 to 6 months of age on the double-step saccade paradigm, which has shown that adults combine visual and eye position information into an egocentric (head- or trunk-centered) representation of saccade target locations In contrast, our results imply that infants depend on a simple retinocentric representation at age 4 months, but by 6 months use egocentric representations more often to control saccade planning Shifts in the representation of visual space for this simple sensorimotor behavior may index maturation in cortical circuitry devoted to visual spatial processing in general


Author(s):  
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo ◽  
Thomas Buhrmann ◽  
Xabier E. Barandiaran

If action and perception depend on the mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies, then any theory of cognition that starts from this premise will not be complete unless it offers an explanation of how such mastery is achieved and of what exactly constitutes it. This chapter takes inspiration from Piaget’s theory of equilibration to develop an account of mastery as the progressive growth and refinement of an agent’s sensorimotor repertoire, involving processes of assimilation and accommodation. A new interpretation is provided of these Piagetian concepts in dynamical systems terms. The resulting theory holds that mastery of sensorimotor skills is both world-involving and nonrepresentational. Mastery does not consist in the accumulation of knowledge about the sensorimotor regularities that the agent is able to enact; rather, it is the ongoing process of equilibration by which the agent continuously adapts to new challenges presented to her by the world.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document