Defining the Nature and Future of the Party–Military Relations in North Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongseok Woo

Since Kim Jong-il officially launched his Songun politics in 1998, conflicting assessments have generated two competing arguments regarding the political role of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). The military garrison state argument suggests that Songun politics brought about the decline of the party and political ascendance of the military, while the party’s army model argues that the KPA is still the party’s army and under the party’s firm control. This article suggests that the debate mischaracterizes the KPA’s political place in North Korea and that the military has not been a politically influential organ from the state-building to the current Kim Jong-un era. This article identifies two distinct patterns of military control mechanisms—namely partisan (1960s–1990s) and personalistic (1998–2008)—and argues that the different control methods have little to do with the KPA’s political strength or weakness. Rather, they merely reflect the dictator’s ruling method of choice for regime survival. The analysis illustrates that the current Kim Jong-un regime is more stable than many outside observers may estimate, and a military coup is highly unlikely in the near future.


Subject The political role of the armed forces. Significance The armed forces have recently assumed an unusually high political profile. The current government has appointed generals to high-level positions and ordered a large-scale intervention led by the army in Rio de Janeiro state security institutions. These measures, many of them unprecedented, are an attempt by President Michel Temer to boost his popularity as a ‘tough-on-crime’ leader. The armed forces are one of the few public institutions enjoying high levels of trust among Brazilians. Impacts Despite recent protest calls for a military coup, support for such a move is restricted to a radical minority. Resistance against further reliance on the military for domestic law enforcement will rise, including among senior officers. Bolsonaro will focus his message on crime, promising to bring more military members into his cabinet, including the Education Ministry.



2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongseok Woo

Military-first politics has been at the heart of the unexpected regime stability in North Korea under Kim Jong-il and his son Jong-un. This article analyzes Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics as a strategic choice for regime survival, in which the locus of political power switched from the party to the military. At the same time, Kim Jong-il formulated a complex system of circumventing the possibility of the armed forces’ political domination, including personalistic control using sticks and carrots, fortifying security and surveillance institutions, and compartmentalizing the security institutions for intra- and inter-organizational checks and balances to prevent the emergence of organized opposition to the regime. Although an effective short-term solution, military-first politics could never be a long-term strategy for building gangseongdaeguk (a powerful and prosperous nation). The current Kim Jong-un regime needs to conduct sweeping reforms to address dire economic difficulties, which might result in a departure from his father’s legacy and downgrade the military’s power. In this process, the current regime’s (in)stability will depend on how it maintains a balance between revoking military-first politics and preserving the armed forces’ allegiance.



2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boubacar N'Diaye

ABSTRACTThe 3 August 2005 military coup was Mauritania's best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military regime's destructive politics. This article critically analyses relevant aspects of the transition that ensued in the context of the prevailing models of military withdrawal from politics in Africa. It also examines the challenges that Mauritania's short-lived Third Republic faced. It argues that the transition process did not escape the well-known African military junta leader's proclivity to manipulate transitions to fulfil suddenly awakened self-seeking political ambitions, in violation of solemn promises. While there was no old-fashioned ballot stuffing to decide electoral outcomes, Mauritania's junta leader and his lieutenants spared no effort to keep the military very much involved in politics, and to perpetuate a strong sense of entitlement to political power. Originally designed as an ingenious ‘delayed self-succession’ of sorts, in the end, another coup aborted Mauritania's democratisation process and threw its institutions in a tailspin. This only exacerbated the challenges that have saddled Mauritania's political system and society for decades – unhealthy civil-military relations, a dismal ‘human rights deficit’, terrorism, and a neo-patrimonial, disastrously mismanaged economy.



2021 ◽  
pp. e001696
Author(s):  
Chris M A Kwaja ◽  
D J Olivieri ◽  
S Boland ◽  
P C Henwood ◽  
B Card ◽  
...  

IntroductionCivilian–military relations play an important yet under-researched role in low-income and middle-income country epidemic response. One crucial component of civilian–military relations is defining the role of the military. This paper evaluates the role of Nigerian military during the 2014–2016 West African Ebola epidemic.MethodsFocus groups and key informant interviews were conducted throughout three states in North East region of Nigeria: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Participants were identified through mapping of stakeholder involvement in Nigerian epidemic response. English-translated transcripts of each key informant interview and focus group discussion were then coded and key themes were elucidated and analysed.ResultsMajor themes elucidated include developing inclusive coordination plans between civilian and military entities, facilitating human rights reporting mechanisms and distributing military resources more equitably across geographical catchment areas. The Nigerian Military served numerous functions: 37% (22/59) of respondents indicated ‘security/peace’ as the military’s primary function, while 42% (25/59) cited health services. Variations across geographic settings were also noted: 35% (7/20) of participants in Borno stated the military primarily provided transportation, while 73% (11/15) in Adamawa and 29% (7/24) in Yobe listed health services.ConclusionsRobust civilian–military relations require an appropriately defined role of the military and clear civilian–military communication. Important considerations to contextualise civilian–military relations include military cultural–linguistic understanding, human rights promotion, and community-based needs assessments; such foci can facilitate the military’s understanding of community norms and civilian cooperation with military aims. In turn, more robust civilian–military relations can promote overall epidemic response and reduce the global burden of disease.



2018 ◽  
pp. 401
Author(s):  
Patrick Plaschg

The aim of this work is to present the military and political role of the Habsburg monarchy in the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars between 1792 and 1809. Within this belligerent period, the peace treaty of Pressburg, the central event in a series of several peace resolutions, is considered as Napoleon's greatest triumph. Therefore, the path of the Habsburg monarchy to this treaty and the overcoming of the crises of those years represent the central events, which are analyzed in this work.



2019 ◽  
pp. 222-249
Author(s):  
Anit Mukherjee

This chapter examines defense planning in the Indian military. It begins with a conceptual discussion on the role of civilians in defense planning, mainly by examining the experience of other democracies. Next, it describes the history of defense planning in India, focusing on the formulation and implementation of five-year defense plans. There are three main arguments in this chapter. First, effective defense planning requires a close partnership between civilians and the military. Second, defense planning in India is marked by a lack of civilian guidance and institutional discordance, creating friction in civil–military relations. To an extent, this is because of a lack of expertise, on the part of civilians, and an institutional design that creates strong civil–military silos. Third, notwithstanding the above, there have been periodic attempts at reforming defense-planning structures. Progress has been achieved in some sectors, but much remains to be done.



Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.



1972 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 375-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Kossok

At the beginning of this study of military dictatorship and the political role of the intellectuals in Latin America, Florestan Fernandes (1970: 1) makes the following statement: “The idea that Latin America is a region in which the coups d'état are a political routine has become a commonplace.” Without doubt, such an opinion is justified and also explains—at least to a certain extent—the wealth of “routine” verdicts on the function of the military in Latin America. A contradiction, however, seems evident at this point: while the number of publications on the political and social position of the armed forces is rapidly increasing (McAlister, 1966; Rouquié, 1969), there is an evident lack of comprehensive analyses that go beyond detailed description, and which explain in a reliable and sound manner the phenomenon of the cyclically increasing militarization of politics. It cannot be overlooked that research on the role of the military in Latin America is in a really critical situation which calls for a reexamination of the facts according to new criteria.



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