Analysis of Complexity in Nuclear Power Severe Accident Management

Author(s):  
Randall J. Mumaw ◽  
Emilie M. Roth ◽  
Isabelle Schoenfeld

A model of decision making has been developed for nuclear power plant operations and has been previously applied to the analysis of performance during emergency operations. The model was extended to identify the cognitive skills required, the types of complexity that can arise, and the potential for human error in severe accident management (SAM). Twelve SAM scenarios were developed to aid in this analysis. Potential sources of complexity and error are described and illustrated, and implications for training cognitive skills are discussed.

Author(s):  
Randall J. Mumaw ◽  
Emilie M. Roth

We have reviewed training programs for complex skills that have strong decision-making components, such as nuclear power plant operations and air traffic control. In each case, we found that an ISD approach is routinely applied to training-program design. The ISD framework can aid training designers in designing individual modules of instruction but seems to provide insufficient guidance on designing the larger training-program structure. We found two types of problems. First, because a good understanding of skill acquisition is not used to drive training-program design, training activities can be ineffective or inefficient. Second, because it is difficult to get insights on cognitive skills with traditional task analysis, the core decision-making task is not trained explicitly. Trainees are typically on their own to discover decision-making skills. We developed an alternative framework for training-program design called the Functional Context Approach. This approach attempts to restore efficiency to skill acquisition and improve training of critical decision-making skills.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Marko Bohanec ◽  
Ivan Vrbanić ◽  
Ivica Bašić ◽  
Klemen Debelak ◽  
Luka Štrubelj

Author(s):  
Kazufumi Nagashima ◽  
Nakahiro Yasuda

Abstract This paper aims at verifying the current Japanese Emergency Response Guideline, especially the “notification” (reporting) scheme of emergency action level (EAL), through the analysis of the progress of Fukushima nuclear accident. We compared timing and emergency classification between two datasets of the plant statuses which expressed by the old prediction-based notification and the latest EAL-based notification, in order to assess the current EAL scheme along the effectiveness of protective action for the local residents. We observed that the plant statuses expressed by the current EAL-based notification gave more engineering insights in the earliest accident phase to identify the accident scenario. However, potential improvement area of the guideline was also observed in the following severe accident management (SAM) phase after the trigger of first precautionary action, where we are required to reduce uncertainties in both processes of the operator's notification and the government's decision making by evaluating the progression speed of the severe accident.


Author(s):  
Wentao Zhu ◽  
Wenjing Li

After Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, severe accident is getting more and more concerns all over the world. In order to mitigate severe accident and improve the safety of nuclear power plant, two different strategies are applied in different plants. One is in-vessel melt retention strategy, and the other is ex-vessel melt retention strategy. Tianwan nuclear power plant is an improved Gen II nuclear power plant and in-vessel melt retention strategy is adopted in the plant. In order to achieve this strategy, cavity injection system is designed for the plant. Probabilistic Safety Analysis is the most commonly used quantitative risk assessment tool for decision-making in selecting the optimal design among alternative options. For this plant, in order to optimize the design of cavity injection system, improve the safety level of nuclear power plant, and meanwhile, improve the engineering implementation and economization, Level 2 PSA was used for this decision-making process. In this paper, the Level 2 PSA for this plant and the application for the design of cavity injection system are introduced.


Author(s):  
Tamás János Katona ◽  
András Vilimi

Paks Nuclear Power Plant identified the post-Fukushima actions for mitigation and management of severe accidents caused by external events that include updating of some hazard assessments, evaluation of capacity / margins of existing severe accident management facilities, and construction of some mew systems and facilities. In all cases, the basic question was, what level of margin has to be ensured above design basis external hazard effects, and what level of or hazard has to be taken for the design. Paks Nuclear Power Plant developed certain an applicable in the practice concept for the qualification of already implemented and design the new post-Fukushima measures that is outlined in the paper. The concept and practice is presented on several examples.


2005 ◽  
Vol 152 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Te-Chuan Wang ◽  
Shih-Jen Wang ◽  
Jyh-Tong Teng

Author(s):  
Zhiyi Yang ◽  
Yimin Chong ◽  
Chun Li ◽  
Jian Deng ◽  
Xianhong Xu ◽  
...  

After Fukushima nuclear accident, the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) are required according to the policy of the regulatory body in China. Most nuclear power plants (NPPs) in China adopt the technical approach of generic-SAMG of the Westinghouse Owner Group, consisting of severe accident control room guideline (SACRG), diagnostic flow chart (DFC), severe accident guideline (SAG), severe challenge status tree (SCST), severe challenge guideline (SCG), technical support center (TSC) long term monitoring guideline, and SAMG termination guideline (SAEG). A number of issues have been identified during the development of the SAMGs for M310+ NPPs, which is a dominant reactor type in China. The paper discussed these issues and identified some considerations for their resolution.


Author(s):  
L. Sihver ◽  
N. Yasuda

In this paper, the causes and the radiological consequences of the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor occurred at 1:23 a.m. (local time) on Apr. 26, 1986, and of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster following the huge Tsunami caused by the Great East Japan earthquake at 2.46 p.m. (local time) on Mar. 11, 2011 are discussed. The need for better severe accident management (SAM), and severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), are essential in order to increase the safety of the existing and future operating nuclear power plants (NPPs). In addition to that, stress tests should, on a regular basis, be performed to assess whether the NPPs can withstand the effects of natural disasters and man-made failures and actions. The differences in safety preparations at the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi will therefore be presented, as well as recommendations concerning improvements of safety culture, decontamination, and disaster planning. The need for a high-level national emergency response system in case of nuclear accidents will be discussed. The emergency response system should include fast alarms, communication between nuclear power plants, nuclear power authorities and the public people, as well as well-prepared and well-established evacuation plans and evacuation zones. The experiences of disaster planning and the development of a new improved emergency response system in Japan will also be presented together with the training and education program, which have been established to ensure that professional rescue workers, including medical staff, fire fighters, and police, as well as the normal populations including patients, have sufficient knowledge about ionizing radiation and are informed about the meaning of radiation risks and safety.


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