From Rolls to Disappointments

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Clarke ◽  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W. Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Reconstruction Era

Much of the literature on partisan agenda setting in Congress focuses on the majority’s ability to exercise negative agenda control. As a result, the empirical emphasis has been on “rolls,” or how often the majority of the majority party opposes legislation that nonetheless passes. Although interesting, rolls are only one source of majority party failure. The other source, largely unexplored in the literature, is when the majority of the majority party supports legislation that is subsequently defeated. These cases represent “disappointments,” and are a means to determine how effective the majority party is at exercising positive agenda control. Making some basic modifications to a standard spatial model of agenda setting, we articulate why and where we might expect the majority party to fail to exercise positive agenda control effectively. We then derive hypotheses regarding (1) which members should vote “no” on roll calls that result in a disappointment and (2) why disappointments vary on a Congress-by-Congress basis across time, and test them using a dataset of final-passage votes on House bills in the post-Reconstruction era.

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

Parties, agendas, and roll rates

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-359
Author(s):  
Shawn Patterson ◽  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Combinatorial Problem ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
The Us

For the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins discover tiny majority-party roll rates and offer them as evidence of majority-party agenda control. However, the observed roll rates are approximately what would result from chance alone or from chance constrained in several natural ways. Besides that, we show that rolls themselves are not evidence of any lapse in partisan agenda control and may even occur as the intended consequence of agenda setting by the majority party. Innovations include a solution to the combinatorial problem of counting all possible rolls, the associated computations, hypothetical examples of strategically advantageous self-induced rolls, and a review of likely real examples of the same.

Discover, Instrumentalize, Monopolize: Fidesz’s Three-Step Blueprint for a Populist Take-over of Referendums

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 705-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pepijn van Eeden
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Social Economic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Disparities ◽  
The One ◽  
Political Apathy ◽  
Risky Option

This article assesses the referendums in Hungary in 2004, 2008, and 2016 diachronically. The review is framed by two competing liberal parliamentary approaches to direct democracy: A useful democratic corrective to the distortions of particracy, or a risky option leading to tyranny of the majority? Rather than choosing sides, this article shows how the conundrum conceals another, more interesting question: Which are the constraints under which the liberal parliamentary viewpoint shifts from the one to the other? Theorizing on post-democracy and populism provides a provisional answer: A consensualized, “post-political” parliament is key, as this, in combination with widening social-economic disparities, incentivizes illiberal populist parties to harness referendums, which prompts liberal parliamentarianists to change their minds. The referendums in 2004, 2008, and 2016 in Hungary substantiate this suspicion. Taken together, they offer a step-by-step blueprint for how, in a thoroughly postpolitical situation, a referendum evolves into a perfect catalyst for populists on their road to power, enabling them with (a) agenda-setting; (b) an explosive emphasis on popular legitimacy; (c) arousing voluntarism, while luring opponents into campaigning for boycott and political apathy; (d) combining social equalitarianism with identarian protectionism, and most importantly; (e) bypassing parliament itself. This article is part of the special cluster titled Political Parties and Direct Democracy in Eastern Europe, guest-edited by Sergiu Gherghina.

scholarly journals Stochastic spatial model for the division of labor in social insects

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alesandro Arcuri ◽  
Nicolas Lanchier
Keyword(s):  
Communication Network ◽  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Social Insects ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Interacting Particle Systems ◽  
Particle Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interacting Particle ◽  
Vertex Set ◽  
The Cost

Motivated by the study of social insects, we introduce a stochastic model based on interacting particle systems in order to understand the effect of communication on the division of labor. Members of the colony are located on the vertex set of a graph representing a communication network. They are characterized by one of two possible tasks, which they update at a rate equal to the cost of the task they are performing by either defecting by switching to the other task or cooperating by anti-imitating a random neighbor in order to balance the amount of energy spent in each task. We prove that, at least when the probability of defection is small, the division of labor is poor when there is no communication, better when the communication network consists of a complete graph, but optimal on bipartite graphs with bipartite sets of equal size, even when both tasks have very different costs. This shows a non-monotonic relationship between the number of connections in the communication network and how well individuals organize themselves to accomplish both tasks equally.

Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures

2006 ◽  
Vol 48 (03) ◽  
pp. 125-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Steering Committee ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Status ◽  
Advantageous Position

Abstract Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policymaking with evidence from Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Majority leaders in the Argentine and Chilean lower chambers have successfully blocked passage of legislation opposed by most of their fellow partisans despite the lack of codified gatekeeping rights. Since 1997, none of the major Mexican parties has benefited from the gatekeeping rights established in the rules. Instead, the benefits have come from the parties' advantageous position with respect to the other parties on the steering committee setting the plenary agenda.

scholarly journals Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongmin Chen ◽  
Xinyu Hua
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Product Liability ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
The Other ◽  
Market Environment ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Potential Gain ◽  
Safety Investment ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract A firm’s incentive to invest in product safety is affected by both market environment and product liability. We investigate the relationship between competition and product liability in a spatial model of oligopoly, where reputation provides a market incentive for safety investment and higher liability may distort consumers’ incentive for product care. We find that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate firms to make safety investment. Increased competition due to less product differentiation diminishes a firm’s gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desired product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces the benefit from maintaining reputation, but has a non-monotonic effect on the potential gain from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured. (JEL L13, L15, K13)

scholarly journals Zelensky's Image in Russian and Ukrainian News: Presidential Campaign 2019 in Ukraine

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1(28)) ◽  
pp. 62-76
Author(s):  
Katrin Dkhair ◽  
Polina Klochko
Keyword(s):  
Network Analysis ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Topic Modeling ◽  
Native Language ◽  
Presidential Campaign ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Campaign ◽  
History Of ◽  
Academic Resources

The work explores the portrayal of the sixth president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Russian and Ukrainian media sources during the pre-electoral campaign in 2019. The study used network analysis, n-grams’ generation, and LDA-based topic modeling. The study reveals that Russia’s media focused on Zelensky as a media personality, while Ukrainian sources paid attention to the portrayal of a novel popular politician. The target audience of the candidate’s campaign was the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. Media in Ukraine’s native language were more inclined to mention elections, the role of the other candidate Petro Poroshenko and the nationalist mood, while defining Zelensky as just an ordinary candidate in an electoral race. The article is based on academic resources concerning the history of the development of political and media contexts in Ukraine, paying particular attention to agenda-setting, framing and priming techniques, and the personality of Volodymyr Zelensky.

scholarly journals Presentation of the Political Agenda in the News Programs of Lithuanian TV channels

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Martyna Bajorinaitė ◽  
Marija Keršanskienė ◽  
Ligita Luščiauskaitė ◽  
Indrė Petronytė ◽  
Valdonė Rudenkienė ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Selection Criteria ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Public ◽  
News Selection ◽  
News Programs ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Made In

The authors of the article investigate how the parliamentary agenda is reflected in the agenda-setting. They determined the study period and examined how many decisions made in the Parliament are on the agenda of Lithuanian television channels. The study showed that the agenda of the Seimas of Lithuania occupies a very small part of the schedule of media topics. The researchers relied on journalistic criteria for the selection of information – novelty, relevance and conflict. According to them, the criteria by which journalists choose news are not very clear. Sometimes the selected news does not match any –novelty, relevance, or conflict criterion, and sometimes only one of them. However, the criterion of conflict should be considered dominant. Let‘s do it the premise that scandalous news is of most interest to the public. On the other hand, the fact that journalists take the news of a press release already prepared by the Parliament also partly explains the fact of non-compliance with the news selection criteria.

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