Saving face in diplomacy: A political sociology of face-to-face interactions in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 672-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepak Nair

Face-saving is a ubiquitous yet under-theorized phenomenon in International Relations. Prevailing accounts refer to face-saving as a shorthand for status and reputation, as a “cultural” trait found outside Euro-American societies, and as a technique for defusing militarized inter-state crisis, without, however, an explanation of its source and repertoire. In this article, I argue that it is possible to recover face-saving from cultural essentialism, and that face-saving practices geared to avoid embarrassment are micro-level mechanisms that produce international institutions like diplomacy. Drawing on the work of sociologists Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu, I propose a theory of face-saving that accounts for its source, effects, and variation. I evaluate this theory with a study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a diplomacy that has long espoused a discourse of “saving face” couched in Asian cultural exceptionalism. I combine a political sociology of ASEAN’s ruling regimes with an ethnography of its diplomats based on 13 consecutive months of fieldwork in Jakarta, Indonesia, to substantiate this wider theoretical argument. I demonstrate that, first, ASEAN’s face-saving practices are rooted in the legacies of authoritarianism rather than essentialist “culture,” and, second, that face-saving practices enable performances of sovereign equality, diplomatic kinship, and conflict avoidance among ASEAN’s diplomats. This article grants a distinct conceptual space to face-saving in International Relations, contributes to international practice theory by situating practices in the context of state–society relations, and offers a novel interpretation of what the “ASEAN Way” of doing diplomacy looks like in practice.

Author(s):  
Xiaoyu Pu

China plays a variety of status games, sometimes emphasizing its status as an emerging great power and other times highlighting its status as a fragile developing country. The reasons for this are unclear. Drawing on original Chinese sources, social psychological theories, and international relations theories, this book provides a theoretically informed analysis of China’s global rebranding and repositioning in the twenty-first century. Contrary to offensive realism and power transition theory, the book argues that China is not always a status maximizer eager to replace the United States as the new global leader. Differing from most constructivist and psychological studies that focus on the status seeking of rising powers, this study develops a theory of status signaling that combines both rationalist and constructivist insights. The book argues that Chinese leaders face competing pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. The book suggests that China’s continual struggle for international status is primarily driven by domestic political calculations. Meanwhile, at the international level, China is concerned about over-recognition of its status for instrumental reasons. The theoretical argument is illustrated through detailed analysis of Chinese foreign policy. Examining major cases such as China’s military transformation, China’s regional diplomacy, and China’s global diplomacy during the 1997 Asian and 2008 global financial crises, this book makes important contributions to international relations theory and Asian studies.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

The purpose of this chapter is to show the limits of existing IR approaches to the question of how leaders can accurately interpret signals that are aimed at communicating their peaceful intent. The book’s argument is that it requires trust between sender and receiver for accurate signal interpretation and that this trust develops through face-to-face interaction and the process of bonding it makes possible. The five approaches to trust-building that are discussed in the chapter are: (1) ‘leap in the dark’; (2) incrementalist; (3) identity; (4) individualist; and (5) interpersonal. The chapter argues that none of these approaches adequately explains how trust can build between enemies, and hence how signals that are aimed at communicating peaceful intent can be accurately interpreted.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER M. R. STIRK

AbstractAlthough the Westphalian model takes many forms the association of Westphalian and sovereign equality is a prominent one. This article argues firstly that sovereign equality was not present as a normative principle at Westphalia. It argues further that while arguments for sovereign equality were present in the eighteenth century they did not rely on, or even suggest, a Westphalian provenance. It was, for good reasons, not until the late nineteenth century that the linkages of Westphalia and sovereign equality became commonplace, and even then sovereign equality and its linkage with Westphalia were disputed. It was not until after the Second World War, notably through the influential work of Leo Gross that the linkage of Westphalia and sovereign equality became not only widely accepted, but almost undisputed until quite recently. The article concludes by suggesting that not only did Gross bequeath a dubious historiography but that this historiography is an impediment to contemporary International Relations.


Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

This chapter discusses the fundamental principles governing international relations. The principles represent the fundamental set of standards on which States are united and which allow a degree of relatively smooth international dealings. They make up the apex of the whole body of international legislation. They constitute overriding legal standards that may be regarded as the constitutional principles of the international community. These principles are: the sovereign equality of States; the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs; the prohibition of the threat or use of force; peaceful settlement of international disputes; the duty to co-operate; the principle of good faith; self-determination of peoples; respect for human rights; and the prevention of significant environmental harm. The discussions then turn to the distinguishing traits of the fundamental principles and the close link between the principles and the need for their co-ordination.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-132
Author(s):  
Rousiley C. M. Maia ◽  
Danila Cal ◽  
Janine Bargas ◽  
Neylson J. B. Crepalde

AbstractReal-world political discussions usually mix reason-giving and storytelling in complex ways, but the interplay between these practices remains essentially unexamined. This article builds a theoretical argument based on a systemic approach for investigating such forms of communication in institutionally organized forums and informal settings alike. It contends that generalizations should not be made about the role of giving reasons and telling stories for good deliberation. A distinctive analytical framework is developed for examining these practices when deliberation is high quality, low quality, or changing (high to low or low to high). Drawing on data about discussions on reducing the criminal responsibility age in Brazil in legislative public hearings and face-to-face groups, the analysis uncovers variations in the structure of reasons and stories and shifts in their functions in optimal and suboptimal moments of deliberation. By incorporating the pragmatic dimension of interactions into the analysis, this paper contributes to advancing comparative analyses in different contexts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Öner Buçukcu

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kennedy Graham

Things change with the passage of time. In the late decades of the 20th century, international relations were naturally founded on 20th-century thought – the nation state as dominant actor; sovereign equality as central principle; international organisation as neutral arena; politicalmilitary strategy as guarantor of peace and security; selfdetermination, economic and social development and human rights as emerging norms. The United Nations Charter was the lodestar, despite the paralysis of the Cold War. The challenge was to make the charter work politically.


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