Raymond Aron and nuclear war

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Barry Cooper
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Strategic Thinking ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Raymond Aron ◽  
The Impact

Raymond Aron began his studies of postwar politics by taking into consideration the impact of the atomic bombing of Japan by the United States. As was true of many strategic thinkers after 1945, he was concerned that the new technology would alter the significance of warfare and thus of politics — because, as a student of Clausewitz, Aron was of the view that war and politics were intimately connected. This paper explores the evolution of Aron’s thinking from 1945 until the 1980s and the development and changes in nuclear strategy. Alone in France, and almost alone in Europe, Aron kept abreast of changes in American nuclear strategy and made some insightful, if commonsensical, analyses of the then secret strategic thinking of the Soviets as well as of the European NATO allies of the United States.

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Empirical Record

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”

The Impact of the Implementation of The North American Datum of 1983 (NAD 83) on Aeronautical Navigation in the United States

1993 ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Ronald M. Bolton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North American ◽  
Traffic Control ◽  
Reference System ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Geodetic Reference System ◽  
The North ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Impact

On October 15, 1992, the horizontal geodetic reference system used for all aeronautical charts and chart-related products published by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/National Ocean Service (NOS) changed from the North American Datum of 1927 (NAO 27) to the North American Datum of 1983 (NAO 83). The Global Positioning System (GPS) now allows satellites to define much more accurately geographic locations in terms of latitude and longitude, utilizing an earth centered reference system; the NAO 83 is based on this new technology. As a result, the latitude and longitude of almost all points in the National Airspace System (NAS) were revised. The greatest coordinate s hifts were in Hawaii and Alaska where latitude moved by as much as 1200 feet and longitude by up to 950 feet. In the conterminous U.S., the largest changes were approximately 165 feet in latitude and 345 feet in longitude. The impact to aeronautical navigation in the C.S. of the datum shift from NAO 27 to NAO 83 was not limited to aeronautical charts and related publications. All Flight Management Systems (FMSs) and Air Traffic Control Systems (ATCs) had to be modified to accept and utilize the NAO 83 coordinates. The impact of the implementation of NAO 83 on aeronautical navigation in the United States was s gnificant.

Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States Imperative

1982 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Rene Beres
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ◽  
Comprehensive Test ◽  
Test Ban ◽  
Active Preparation

This paper argues that current US nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war fighting. The proponents of this counterforce strategy claim it is necessary to make US deterrence more credible. The author rejects this claim and shows how US strategy actually degrades US security. Moreover, the author contends that it actually encourages nuclear war because it is based on a number of implausible and contradictory assumptions. After examining these assumptions in detail, the author proposes an alternative strategy for nuclear war avoidance and for improving the likelihood of nuclear disarmament. This strategy involves a comprehensive test ban treaty, joint renunciation of first use, and the establishment of new and more extensive nuclear weapon free zones.

scholarly journals L’évolution de la doctrine nucléaire américaine de contreforce

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Charles-Philippe David
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Strategic Consensus ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Central Purpose ◽  
The U.S

There has been a tendency lately in the United States to talk about the breakdown of the domestic consensus on the purpose of American nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration policies have been largely responsible for the growing felt need by many to question the doctrine and plans underlining that strategy. Why did the erosion of the strategic consensus take place ? One explanation examined in this paper is that the U.S. government has appeared in its nuclear strategy to emphasize more and more counterforce and limited nuclear war plans as its nuclear weapons policy, and therefore has become increasingly receptive to the idea that atomic bombs can be treated like conventional weapons and thought in ways characteristic of the pronuclear world. The central purpose of this article is to analyze how those two phenomenons - the attractiveness of counterforce and the erosion of the strategic consensus - are related to one another. The evolution of the doctrine of counterforce is assessed through a survey of the literature from 1974 to 1984, and particularly from 1980 with the coming to power of the Reagan administration.

scholarly journals Efficiency and Effectiveness Impacts of a Computer-Assisted Scheduling and Dispatching System Implementation

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Metaxatos ◽  
Anthony M. Pagano
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Computer Assisted ◽  
Small City ◽  
System Implementation ◽  
Organizational Changes ◽  
Efficiency And Effectiveness ◽  
Effectiveness And Efficiency ◽  
The Impact

Computer-assisted scheduling and dispatch (CASD) systems have been implemented in many paratransit systems in the United States to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. This paper contributes to the limited literature of studies documenting the impact of such systems on paratransit operations based on the implementation of such a system in a small city in Illinois. The analysis provides evidence of small but measurable efficiency and effectiveness gains. This paper also provides evidence that proper CASD evaluation efforts should allow enough time after implementation so that not only familiarity with the system has been established, but also most or all of the necessary organizational changes related to the new technology have been completed.

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