scholarly journals The personal is global political: The antifeminist backlash in the United Nations

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 702-714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Cupać ◽  
Irem Ebetürk

Antifeminist mobilisation is growing in the United Nations. It is led by a coalition of certain post-Soviet, Catholic, and Islamic states; the United States; the Vatican; conservative nongovernmental organisations, occasionally joined by the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, the League of Arab States, the UN Africa Group, and the G77. Uniting them is the aim of restoring the ‘natural family’ and opposing ‘gender ideology’. The group has become increasingly strategic, and its impact can already be seen in a number of UN fora, including the Security Council. By surveying feminist notions of backlash and comparing them to Alter and Zürn’s definition of ‘backlash politics’, the article gauges whether the group’s activities can be characterised as such politics. The conclusion is that they can, suggesting that we are looking at a group with the potential to alter not only the global course of women’s rights but also how politics is done within the UN.

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.


1947 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-343

The last of the main organs of the United Nations to begin functioning, the Trusteeship Council met for its first session at Lake Success on March 26, 1947. Representatives were present from five powers administering trust territories (Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand and United Kingdom) and four non-administering states (China, Iraq, Mexico, and the United States); the USSR, although automatically a member of the Council by virtue of her permanent membership on the Security Council, did not designate a representative and took no part in the activities of the Council.


1976 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 470-491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Gross

The United States and some other members of the United Nations have been concerned in recent years about the substance of some resolutions of the General Assembly and the procedures by which they were adopted. Their concern was intensified by certain actions at the twenty-ninth session, when the Assembly sustained a ruling of its President with respect to the representation and participation of South Africa in that and future sessions, when it curbed the right of Israel to participate in the debate on the question of Palestine, when it accorded to the representative of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) a treatment usually reserved to the head of a member state, and when it declared by Resolution 3210 (XXIX) of October 14, 1974, “that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine” and invited the PLO “to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 259-263
Author(s):  
Veronica L. Taylor

As we meet in 2018, it is nearly thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; seventeen years have passed since the terrorist attacks in the United States of September 11, 2001; and it is nearly fifteen years since the United Nations promulgated its definition of rule of law in 2004.


Author(s):  
Marina E. Henke

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).


1966 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-431

Amendments to Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on December 17, 1963, came into force on August 31, 1965. The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The amendment to Article 61 enlarges the membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from eighteen to 27.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Glennon

Does Security Council Resolution 678, read in conjunction with the United Nations Charter, confer authority on the President under United States domestic law to introduce the United States Armed Forces into hostilities? The operative part of the resolution provides that the Security Council:1.Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;2.Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;3.Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;4.Requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution;5.Decides to remain seized of the matter.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-551

In Korea the government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of theUnited Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38thparallel. This they have not done, but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war.


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