scholarly journals Perspectives on the U.S. Current Account Deficit and Sustainability

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine L Mann

This essay considers the underpinnings of the large U.S. current account deficit. It then tackles the question of whether the U.S. current account deficit is sustainable. A current account deficit is “sustainable” at a point in time if neither it, nor the associated foreign capital inflows, nor the negative net international investment position are large enough to induce significant changes in economic variables, such as consumption or investment or interest rates or exchange rates. Even if the current account deficit is sustainable by this definition today, its trajectory could still be creating future risks for the U.S. and global economy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-411
Author(s):  
Robert Aliber

AbstractRemarkable transformation of the U.S. international investment position occurred over the last 40 years. U.S. net foreign assets were larger than combined net foreign assets of all other creditors. By 1990, foreign-owned U.S. securities and real assets were larger than U.S. owned foreign securities and assets. This change occurred without the U.S. Treasury borrowing in foreign currency and few U.S. firms borrowing, reflecting a surge in foreign purchases of U.S. securities. Inferences from the currency composition of portfolio changes of those who acquired U.S. dollar securities suggest that foreign savers took the initiative on cross-border investment inflows. The U.S. could not have developed a larger capital account surplus after 1980 unless a similar increase in the U.S. current account deficit occurred. The primary factor that led to the U.S. current account deficit increase was the surge in U.S. stocks and other asset prices, resulting in a U.S. household wealth surge and consumption boom. The foreign saving inflow displaced domestic saving. In addition, an increase in the price of the U.S. dollar led to expenditure-switching from U.S. goods to increasingly less expensive foreign goods. When investor demand for U.S. dollar securities declined, the U.S. dollar price fell in 1992, 2002, and 2020 and the price of U.S. dollar securities declined. The paper discusses the source of the change in the U.S. international investment position, the flow of foreign saving to the U.S., cyclical variability in the foreign saving flow to the U.S., and the potential impact of an adjustable parity arrangement.


Author(s):  
Bahram Adrangi ◽  
Mary Allender ◽  
Kambiz Raffiee

The recent depreciation of the dollar against major currencies of the world, notably the euro, has kindled discussion on the causes of this phenomenon and the possible outcomes should it continue. Many politicians blame the rising U.S. current account deficit and some economists have questioned the sustainability of the current account deficit. This paper examines the relationship between the U.S. current account balance, the net U.S. international investment position, and the exchange value of the dollar. Our results show that there is a relationship between the exchange value of the dollar and the current account balance. However, our results do not show that the current account balance is solely responsible for changes in the exchange value of the dollar. This is not surprising given the many influences currently under investigation as possible explanations for the recent behavior of the dollar.


Asian Survey ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey C. Gunn

Ahead of upcoming elections, expectations ran high in 2013 across the archipelago for a highly pluralistic electorate. With China as a leading trading partner, the backdrop for Indonesia was steady economic growth, albeit checked by a sliding currency, a current account deficit, and a depressing culture of corruption. Mixing commerce and geopolitics, China, the U.S., and Japan all turned to Indonesia to expand their influence.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Feldstein

The massive deficit in the U.S. trade and current accounts is one of the most striking features of the current global economy and, to some observers, one of the most worrying. Although the current account deficit finally began to shrink in 2007, it remained at more than 5 percent of GDP—more than $700 billion. While some observers claim that the U.S. economy can continue to have trade deficits of this magnitude for years—some would say for decades—into the future, I believe that such enormous deficits cannot continue and will decline significantly in the coming years. This paper discusses the reasons for that decline and the changes that are needed in the U.S. saving rate and in the value of the dollar to bring it about. Reducing the U.S. current account deficit does not require action by the U.S. government or by the governments of America's trading partners. Market forces alone will cause the U.S. trade deficit to decline further. In practice, however, changes in government policies at home and abroad may lead to faster reductions in the U.S. trade deficit. More important, the response of the U.S. and foreign governments and central banks will determine the way in which the global economy as a whole adjusts to the decline in the U.S. trade deficit. Reductions in the U.S. current account deficit will of course imply lower aggregate trade surpluses in the rest of the world. Taken by itself, a reduction in any country's trade surplus will reduce aggregate demand and therefore employment in that country. I will therefore look at what other countries—China, Japan, and European countries—can do to avoid the adverse consequences of the inevitable decline of the U.S. trade deficit.


Author(s):  
Arus Tunian

The article is devoted to the study of the problem of economic growth in Armenia. It is identified the nature of the balance of payments of the country, indicating a net debtor position, which leads to inherent deterioration of the international investment position. A small open economy of Armenia moves to a new phase of development, in the frame of the integration processes within the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. One of the main characteristics of the Armenian economy vulnerability remains a negative balance in foreign trade, which continues to grow, despite the export growth. Economic growth is provided, as before, mostly due to the sale of raw materials - non-ferrous metals and metal ores, both in the primary as well as in the previous preprocessing. Estimating the econometric VAR models revealed that the negative current account impacts on GDP growth negatively.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anwar Nasution

This paper examines the current path of global imbalances and the role of East Asia in addressing these issues. The roots of the problem are the exploding budget deficit and soaring current account deficit of the United States. The twin deficits are being financed by foreign savings including the placement of the massive foreign exchange reserves of East Asia in U.S. dollar–denominated debt, such as U.S. Treasury notes. Solving the imbalances will require corrections of internal and external imbalances by both the United States and its trading partners. How East Asia deploys its reserves could set off a tsunami of sales of dollar-based assets that could disrupt the U.S. and global economy. Sharp exchange rate adjustments (particularly a large fall in the U.S. dollar), and a protectionist backlash against the U.S. current account deficit, are in no one's interest as they could trigger global shocks.


Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  

After narrowing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and remaining broadly unchanged in recent years, global imbalances increased moderately in 2015, amid a reconfiguration of current accounts and exchange rates. Shifts in 2015 were driven primarily by the uneven strength of the recovery in advanced economies, the redistributive effects of the sharp fall in commodity prices, and tighter external financing conditions for emerging markets (EMs). A relatively stronger U.S. outlook led to a further appreciation of the USD and a depreciation of the yen and the euro. The sharp decline in commodity prices, reflecting both supply shocks and concerns about rebalancing and growth in China, brought about a significant redistribution of income from commodity exporters to importers, and a weakening of commodity exporters’ currencies. Meanwhile, heightened global risk aversion, contributed to softer capital inflows and depreciation pressures in many EMs. This moderate widening of current account imbalances was largely driven by systemic economies. Surpluses in Japan, the euro area and China grew, supported by improved terms of trade and currency depreciation, while the current account deficit in the U.S. widened amid the steep appreciation of the USD. These widening imbalances were only partially offset by narrowing surpluses in large oil exporters and smaller deficits in vulnerable EMs and some euro area debtor countries. Similarly, excess imbalances expanded in 2015. External positions in the U.S. and Japan moved from being broadly in line with fundamentals to being “moderately weaker” and “moderately stronger”, respectively. This was partly offset by a further narrowing of excess deficits in vulnerable EMs and euro area debtor countries. Meanwhile, excess surpluses persisted among the larger surplus countries, some of which remain “substantially stronger” than fundamentals (Germany, Korea). Currency movements since end-2015 helped to partially reverse the trends observed last year, although market volatility following the result of the U.K. referendum to leave the European Union have led to a strengthening of the USD and yen along with a weakening of the sterling, euro, and EM currencies. The implications for external assessments going forward, especially for the U.K. and the euro area, remains uncertain and will likely depend on how the transition is managed and on what new arrangements are adopted. With output below potential in most countries, and limited policy space in many, balancing internal and external objectives will require careful policy calibration. In general, a more balanced policy mix that avoids excessive reliance on policies with significant demanddiverting effects is necessary, with greater emphasis on demand-supportive measures and structural reforms. Surplus countries with fiscal space have a greater role to play in supporting global demand while reducing external imbalances. Global collective policy action, especially if downside risks materialize, would also help address global demand weakness while mitigating its effects on external imbalances.


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