Mpt in the Air Force

1986 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 1294-1295
Author(s):  
John Speigel ◽  
Mike Skinner

The Air Force recognizes the importance of Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) issues in weapon system acquisition. To give supportability of future weapon systems equal consideration to cost, schedule, and performance of the system, the Air Force has set out to build an integration system to monitor MPT issues.


1988 ◽  
Vol 32 (18) ◽  
pp. 1251-1255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Potempa ◽  
Frank C. Gentner

Manpower, personnel, training and safety (MPTS) analysis is currently inconsistent and incomplete in its application to Air Force acquisitions. While many problems are managerial, MPTS analysis also suffers from a lack of adequate tools and data bases to analyze weapon system design, project MPTS requirements and suggest trade-offs. These problems are particularly acute in the early phases of the weapon system acquisition process (WSAP), making it difficult to influence design during this critical period. To improve MPTS analysis, a study is being conducted by the Air Force to define a comprehensive and integrated MPTS analytic system for use in the WSAP. The study is identifying what MPTS decisions need to be made in the WSAP, when they need to be made, and how they are interrelated. Current capabilities are then being determined by analyzing the tools and data bases available to support each MPTS decision. The analysis will identify needed improvements to existing tools and data bases and whether new ones need to be developed. This paper discusses the requirement for an improved MPTS system and then describes a variety of managerial and technical initiatives being undertaken to satisfy the requirement. The last section identifies the desired characteristics of an effective MPTS system.



Author(s):  
Jon R. Lindsay

This chapter investigates the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), the analogue to the Fighter Command Ops Room in the modern U.S. Air Force. The air force formally designates the CAOC as a weapon system, even as it is basically just a large office space with hundreds of computer workstations, conference rooms, and display screens. The CAOC is an informational weapon system that coordinates all of the other weapon systems that actually conduct air defense, strategic attack, close air support, air mobility and logistics, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). One might be tempted to describe the CAOC as “a center of calculation,” but modern digital technology tends to decenter information practice. Representations of all the relevant entities and events in a modern air campaign reside in digital data files rather than a central plotting table. The relevant information is fragmented across collection platforms, classified networks, and software systems that are managed by different services and agencies. Thus, in each of the four major U.S. air campaigns from 1991 to 2003, CAOC personnel struggled with information friction. They rarely used the mission planning systems that were produced by defense contractors as planned, and they improvised to address emerging warfighting requirements.



1988 ◽  
Vol 32 (16) ◽  
pp. 1100-1103
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Malone ◽  
Clifford C. Baker

The U.S. Navy is developing methods for integrating the disciplines concerned with personnel considerations into the weapon system acquisition process. This integration essentially involves human factors engineering, manpower, personnel and training, and life support engineering. Since the Navy already has the HARDMAN methodology in place to ensure that manpower, personnel and training concerns are addressed early in system development, the process of integration of personnel issues will involve expanding the HARDMAN methods and data to include human factors engineering and life support engineering, resulting in the Enhanced HARDMAN process. This paper describes the objectives of Enhanced HARDMAN.



2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-208
Author(s):  
Seungmok Lee

With the advent of the Fourth Revolution, military weapon systems are also being advanced. In particular, as the proportion of software embedded in these weapon systems increases, the cyber vulnerabilities of advanced weapon systems also gradually increase. If cutting-edge weapons stop abruptly or malfunction owing to software defects or cyberattacks, they will adversely affect defense security as well as combat power and economic losses. The U.S. DoD is implementing the risk management framework (RMF) to cope with cyber vulnerabilities and threats. RMF is a risk management (RM)-based framework that classifies the cyber vulnerabilities of weapon systems based on data and evaluates them according to confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The application of RMF to the Korean military's weapon-system acquisition procedure is still in its infancy. In this study, we studied the application of the RMF to weapon acquisition processors in the U.S. DoD and suggested that measures of availability, reliability, and safety that can affect weapon performance should be managed with security, and that security systems should be applied to reliability, availability, and maintenance (RAM).



1986 ◽  
Vol 30 (13) ◽  
pp. 1286-1286
Author(s):  
Eleanor L. Criswell

The goal of this symposium is to present the status and future directions of programs aimed at consideration of human factors early in military system design. Military initiatives of this nature are not new, but in the past they have not become integral parts of the military system acquisition process. Recent programs in each service, however, reflect more serious and in-depth attempts to use human factors data to influence and evaluate system design than has been the case in the past. The Army now requires MANPRINT analyses, Navy HARDMAN analyses are mandated, and the Air Force is now pilot testing its own program called MPTIS. This symposium consists of introductory remarks by Dr. Joseph Peters of Science Applications International Corporation, and papers from LTC William 0. Blackwood, HQ Department of the Army, CDR George S. Council, Jr., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and COL AI Grieshaber, HQ, U. S. Air Force. Dr. Peters' paper, “Human Factors Issues in Military System Design,” defines “human factors” as a combination of human factors engineering, biomedical engineering, manpower/personnel, and training elements. The paper presents three measures of success of human factors programs early in system acquisition: long-lasting policy, committed management, and availability of scientific technology for program Implementation and evaluation. LTC Blackwood's paper discusses the importance the Army places on its MANPRINT program. MANPRINT program history, status, and possible program evolution are addressed. CDR Council's paper addresses the potential for the addition of human factors to the Navy HARDMAN program which addresses manpower, personnel, and training. CDR Council suggests that human factors advocates present a human factors program which is clearly defined and limited in scope to render it easily appreciated by Navy management, and that advocates can benefit from lessons learned during the institutionalization of HARDMAN. COL Grieshaber's paper “MPT in the Air Force” describes a pilot MPT (manpower, personnel, training) program at Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright Patterson AFB. This program will analyze aircraft system designs for their MPT requirements, suggest design changes where requirements exceed Air Force availabilities, and assess design changes for their MPT impact.



2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 282
Author(s):  
Giseop Noh ◽  
Hayoung Oh

As the complexity of weapon systems has grown exponentially during the past few years, initial operation capability has been a crucial factor for military forces. Concurrent spare parts (CSPs) is the quantity of spare parts ensuring initial operating period specified by demanding forces acquiring newly deployed weapon systems. Because of the growth of system complexity, recommending precise CSP is not trivial. The Republic of Korea developed an improved CSP recommendation system and deployed the system for naval weapon systems. In this paper, we increase the prediction accuracy of CSP up to 23.1 per cent and 7.16 per cent higher in terms of budget constraint and operational availability (Ao) constraint. The main improvement is achieved by facilitating simulations using the real field data from Korean air force. Also, we propose two validation approaches and show the possibility of extension to the general weapon systems. From the experimental study, we show that the CSP recommendation system can be deployed for navy and air forces.



Author(s):  
Carl R Parson ◽  
John O Miller ◽  
Jeffery D Weir

This research develops a discrete event simulation to investigate factors that affect key Air Force (AF) metrics for gauging the health of the AF spares supply chain and the impact on maintaining the mission capability of individual weapon systems. We focus on the unscheduled maintenance actions at a single air base for a single weapon system – the B-1 Bomber. A notional fleet of 16 aircraft at a single air base is modeled based on historical supply and maintenance data. To identify and quantify the effects of various factors, an experimental design is used for analyzing the output of our high-level discrete event simulation. This exploration shows we successfully capture several factors that significantly impact the key metrics used for the B-1 and have the potential to significantly increase mission capability for this weapon system.





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