scholarly journals L’évolution de la doctrine nucléaire américaine de contreforce

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-31
Author(s):  
Charles-Philippe David
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Strategic Consensus ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Central Purpose ◽  
The U.S

There has been a tendency lately in the United States to talk about the breakdown of the domestic consensus on the purpose of American nuclear strategy. The Reagan administration policies have been largely responsible for the growing felt need by many to question the doctrine and plans underlining that strategy. Why did the erosion of the strategic consensus take place ? One explanation examined in this paper is that the U.S. government has appeared in its nuclear strategy to emphasize more and more counterforce and limited nuclear war plans as its nuclear weapons policy, and therefore has become increasingly receptive to the idea that atomic bombs can be treated like conventional weapons and thought in ways characteristic of the pronuclear world. The central purpose of this article is to analyze how those two phenomenons - the attractiveness of counterforce and the erosion of the strategic consensus - are related to one another. The evolution of the doctrine of counterforce is assessed through a survey of the literature from 1974 to 1984, and particularly from 1980 with the coming to power of the Reagan administration.

Ethics, Technology, and Nuclear War, II : How do nuclear weapons affect our military policy?

Worldview ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-5
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Policy ◽  
World War ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
The U.S

Since the end of World War II, the United States has aimed at deterring aggression against this country or its allies by a judicious combination of longlange nuclear striking forces and other forces armed with both nuclear and conventional weapons. (The verb "to deter" is defined as "to inhibit" or, in a more absolute usage, as "to prevent." One of the ambiguities of the concept of deterrence is that no one, including ourselves, is clear as to which usage is meant, much less which may prevail.) Of late years, as the Soviet Union achieved and developed a nuclear capability, deterrence has increasingly rested on the ability of the United States to launch a devastating retaliatory blow against anyone attacking the U.S. or, by extension, our allies.

Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions

2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L. Glaser ◽  
Steve Fetter
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Damage Limitation ◽  
The Cold War

Current U.S. nuclear strategy identifies new nuclear counterforce missions as a means of impeding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy appears to overvalue these counterforce missions. U.S. conventional weapons can destroy most targets that can be destroyed with nuclear weapons; only moderately deep and precisely located targets can be destroyed only by nuclear weapons. In addition, the benefits of nuclear counterforce-which could include deterrence, damage limitation, and the continued ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy objectives-are relatively small, because the United States possesses large nuclear forces and highly effective conventional forces. Finally, nuclear counterforce would bring a variety of costs, including an increased probability of accidental war and unnecessary preemptive attacks in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the case for nuclear counterforce is stronger than during the Cold War, when the enormous size and redundancy of U.S. and Soviet forces rendered counterforce useless. When facing a small nuclear force, the United States may decide to use counterforce to limit damage. Although complex trade-offs are involved, if there are critical targets that can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons, then under a narrow set of conditions the benefits of planning for damage limitation might exceed the dangers. The United States must not, however, rely on nuclear counterforce to support a more assertive foreign policy; doing so would unjustifiably increase the probability of nuclear war.

The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 18-23
Author(s):  
Robert G. Gilpin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Difficult Situation ◽  
Political Spectrum

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theoretical Explanation ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Empirical Record

What kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to defend itself and its allies? According to conventional wisdom, the answer to this question is straightforward: the United States needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and respond with a devastating nuclear counterattack. These arguments are logical and persuasive, but, when compared to the empirical record, they raise an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has consistently maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. How do we make sense of this contradiction? Scholarly deterrence theory, including Robert Jervis’s seminal book, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, argues that the explanation is simple—policymakers are wrong. This book takes a different approach. Rather than dismiss it as illogical, it explains the logic of American nuclear strategy. It argues that military nuclear advantages above and beyond a secure, second-strike capability can contribute to a state’s national security goals. This is primarily because nuclear advantages reduce a state’s expected cost of nuclear war, increasing its resolve, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage, and enhancing nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most intractable puzzles in international security studies. The book also explains why, in a world of growing dangers, the United States must possess, as President Donald J. Trump declared, a nuclear arsenal “at the top of the pack.”

The Madness beyond MAD—Current American Nuclear Strategy

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Past ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
Soviet Force ◽  
Nuclear Policy ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

A rational strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons is a contradiction in terms. The enormity of the destruction, either executed or threatened, severs the nexus of proportionality between means and ends which used to characterize the threat and use of force. This does not mean, however, that all nuclear strategies are equally irrational. The nuclear policy of the Reagan administration—which is essentially the same as that of the Carter administration and which has its roots in developments initiated by even earlier administrations—is particularly ill-formed. As I will demonstrate, the basic reason for this is that the strategy rests on a profound underestimation of the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and attempts to understand the current situation with intellectual tools appropriate only in the pre-nuclear era.American strategy for the past several years—the “countervailing strategy”—has been based on the assumption that what is crucial is the ability of American and allied military forces to deny the Soviets military advantage from any aggression they might contemplate. The U.S. must be prepared to meet and block any level of Soviet force. The strategy is then one of counterforce—blocking and seeking to destroy Soviet military power. The goal is deterrence. Although it is concerned with how the U.S. would fight many different kinds of wars, both nuclear and non-nuclear, it is not correct to claim that the strategy seeks to engage in wars rather than deter them.

The continuing threat of nuclear war

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Cirincione
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The North ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The World ◽  
Nuclear Winter

The American poet Robert Frost famously mused on whether the world will end in fire or in ice. Nuclear weapons can deliver both. The fire is obvious: modern hydrogen bombs duplicate on the surface of the earth the enormous thermonuclear energies of the Sun, with catastrophic consequences. But it might be a nuclear cold that kills the planet. A nuclear war with as few as 100 hundred weapons exploded in urban cores could blanket the Earth in smoke, ushering in a years-long nuclear winter, with global droughts and massive crop failures. The nuclear age is now entering its seventh decade. For most of these years, citizens and officials lived with the constant fear that long-range bombers and ballistic missiles would bring instant, total destruction to the United States, the Soviet Union, many other nations, and, perhaps, the entire planet. Fifty years ago, Nevil Shute’s best-selling novel, On the Beach, portrayed the terror of survivors as they awaited the radioactive clouds drifting to Australia from a northern hemisphere nuclear war. There were then some 7000 nuclear weapons in the world, with the United States outnumbering the Soviet Union 10 to 1. By the 1980s, the nuclear danger had grown to grotesque proportions. When Jonathan Schell’s chilling book, The Fate of the Earth, was published in 1982, there were then almost 60,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled with a destructive force equal to roughly 20,000 megatons (20 billion tons) of TNT, or over 1 million times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. President Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ anti-missile system was supposed to defeat a first-wave attack of some 5000 Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 missile warheads streaking over the North Pole. ‘These bombs’, Schell wrote, ‘were built as “weapons” for “war”, but their significance greatly transcends war and all its causes and outcomes. They grew out of history, yet they threaten to end history. They were made by men, yet they threaten to annihilate man’.

Rational Superiority, Crises, and Arms Control, 1961–1963

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Rhetoric ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Test Ban

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.

Theater Missile Defenses: Possible Chinese Reactions; U.S. Implications and Options. By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-154 S, 23 February 1994. 4pp.] - Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications and Options for the United State By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 94-422 S, 25 March 1994. 22pp.] - China in World Affairs – U.S. Policy Choice By Robert G. Sutter, [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-265 S, 31 January 1995. 19pp.] - China After Deng Xiaoping – Implications for the United States. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-465 S, 7 April 1995. 27pp.] - China Policy: Managing U.S.–PRC–Taiwan Relations after President Lee′s visit to the U.S. By Robert G. Sutter, with the assistance of James Casey Sullivan. [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress No. 95-727 S, 19 June 1995. 5pp.]

1996 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 643-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxane D. V. Slsmanidis
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
China Policy ◽  
United State ◽  
Congressional Research ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Research Service

scholarly journals Modern Transatlantic Relations: Key Challenges for US and Russian Interests

2021 ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Sergey Rogov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Military Spending ◽  
The United States ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Economic Support ◽  
The Us ◽  
Economic Contribution ◽  
The Baltic ◽  
The U.S

In his presentation, the speaker focuses on the problems in relations between the United States and its European NATO allies. Firstly, he talks about the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, that Sergey M. Rogov considers the first serious defeat of the Western countries since the foundation of NATO. At the same time, he notes the significant military and economic contribution of the U.S. allies to the operation in Afghanistan, and the fact that the US did not take into account the opinion of its allies as well as the issues that may await European countries and the alliance as a whole in this regard. Second, the speaker notes the huge difference in military spending and military capabilities between the United States and the European allies, and concludes that NATO countries will continue to be militarily dependent on the United States. In nuclear sphere, despite the approval of the START III extension by the Biden administration, European countries did not actively resist the collapse of the INF Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. The forthcoming deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Baltic states will further exacerbate of the NATO-Russia crisis. J. Biden's support for the sole purpose concept, which to certain extent implies no first use of nuclear weapons, jeopardizes the U.S. security obligations towards its European allies. Fourth, there is the problem of "new" NATO members, which make minimal contribution to common security, but require economic support and protection from possible Russian aggression. In conclusion, the problem of the U.S.-China confrontation is considered, where the US is actively seeking to involve European countries.

Atoms for Peace in Latin America

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gisela Mateos ◽  
Edna Suárez-Díaz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Atomic Energy ◽  
Latin American Countries ◽  
The U.S

On December 8, 1953, in the midst of increasing nuclear weapons testing and geopolitical polarization, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for Peace initiative. More than a pacifist program, the initiative is nowadays seen as an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. As such, it pursued several ambitious goals, and Latin America was an ideal target for most of them: to create political allies, to ease fears of the deadly atomic energy while fostering receptive attitudes towards nuclear technologies, to control and avoid development of nuclear weapons outside the United States and its allies, and to open or redirect markets for the new nuclear industry. The U.S. Department of State, through the Foreign Operations Administration, acted in concert with several domestic and foreign middle-range actors, including people at national nuclear commissions, universities, and industrial funds, to implement programs of regional technical assistance, education and training, and technological transfer. Latin American countries were classified according to their stage of nuclear development, with Brazil at the top and Argentina and Mexico belonging to the group of “countries worthy of attention.” Nuclear programs often intersected with development projects in other areas, such as agriculture and public health. Moreover, Eisenhower’s initiative required the recruitment of local actors, natural resources and infrastructures, governmental funding, and standardized (but localized techno-scientific) practices from Latin American countries. As Atoms for Peace took shape, it began to rely on newly created multilateral and regional agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Nevertheless, as seen from Latin America, the implementation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was reinterpreted in different ways in each country. This fact produced different outcomes, depending on the political, economic, and techno-scientific expectations and interventions of the actors involved. It provided, therefore, an opportunity to create local scientific elites and infrastructure. Finally, the peaceful uses of atomic energy allowed the countries in the region to develop national and international political discourses framing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean signed in Tlatelolco, Mexico City, in 1967, which made Latin America the first atomic weapons–free populated zone in the world.

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