The epistemics of advice-giving sequences: Epistemic primacy and subordination in advice rejection

Although advice is routinely offered in ordinary conversation, commentators and analysts have treated it as a special or delicate type of action, noticing a number of challenges associated with both providing and receiving it. In this article, I first describe the most basic social-sequential context for giving advice and explicate how the formulations speakers use to offer advice are adapted to the distinct epistemic configurations (and other characteristics) that characterize that context. Drawing on Jefferson and Lee’s (1992) observations regarding ‘troubles tellings’, I argue that speakers typically offer advice when a co-participant reports an insoluble trouble or problem to one who (may or claims to) possess special knowledge about the domain of trouble. I show how this epistemic configuration constitutes a ‘home environment’ for advice-giving (i.e. a place where advice may be relevantly offered) and discuss how speakers vary the design of their advice (e.g. using different grammatical forms) to adapt to the sequential environments that entail different epistemic configurations. Finally, I consider how alternative, contrasting responses to advice manage (e.g. by ratifying or challenging) the epistemic framework set in motion by advice-giving.