Bargaining Power and Trade Liberalization: European External Trade Policies in the 1960s

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 645-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Dür
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
John (Jianqiu) Bai

This paper studies how firms’ internal organization shapes the impact of international trade. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census and a difference-in-difference specification, I find that, relative to standalone firms, conglomerates are more likely to restructure after trade liberalization episodes, focusing on their core competency and improving firm productivity and product market performance. Adjustments through the extensive margin account for the majority of the productivity growth differential between conglomerates and standalones experiencing trade shocks. Aggregate industry productivity remains relatively unchanged in industries dominated by conglomerates’ core business but decreases significantly in others. My findings suggest that firms’ internal organization has important consequences on the effects of trade policies. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.


The world food and agricultural situation in the 1980s must be looked at, as now, in terms of the division between developed and developing countries. While there will still be problems in the developed countries - such as surpluses - the great crisis will remain in the developing countries. The most obvious feature of the crisis is the balance between the increase in population and the increase in food production. In the 1960s, the balance was extremely precarious and, in the first two years of the 1970s, population actually grew faster than production. Hence, it is imperative to accelerate the increase in production in the developing countries. In order to achieve this, it is important to see to what extent the obstacles are due to lack of knowledge on how to obtain more from natural resources - primarily a technological problem - and to what extent they are due to the weaknesses of human institutions and of the political will for change. In addition, the prospects for a more rational and hopeful world food and agricultural situation in the 1980s will depend very largely on how the national agricultural production and trade policies of both developed and developing countries can be modified by practical steps towards international agricultural adjustment for the benefit of all.


Author(s):  
Yi-min Lin

Chapter 6 extends the analysis of local state actions to the privatization function of FDI. The focal issue is how and why foreign investors were able to overcome centrally imposed regulatory and policy constraints on their entry, expansion, and organization before trade liberalization associated with China’s WTO accession in 2001. Again, rule bending by local governments was the centerpiece of the story. As in the case of locales experiencing early privatization, local officials took calculated political risk by using economic hardship and the benefits of FDI for addressing revenue and employment imperatives as justifications. The extent of their deviations from centrally set boundaries nevertheless varied, depending greatly on the bargaining power of local political leaders vis-à-vis their supervising authorities. In particular, whether a locale was perceived as a major fiscal burden or an important resource contributor to higher-level authorities was an important differentiating factor.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Maggi ◽  
Robert W. Staiger

We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a “property rule” or a “liability rule.” High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiated. With a cost of renegotiation, property rules are favored when this cost is higher, reversing a central conclusion of the law-and-economics literature. (JEL C78, D86, F13, F15, K12)


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraldine E. Nzeribe ◽  
Chinecherem M. Uzonwanne ◽  
Uju R. Ezenekwe

The quest for a self-reliant and industrialised economy made Nigeria adopt several policies, over the years, towards opening up the economy to the industrialised world. The 1986 structural adjustment programme and other successive reforms were aimed at liberalising the economy. This study, using the ARDL bounds testing approach and interaction of trade liberalization dummy with trade openness, investigates if trade liberalization led to industrialization or de-industrialisation during the period under review and finds that trade liberalisation actually led to de-industrialisation but the interaction of trade liberalization and trade openness has positive effect on industrialization. The study recommends that liberalization of the economy should be handled with caution and should be accompanied by dynamic and flexible trade policies that will boost exports, especially industrial exports


2008 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID TODD

ABSTRACTThe international diffusion of ideas has often been described as an abstract process. John Bowring's career offers a different insight into the practical conditions that permitted a concept, free trade, to spread across national borders. An early advocate of trade liberalization in Britain, Bowring promoted free trade policies in France, Italy, Germany, Egypt, Siam, and China between 1830 and 1860. He employed different strategies according to local political conditions, appealing to public opinion in liberal Western Europe, seeking to persuade bureaucrats and absolute rulers in Central Europe and the Middle East, and resorting to gunboats in East Asia. His career also helps to connect the rise of free trade ideas in Europe with the ‘imperialism of free trade’ in other parts of the world. Bowring upheld the same liberal ideals as Richard Cobden and other luminaries of the free trade movement. Yet unlike them, he endorsed imperial ascendancy in order to remove obstacles to global communications and spread civilization outside Europe.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALIREZA NAGHAVI

ABSTRACTThis paper studies the impact of a World Trade Organization withdrawal of trade concessions against countries that fail to respect globally recognized environmental standards. We show that a punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade policies are endogenous. When required standards are not too stringent with respect to the marginal damage of pollution, compliance along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. A positive optimal tariff in the case of non-compliance prevents complete relocation to pollution havens, but only works as a successful credible threat and does not emerge in equilibrium.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document