scholarly journals How Many Atheists Are There?

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will M. Gervais ◽  
Maxine B. Najle
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Estimation ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Prevalence Estimates ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Representative Samples

One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain the patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2,000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest U.S. atheist prevalence of only 3–11%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% with greater than .99 probability and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11% were even less credible than estimates of 40%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.

scholarly journals How many atheists are there?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will M Gervais ◽  
Maxine Belén Najle
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Estimation ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Prevalence Estimates ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Representative Samples

One crucible for theories of religion is their ability to predict and explain patterns of belief and disbelief. Yet, religious nonbelief is often heavily stigmatized, potentially leading many atheists to refrain from outing themselves even in anonymous polls. We used the unmatched count technique and Bayesian estimation to indirectly estimate atheist prevalence in two nationally representative samples of 2000 U.S. adults apiece. Widely-cited telephone polls (e.g., Gallup, Pew) suggest USA atheist prevalence of only 3-11%. In contrast, our most credible indirect estimate is 26% (albeit with considerable estimate and method uncertainty). Our data and model predict that atheist prevalence exceeds 11% with greater than .99 probability, and exceeds 20% with roughly .8 probability. Prevalence estimates of 11% were even less credible than estimates of 40%, and all intermediate estimates were more credible. Some popular theoretical approaches to religious cognition may require heavy revision to accommodate actual levels of religious disbelief.

scholarly journals The Origins of Religious Disbelief: A Dual Inheritance Approach

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062199400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will M. Gervais ◽  
Maxine B. Najle ◽  
Nava Caluori
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Cultural Exposure ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Cultural Cues ◽  
Dual Inheritance

Widespread religious disbelief represents a key testing ground for theories of religion. We evaluated the predictions of three prominent theoretical approaches—secularization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance—in a nationally representative (United States, N = 1,417) data set with preregistered analyses and found considerable support for the dual inheritance perspective. Of key predictors of religious disbelief, witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment was the most potent, β = .28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style, β = .13, and less advanced mentalizing, β = .05. Low cultural exposure predicted about 90% higher odds of atheism than did peak cognitive reflection, and cognitive reflection only predicted disbelief among those relatively low in cultural exposure to religion. This highlights the utility of considering both evolved intuitions and transmitted culture and emphasizes the dual roles of content- and context-biased social learning in the cultural transmission of disbelief (preprint https://psyarxiv.com/e29rt/ ).

To What Extent Is Trust a Prerequisite for Charitable Giving? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

2021 ◽  
pp. 089976402110032
Author(s):  
Cassandra M. Chapman ◽  
Matthew J. Hornsey ◽  
Nicole Gillespie
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Actual Behavior ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Representative Samples

Trust is assumed to be important for charitable giving. However, disparate associations have been found, and recent theoretical approaches emphasize motives for giving that do not rely on trust. To resolve this tension, we conducted a systematic review of evidence generated between 1988 and 2020. A meta-analysis of 69 effect sizes from 42 studies sampling 81,604 people in 31 countries confirmed a positive association between trust and giving across diverse measures, r = .22. Meta-regressions showed that organizational ( r = .35) and sectoral trust ( r = .27) were more strongly associated with giving than were generalized ( r = .11) or institutional trust ( r = .14). The relationship was also stronger in non-western (vs Western) countries and in nonrepresentative (vs nationally representative) samples. All evidence was correlational, and few studies measured actual behavior. We discuss implications for theories of trust and for fundraising practice, and highlight critical gaps in evidence.

scholarly journals The Origins of Religious Disbelief: A Dual Inheritance Approach

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will M Gervais ◽  
Maxine Belén Najle ◽  
Nava Caluori
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Religious Commitment ◽  
Dual Roles ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Cultural Exposure ◽  
Theories Of Religion ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Cultural Cues ◽  
Dual Inheritance

Widespread religious disbelief represents a key testing ground for theories of religion. We evaluated the predictions of three prominent theoretical approaches – secularization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance – in a nationally representative (USA, N = 1417) dataset with preregistered analyses, and found considerable support for the dual inheritance perspective. Of key predictors of religious disbelief, witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment was the most potent, β = 0.28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style, β = 0.13, and less advanced mentalizing, β = 0.05. Low cultural exposure predicted about 90% higher odds of atheism than did peak cognitive reflection, and cognitive reflection only predicted disbelief among those relatively low in cultural exposure to religion. This highlights the utility of considering both evolved intuitions and transmitted culture, and emphasizes the dual roles of content- and context-biased social learning in the cultural transmission of disbelief.

Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-605
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Political Orientations ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Political Left ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Representative Samples

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.

Gender and Marital Satisfaction: Data from the National Survey of Families and Households

1998 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter R. Schumm ◽  
Farrell J. Webb ◽  
Stephan R. Bollman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Marital Satisfaction ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Satisfaction Relationship ◽  
Representative Samples ◽  
Small Support

In 1972, Bernard argued that marriage was good for men and bad for women. Subsequent research noted that wives, on average, reported lower marital satisfaction than husbands. Furthermore, when differences within couples existed on marital satisfaction, the wife was usually the less satisfied spouse; however, most previous studies of the gender/marital satisfaction relationship had not been based on nationally representative samples. A nationally representative sample from the 1988 Survey of Families and Households was used to assess the relationship of gender with marital satisfaction. Within-couple analyses indicated that wives were less satisfied with their marriages than husbands and that, when substantial within-couple differences occurred with respect to marital satisfaction, the wife was usually the less satisfied spouse. Results provide at least small support for feminist assertions about the relatively adverse nature of marriage for women in the United States.

scholarly journals National Serosurvey of Cytomegalovirus in Australia

2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 1181-1184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly Seale ◽  
C. Raina MacIntyre ◽  
Heather F. Gidding ◽  
J. L. Backhouse ◽  
Dominic E. Dwyer ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Confidence Interval ◽  
Protective Efficacy ◽  
Vaccination Program ◽  
Age And Gender ◽  
Target Populations ◽  
Long Duration ◽  
Australian Community ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Representative Samples

ABSTRACT In anticipation of the development of a vaccine against cytomegalovirus (CMV), we conducted a large, nationally representative serosurvey to examine the seroprevalence of CMV in Australia. Sera were collected opportunistically from laboratories around Australia. Age- and gender-representative samples were tested for CMV antibody. The population-weighted rate of CMV seropositivity in subjects between 1 and 59 years of age was 57% (95% confidence interval, 55.2 to 58.6%). An association between CMV seroprevalence and increasing age was recognized; however, little overall difference in seroprevalence between the sexes was found. The finding that high levels of CMV exposure occur in the first few years of life suggests that for a universal vaccination program to have maximal impact, the vaccine would need to be delivered to infants and have a long duration of protective efficacy. This is the first national serosurvey looking at cytomegalovirus in the Australian community. This study provides valuable information that can be used to examine the incidence of infection in the community and help focus the administration of a future CMV vaccine to appropriate target populations.

scholarly journals Psychological factors underpinning vaccine willingness in Israel, Japan and Hungary

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Goodwin ◽  
Menachem Ben-Ezra ◽  
Masahito Takahashi ◽  
Lan Anh Nguyen Luu ◽  
Krisztina Borsfay ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Latent Class ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Vaccine Hesitancy ◽  
Effective Vaccine ◽  
Anticipated Regret ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Government ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Representative Samples

The rapid international spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus 19 led to unprecedented attempts to develop and administer an effective vaccine. However, there is evidence of considerable vaccine hesitancy in some countries and sub-populations. We investigated willingness to vaccinate in three nations with historically different levels of vaccine willingness and attitudes to the COVID-19 vaccine rollout: Israel, Japan and Hungary. Employing an ecological-systems approach we analysed associations between demographic factors and health status, individual cognitions, normative pressures, trust in government, belief in COVID-19 myths and willingness to be vaccinated, using data from three nationally representative samples (Israel, N=1011 (Jan 2021); Japan, N= 997 (Feb 2021); Hungary, N=1131 (Apr 2021)). In Israel 74% indicated a willingness to vaccinate, but only 51% in Japan and 31% in Hungary. Results from multigroup regression analyses indicated greater vaccine willingness amongst those who perceived benefits to vaccination, anticipated regret if not vaccinated and trusted the government. Multi-group latent class analysis of ten COVID-19 (mis)beliefs identified three classes of myths, with concerns about the alteration of DNA (Israel), allergies (Hungary) and catching COVID-19 from the vaccine (Japan) specific to vaccine willingness for each culture. Rather than focusing primarily on disease threats, intervention campaigns should focus on increasing trust and addressing culturally specific myths while emphasising the individual and social group benefits of vaccination.

scholarly journals Factors associated with nonessential workplace attendance during the Covid-19 pandemic in the UK in early 2021: evidence from cross-sectional surveys

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Michie ◽  
Henry WW Potts ◽  
Robert West ◽  
Richard Amlot ◽  
Louise E Smith ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Hardship ◽  
Dependent Child ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Psychological Variables ◽  
Sociodemographic Variables ◽  
Key Sectors ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Living Circumstances ◽  
Representative Samples

Background and aims: Working from home where possible is important in reducing spread of Covid-19. In early 2021, a quarter of people in England who believed they could work entirely from home reported attending their workplace. To inform interventions to reduce this, this study examined associated factors. Methods: Data from the ongoing CORSAIR survey series of nationally representative samples of people in the UK aged 16+ years in January-February 2021 were used. The study sample was 1422 respondents who reported that they could work completely from home. The outcome measure was self-reported workplace attendance at least once during the preceding week. Factors of interest were analysed in three blocks: 1) sociodemographic variables, 2) variables relating to circumstances of respondents, and 3) psychological variables. Results: 26.8% (95%CI=24.5%-29.1%) of respondents reported having attended their workplace at least once in the preceding week. Sociodemographic variables and living circumstances significantly independently predicted non-essential workplace attendance: male gender (OR=1.85,95%CI=1.33-2.58), dependent children in the household (OR=1.65,95%CI=1.17-2.32), financial hardship (OR=1.14,95%CI=1.08-1.21), socio-economic grade C2DE (OR=1.74, 95%CI=1.19-2.53), working in sectors such as health or social care (OR=4.18, 95%CI=2.56-6.81), education and childcare (OR=2.45, 95%CI=1.45-4.14) and key public service (OR=3.78, 95%CI=1.83-7.81), and having been vaccinated (OR=2.08,95%CI=1.33-3.24). Conclusions: Non-essential workplace attendance in the UK in early 2021 during the Covid-19 pandemic was significantly independently associated with a range of sociodemographic variables and personal circumstances. Having been vaccinated, financial hardship, socio-economic grade C2DE, having a dependent child at home, working in certain key sectors were associated with higher likelihood of workplace attendance.

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