On the Mental Disturbances of Epileptics [Beitrag zur Kenntniss der Seelenstorungen der Epileptiker]. (Allgem. Zeits. f. Psychiat., B. lvi, H. 5, 1899.) Deiters

1901 ◽  
Vol 47 (196) ◽  
pp. 175-175
Author(s):  
W. W. Ireland

Dr. Deiters commences his article by stating that, since Samt's investigations on the forms of epileptic insanity, it has generally been recognised that the mental symptoms are very characteristic; indeed, some hold that the presence of epilepsy may sometimes be inferred from the psychical manifestations alone. Sometimes, however, insanity combined with epileptic seizures takes a different character, approaching the forms of other vesaniæ. He gives at some length the description of a patient fifty-five years old, who had epilepsy combined with delusions of a paranoic nature. He had led a vagabond life, had been in prison for stealing, and had been passed on to a workhouse as incapable of earning a livelihood. When admitted to the asylum at Andernach, he was found to be lazy and indifferent, to have religious delusions, and suspicions of being poisoned. He said that at night people put “oprigus” under his nose, and that he was going to be made pope. Finally, he imagined that he was actually crowned as pope, and that Christ had appeared to him and held a chalice over his head, etc. Other cases of hallucination and systematised delusions have been described by Gnauck, Pohl, Buchholz, and others. Magnan thought that several psychoses might exist together. Deiters observes that the forms of insanity which he specifies are technical divisions rather than specific diseases, but that fairly distinct forms may supervene the one upon the other. He thinks that the mind never remains intact after repeated epileptic seizures. Epilepsy prepares the ground for insane ideas, but the character and sequence of these ideas may now and then take an unusual course.

1863 ◽  
Vol 8 (44) ◽  
pp. 535-545
Author(s):  
J. Crichton Browne

At the close of our last paper on personal identity we had just turned to the consideration of those apparent morbid divisions of the unity of consciousness which are sometimes, though happily rarely, brought under the notice of medical psychologists. Double consciousness, as we have already hinted, is essentially a result of diseased action, and comprehends a variety of conditions, distinguished from each other by differences in the mental symptoms, and by the relations to each other of the lucid and insane or of the two insane “oscillations.” In all of them, however, there is, for the time, a change, a perversion, or an exaltation, of the mental identity of the individual, of that principle which is, as it were, a centre round which the other faculties of mind revolve, and about which memories cluster. In the intensest forms of double consciousness, so called, mental identity is separated or multiplied into two distinct parts, so that two identities reside in the same individual, while in the milder manifestations of this condition there is a partial division of the same principle, a confusion of two natures in the same person. Where two alternating, though altogether unconnected, lives are lived by the same being, there is afforded, we think, a proof that mental identity is something more than consciousness, and so far independent in its affections. Indeed, it appears to us that the morbid states at present under examination would have been more aptly described as instances of double identity rather than of double consciousness. The phrase double consciousness is a contradiction in terms, for it is manifestly absurd to suppose that the mind can exist in two different states at the same moment. It is also a misleading expression, for this is not, of course, the meaning which it is intended to convey, nor is it at all descriptive of the conditions to which it is applied. These conditions are not necessarily characterised by any alteration of consciousness; that is to say, if consciousness is regarded as having reference simply to the present existing operation of the mind, for the man who inhabits alternately two distinct mental spheres may be perfectly conscious in both of them. In both of them his eyes, his ears, and all his organs of sense, may be normally active. In both of them, with equal accuracy, he may appreciate his surroundings, govern his movements, and express his ideas. In both of them he may be equally conscious, but he is not similarly conscious. The same world is inspected from different points of view in each. In the one it may be the real world, as it is to the perceptions of ordinary people; in the other, the world clad in the unsubstantial figments of a feverish fancy; or in both, a shadowy world, made up of metamorphosed realities. But whatever the metamorphoses may be, they arise, not from errors of perception, but of the personality—perceiving. A man who has passed into the abnormal phase of double consciousness sees all the familiar faces that surround him, but he does not recognise them; he hears loved and well-known voices, but they fall upon his ears as strange sounds; he beholds his household gods, but these do not, as they were wont, awaken emotion in his mind; in short, he regards everything in a new light and apart from former associations. The mind, shorn of its past, begins to learn the lessons of life anew, and perceives every object in relation to its new condition, the result of internal changes. The outward creation becomes subordinate to the inward idea, and is regarded only as it harmonises with the reigning delusion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-377
Author(s):  
Leonardo Niro Nascimento

This article first aims to demonstrate the different ways the work of the English neurologist John Hughlings Jackson influenced Freud. It argues that these can be summarized in six points. It is further argued that the framework proposed by Jackson continued to be pursued by twentieth-century neuroscientists such as Papez, MacLean and Panksepp in terms of tripartite hierarchical evolutionary models. Finally, the account presented here aims to shed light on the analogies encountered by psychodynamically oriented neuroscientists, between contemporary accounts of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system on the one hand, and Freudian models of the mind on the other. These parallels, I will suggest, are not coincidental. They have a historical underpinning, as both accounts most likely originate from a common source: John Hughlings Jackson's tripartite evolutionary hierarchical view of the brain.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-27
Author(s):  
Monica Manolachi

Censorship as a literary subject has sometimes been necessary in times of change, as it may show how the flaws in power relations influence, sometimes very dramatically, the access to and the production of knowledge. The Woman in the Photo: a Diary, 1987-1989 by Tia Șerbănescu and A Censor’s Notebook by Liliana Corobca are two books that deal with the issue of censorship in the 1980s (the former) and the 1970s (the latter). Both writers tackle the problem from inside the ruling system, aiming at authenticity in different ways. On the one hand, instead of writing a novel, Tia Șerbănescu kept a diary in which she contemplated the oppression and the corruption of the time and their consequences on the freedom of thought, of expression and of speech. She thoroughly described what she felt and thought about her relatives, friends and other people she met, about books and their authors, in a time when keeping a diary was hard and often perilous. On the other hand, using the technique of the mise en abyme, Liliana Corobca begins from a fictitious exchange of emails to eventually enter and explore the mind of a censor and reveal what she thought and felt about the system, her co-workers, her boss, the books she proofread, their authors and her own identity. Detailed examinations and performances of the relationship between writing and censorship, the two novels provide engaging, often tragi-comical, insights into the psychological process of producing literary texts. The intention of this article is to compare and contrast the two author’s perspectives on the act of writing and some of its functions from four points of view: literary, cultural, social and political.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-77
Author(s):  
Claire Petitmengin

Abstract Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.


2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK IAN THOMAS ROBSON

AbstractIn this paper I explore the relationship between the idea of possible worlds and the notion of the beauty of God. I argue that there is a clear contradiction between the idea that God is utterly and completely beautiful on the one hand and the notion that He contains within himself all possible worlds on the other. Since some of the possible worlds residing in the mind of the deity are ugly, their presence seems to compromise God's complete and utter beauty.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN HARRIS ◽  
DAVID R. LAWRENCE

Abstract:The idea—the possibility—of reading the mind, from the outside or indeed even from the inside, has exercised humanity from the earliest times. If we could read other minds both prospectively, to discern intentions and plans, and retrospectively, to discover what had been “on” those minds when various events had occurred, the implications for morality and for law and social policy would be immense. Recent advances in neuroscience have offered some, probably remote, prospects of improved access to the mind, but a different branch of technology seems to offer the most promising and the most daunting prospect for both mind reading and mind misreading. You can’t have the possibility of the one without the possibility of the other. This article tells some of this story.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 145-155
Author(s):  
Hichem Ismaïl ◽  

"We aim to identify the thematic elements that shape the imagination of identity confusion. Indeed, besides inventing a new rhetoric to express the identity crisis, Taos Amrouche has discussed the same major themes of migrant literature, giving them a self-related dimension. We will investigate how the geographical exile of the Iakouren is coupled with the identity exile in which they are locked up due to the confrontation with various groups which instill in them the feeling of irreducible difference. This difference is particularly obvious in the mind of the narrator Marie-Corail, who, under the influence of two opposing cultures – the tribal Arab culture that strongly bonds with the ancestors, on the one hand, and the Western culture, on the other – will find herself at an impasse."


Author(s):  
Joseph Levine

This chapter first presents a framework, one that the author has defended elsewhere (Levine 2001), for understanding the notion of bruteness, its relation to modality, and the way this framework applies to the mind–body problem. Second, the chapter then turns to a problem in meta-ethics and attempts to address this problem within the framework already established. The problem is how to reconcile two views that many philosophers, including the author, are inclined to hold: on the one hand, “robust realism” or “non-naturalism” about the ethical and, on the other, the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical. The chapter speculates about how one might reasonably reconcile these two views.


2019 ◽  
pp. 45-55
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Astafiev

The article states that the base of the non-referent (non-address-communicational) lyrics are parts of stylistic and surrealism. Such poetry is built on principle “text like text”, the artistic world looses its referency completely and is transformed into a sign. The function of such poetry is non-referential (arbitrary). The most common for such lyrics is stimulation and continuousness of the expression plan (not the contests) that commonly is done on the phonic and graphic levels. The main semiotic classificators here are arbitrary convention and symbol sign. They are non-address and non- communicational. If index has illocutive power, then a symbol sign has a power of categorical imperative. The system of non-referential lyrics in its own way is a spere of experimants. One of them, or maybe the most principal, which made “the exploitation” of the subconsciousness possible, and often gave metaphysical results, was so called automatic writing (ecriture automatique). The main point of it was to write having maximum freedom from the control of the mind, moving in the stream of free associations, and not returning to the written text; in any case nothing should be corrected (creative work of Zinoviy Berezhan). Second is orientation on dreams. Formal distinctive mark of “hooked” to the artistic world neurospace is the image of a dreamer – the one who watches a nightdream and tells about its cotntents (it can be either a narrator, as in the majority of the poems by Boychuk, or an animal, plant or an insect as in the works of Andrievska). The image has two functions: 1. to receive and transmit the contents of a dream spiritually; 2. to associate the contents of seen in a dream with the feelings, or in the other words transform it into the concrete feeling images. Semantic variety of expressionalism against impressionalism (the antipode of which it became) has also the character of conversion, and concerning existentionalism -– inversion. The differences between the styles of non-referential lyrics we can imagine in the shape of inversion. Stylizations also pretend to autonomy. Their structure e.g., in the poem by Olexa Stephanovich “From the chronic”, is defined by not immanently “imagined” in the “reality” norms but by convention -– as if a transition from outside, in advance, only to stress the function of a speaker. In the works of Yuriy Lypa, especially in his stylization “About the seamster Kozhumiaka” the artistic shape net catches the breething of a “chronical”, inner and outer world of a character connecting it with his pseudoarchaic way of narration, the poet makes stylization not only of characters’ dialogues (“The Monk and the Death”), but also the language of a storyteller (“The Deivil”, “The demons and the catcher”), receiving in such a way harmony of languages – the vision of the world. The same was done by Euhen Malanuk in his poem “The rye in the field is spoiled by the hoofs”, in which he eliminated from the narrative language expressions, that went away from geographical-phyhological base of our 20-th century’s menthality.


1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell

The central fact about the problem of personal identity is that it is a problem posed by an apparent dichotomy: the dichotomy between the objective, third-person viewpoint on the one hand and the subjective perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint on the other. Everyone understands that the mind/body problem is precisely the problem of what to do about another apparent dichotomy, the duality comprising states of consciousness on the one hand and physical states of the body on the other. By contrast, contemporary discussions of the problem of personal identity generally display little or no recognition of the divide which to my mind is at the heart of the problem. As a consequence, there has been a relentlessly third-personal approach to the issue, and the consequent proposal of solutions which stand no chance at all of working. I think the idea that the problem is to be clarified by an appeal to the idea of a human being is the latest manifestation of this mistaken approach. I am thinking in particular of the claim that what ought to govern our thinking on this issue is the fact that human beings constitute a natural kind, and that standard members of this kind can be said to have some sort of essence. Related to this is the idea that ‘person’, while not itself a natural kind term, is not a notion which can be framed in entire independence of this natural kind.


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