Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-605
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.

2019 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-533
Author(s):  
Adam M Enders

Abstract  Recent research on conspiracy beliefs reveals that the general predisposition to believe conspiracy theories cuts across partisan and ideological lines. While this may signify that political orientations have no bearing on conspiratorial reasoning, it also may suggest that conspiracy theorists are simply less engaged in traditional left-right politics. In this manuscript, I consider the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and political constraint, or the extent to which individuals have a clear picture of “what goes with what” with respect to the various objects of the political world. Using the 2012 American National Election Study, I construct a measure of conspiratorial thinking, as well as several operationalizations of both ideological and group-based constraint and ideological thinking. Results show that individuals prone to conspiratorial thinking are less politically constrained—when it comes to both thoughts about issues and feelings about political groups—than their less conspiratorial counterparts. Moreover, conspiratorial thinking is positively associated with antigovernmental orientations and a lack of political efficacy, with conspiracy theorists perceiving a governmental threat to individual rights and displaying a deep skepticism that who one votes for really matters. These findings suggest that conspiratorial thinking may have broader implications for individuals’ basic conceptualization of politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 183449092110518
Author(s):  
Paul Bertin ◽  
Sylvain Delouvée

Many conspiracy theories appeared along with the Zika outbreak. While the virus is still circulating, motives underlying Zika conspiracy beliefs remain underexplored. National narcissism has been shown to be a robust social motive predicting conspiracy beliefs about other public health crises. This relationship has been interpreted as conspiracy beliefs protecting one's idealistic national image from the crisis by externally attributing any potential threatening factors. We seek to provide an additional account by proposing that such external projection of grievances is rooted in the ethnocentric tendency to frame one's nation's suffering as central to the crisis. We argue that this inflated perception of victimhood, which we operationalized through exclusive victimhood, legitimizes national narcissists’ expression of their (conspiracy) view of the crisis, hence managing their identity. Based on a representative sample of the French population ( N = 1,104), results confirmed that national narcissism was related to Zika conspiracy beliefs, and that this relationship was mediated by the belief that French people suffered uniquely and more than others from the Zika outbreak. These results held even when controlling for potential confounding variables. We discuss the possible functions of exclusive victimhood in times of global threats, and the defensive role played by conspiracy beliefs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 849-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Steven M. Smallpage ◽  
Robert N. Lupton

While research on conspiracy theories and those who believe them has recently undergone a renaissance, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the measurement of conspiratorial beliefs and orientations, and the consequences of a conspiratorial mindset for expressly political attitudes and behaviors. We first demonstrate, using data from the 2012 American National Election Study, that beliefs in a variety of specific conspiracy theories are simultaneously, but differentially, the product of both a general tendency toward conspiratorial thinking and left/right political orientations. Next, we employ unique data including a general measure of conspiratorial thinking to explore the predictors of specific conspiracy beliefs. We find that partisan and ideological self-identifications are more important than any other variable in predicting ‘birther’ beliefs, while conspiratorial thinking is most important in predicting conspiracy beliefs about the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096366252199802
Author(s):  
Xizhu Xiao ◽  
Porismita Borah ◽  
Yan Su

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation has been circulating on social media and multiple conspiracy theories have since become quite popular. We conducted a U.S. national survey for three main purposes. First, we aim to examine the association between social media news consumption and conspiracy beliefs specific to COVID-19 and general conspiracy beliefs. Second, we investigate the influence of an important moderator, social media news trust, that has been overlooked in prior studies. Third, we further propose a moderated moderation model by including misinformation identification. Our findings show that social media news use was associated with higher conspiracy beliefs, and trust in social media news was found to be a significant moderator of the relationship between social media news use and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, our findings show that misinformation identification moderated the relationship between social media news use and trust. Implications are discussed.


1998 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter R. Schumm ◽  
Farrell J. Webb ◽  
Stephan R. Bollman

In 1972, Bernard argued that marriage was good for men and bad for women. Subsequent research noted that wives, on average, reported lower marital satisfaction than husbands. Furthermore, when differences within couples existed on marital satisfaction, the wife was usually the less satisfied spouse; however, most previous studies of the gender/marital satisfaction relationship had not been based on nationally representative samples. A nationally representative sample from the 1988 Survey of Families and Households was used to assess the relationship of gender with marital satisfaction. Within-couple analyses indicated that wives were less satisfied with their marriages than husbands and that, when substantial within-couple differences occurred with respect to marital satisfaction, the wife was usually the less satisfied spouse. Results provide at least small support for feminist assertions about the relatively adverse nature of marriage for women in the United States.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. e0262022
Author(s):  
Kevin B. Smith

Objectives To quantify the effect of politics on the physical, psychological, and social health of American adults during the four-year span of the Trump administration. Methods A previously validated politics and health scale was used to compare health markers in nationally representative surveys administered to separate samples in March 2017 (N = 800) and October 2020 (N = 700). Participants in the 2020 survey were re-sampled approximately two weeks after the 2020 election and health markers were compared to their pre-election baselines. Results Large numbers of Americans reported politics takes a significant toll on a range of health markers—everything from stress, loss of sleep, or suicidal thoughts to an inability to stop thinking about politics and making intemperate social media posts. The proportion of Americans reporting these effects stayed stable or slightly increased between the spring of 2017 and the fall of 2020 prior to the presidential election. Deterioration in measures of physical health became detectably worse in the wake of the 2020 election. Those who were young, politically interested, politically engaged, or on the political left were more likely to report negative effects. Conclusions Politics is a pervasive and largely unavoidable source of chronic stress that exacted significant health costs for large numbers of American adults between 2017 and 2020. The 2020 election did little to alleviate those effects and quite likely exacerbated them.


Vaccines ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Yang ◽  
Xi Luo ◽  
Hepeng Jia

A large body of research has found that people’s beliefs in conspiracy theories about infectious diseases negatively impacts their health behaviors concerning vaccination. Conspiracy belief-based vaccination hesitancy has become more rampant after the global outbreak of COVID-19. However, some important questions remain unanswered. For instance, do different versions of conspiracy theories—particularly conspiracy theories about the origin of the epidemic (e.g., that the SARS-CoV-2 leaked from a Wuhan virology laboratory or that the virus was of foreign origin) and the general theories about vaccine conspiracies (e.g., pharmaceutical companies covered up the danger of vaccines or people are being deceived about the effectiveness of vaccines)—have the same effect on vaccination intentions? Through a national survey adopting quota sampling in China, the current study tested the relationship between people’s conspiracy beliefs and their intention to receive the COVID-19 vaccination. The findings show that people’s embrace of conspiracy theories did indeed affect their intention to take COVID-19 shots. However, only conspiracy theories related to vaccines had a significant impact, while belief in more general theories about COVID-19 did not significantly affect vaccination intentions. People’s knowledge of vaccines (vaccine literacy) played an important role in this relationship. People with lower beliefs in vaccines conspiracy theories and higher levels of vaccine literacy were more likely to receive the COVID-19 vaccination.


1986 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald D. Lambert ◽  
James E. Curtis ◽  
Steven D. Brown ◽  
Barry J. Kay

AbstractWe report on findings from alternative ways of assessing the meaning given to “left” and “right” by respondents in the 1984 National Election Study. Approximately 40 per cent of the sample supplied definitions of the concepts; in comparison, about 60 per cent stated their feelings toward left-wingers and right-wingers and described their political orientations using a seven-point left/right rating scale. Left signified socialism or communism for about one-half of those who supplied definitions, and dislike for left-wingers seemed to be associated with these conceptions of left. Right, which was much more highly regarded than left, signified conservatism for one-quarter of those who defined the term. We also factor analyzed respondents' self-ratings on the left/right scale along with their answers to 15 attitude statements. Left was weakly associated with support for labour's use of the strike weapon. In a criterion group of respondents who had completed university and who had ventured definitions of left and right, self-ratings correlated with factors tapping attitudes toward the military and toward economic disparity and social welfare. As expected, respondents' ratings of themselves on the left/right scale were more similar to their ratings of their preferred parties than to their ratings of other parties. The relationship between self-ratings and ratings of preferred parties generally varied directly with the strength of party identification. We conclude with some observations about the political utility of political labels such as left and right.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathew Marques ◽  
Mathew Ling ◽  
Matt Williams ◽  
John Kerr ◽  
Jim McLennan

Conspiracism is not restricted to the fringe dwellers of society. International research suggests that such beliefs are quite common and that conspiracy theories may serve three basic psychological motives (i.e., epistemic, existential, and relational) for individuals. Yet, little is known about conspiracy theory awareness or conspiracism in Australasia. We report the first large systematic investigation of system justifying motives using two nationally representative samples of Australians (n = 1,011) and New Zealanders (n = 754). Our findings show that almost all are aware of local and international conspiracies, and the majority endorse one or more. Also, that all three psychological motives consistently relate to conspiracism but not to awareness. In a series of hierarchical multiple regressions, we find that epistemic (i.e., decreased analytic thinking), existential (i.e., less trust in others, and socially conservative political ideology and increased religiosity), and relational motives (i.e., increased anomie and disillusionment with the government) were all significant unique predictors of increased local and international conspiracism. Findings are discussed in terms of the importance of understanding conspiracism as an ideological belief system that may function to serve underlying psychological motives.


Author(s):  
S. Erdem Aytaç

This chapter examines the relationship between religiosity and political attitudes in Turkey during the incumbency of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). There were several restrictions on the public role and visibility of Islam in Turkey when the AKP came to power in 2002, and the party gradually lifted these restrictions over time. Did this change in the state’s policies and approach toward religion affect the political attitudes of devout Muslims? Analyses of a series of nationally representative surveys spanning the period 2002–2018 highlight that the AKP governments’ positive approach to Islamic religiosity in public life led to a rapprochement of devout Muslims with the political regime. There is no evidence that this rapprochement has been accompanied by a more pluralistic understanding of democracy, however, as more religious individuals tend to hold more populist attitudes than less religious ones.


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