scholarly journals Signaling Character in Electoral Competition

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 852-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Navin Kartik ◽  
R. Preston McAfee
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Convex Combination ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Median Voter Theorem

We study a one-dimensional Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation: a fraction of candidates have “character” and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform; this is unobservable to voters. Character is desirable, and a voter's utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate's character. This structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters, since a policy platform affects voters' utilities not only directly, but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate's character. The model generates a number of predictions, starting with a failure of the median voter theorem. (JEL D72, D82)

A model of electoral competition between national and regional parties

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mihir Bhattacharya
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Policy Position ◽  
National Party ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Regional Parties ◽  
Homogeneous Regions ◽  
Outcome Function

We consider a one-dimensional model of electoral competition with national and regional parties. There are two regions and three parties—one national party and one regional party for each region. We divide the paper into two parts— homogeneous and heterogeneous regions. In the former, the policy positions of the national party and the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies coincide with the favorite policy position of the region-wide median voter. In the latter, the national party chooses a policy position in a maximal isolation set, while the two regional parties choose policies on the same side of the national party’s policy as their own respective region-wide medians. For a given outcome function, the national party performs better when the regions are heterogeneous. In the homogeneous regions case, the national party can at best do as well as the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies. Our results are broadly consistent with intuition and evidence.

Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentino Larcinese
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Political Information ◽  
Optimization Process ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Negligible Probability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Decisive Vote

Abstract In spite of the negligible probability that everyone has to cast a decisive vote, political information can be relevant for a number of private decisions. Under quite mild assumptions, the demand for information is increasing in income. Being informed affects responsiveness to electoral platforms and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account in their optimization process. As a consequence, redistribution is generally lower than what the median voter theorem predicts. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature takes for granted, an increase in inequality does not unambiguously increase redistribution. This is consistent with most empirical research in this field. Finally, an increase in the cost of information induces a reduction in redistribution.

SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?

2010 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN N. MORDESON ◽  
LANCE NIELSEN ◽  
TERRY D. CLARK
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Binary Relations ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Fuzzy Preferences ◽  
Median Position ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Dimensional Models

Black's Median Voter Theorem is among the more useful mathematical tools available to political scientists for predicting choices of political actors based on their preferences over a finite set of alternatives within an institutional or constitutional setting. If the alternatives can be placed on a single-dimensional continuum such that the preferences of all players descend monotonically from their ideal point, then the outcome will be the alternative at the median position. We demonstrate that the Median Voter Theorem holds for fuzzy preferences. Our approach considers the degree to which players prefer options in binary relations.

Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Social Conflict

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Goodin
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Social Conflict ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Religious Question

Cross-cutting cleavages do seem to help moderate social conflict.1 This can be explained in either of two ways. One argument focuses on the logic of electoral competition. Where parties must appeal to an electorate with diverse tastes along many dimensions, politicians must take moderate positions (defined as near the median voter) in most dimensions of cleavage if they are to win. A socialist party which draws its support from both Protestants and Catholics cannot take extreme positions on the religious question without alienating potential supporters and jeopardizing its electoral chances.2

Voters and Parties

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Wren ◽  
Kenneth M. McElwain
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Educational Attainment ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
The Political ◽  
Organizational Changes ◽  
Media Technology ◽  
Partisan Identification

This article studies voters and parties, beginning with realignment or dealignment in the party-voter nexus. It discusses changes in the policy preferences of voters and even organizational changes to the party-voter linkage. Electoral competition, performance of traditional parties, and organizational change are discussed as well. This article determines that there are two parallel trends in the linkage between parties and voters. The first is that voters are showing weaker partisan identification with political parties, and a widening gap between the policy preferences of voters and the electoral manifestos of parties is apparent. The second trend is that improvements in educational attainment and innovations in media technology are strengthening the political capability of both parties and voters.

The median voter theorem and the repeal of the prohibition on abortion in Ireland: an analysis of the passage of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara E. Guffey
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Unborn Child ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Religious Identification ◽  
Sixth Amendment ◽  
Eighth Amendment ◽  
Irish People ◽  
Elected Representatives

In 2018, the Irish people voted in favour of the passage of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment. This vote abolished the Eighth Amendment, which had previously outlawed abortion by establishing the equal rights of the woman and the unborn child. To uncover potential driving forces behind the vote share in support of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment, this article uses regional data on religious identification, age and a measure of traditional identity. The results of this article show that variation by region in religious identification was significantly correlated with voting behaviour in the 2018 referendum. Furthermore, evidence for the validity of the median voter theorem is developed by analysing data on the reported support of Irish elected representatives for the legislation before the vote. The results of this analysis on the referendum vote suggest a societal shift has taken place in the preferences of Irish citizens, which is complimented by the views of their elected representatives.

Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Muirhead
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Theory Of Democracy ◽  
Models Of Democracy

Anthony Downs’s Economic Theory of Democracy has been marginalized in normative democratic theory, notwithstanding its prominence in positive political theory. For normative theorists, the “paradox of voting” testifies to the reality of moral motivation in politics, a species of motivation foreign to Downs’s theory and central to the ideals of deliberative democracy that normative theorists developed in the 1980s and 1990s. The deliberative ideal displaced aggregative conceptions of democracy such as Downs’s model. The ensuing segmentation of normative democratic theories that assume moral motives (like deliberative democracy) and positive models of democracy that assume selfish motives (like Downs’s theory) leaves both without the resources to diagnose the persistence of ideological partisanship and polarization that beset modern democracies. Engaging Downs’s theoretical contributions, especially the median voter theorem, would constitute a salutary step toward a democratic theory that integrates normative and positive theory.

scholarly journals Why the current Peak in Populism in the US and Europe? Populism as a Deviation in the Median Voter Theorem

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filipa Figueira
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
The United States ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Historical Factors ◽  
The Us ◽  
Political Spectrum

The current surge of populism in Europe and the United States calls for further analysis using public choice tools. In this article, populism is modelled as a deviation from the normal state of the median voter theorem. This study adds to the public choice literature by proposing a model of populism which is suited, not only to left-wing populism, but also to other forms of populism prevalent in Europe and the United States today. It is argued that, due to changes in the assumptions underpinning the median voter theorem, the operation of the model can be modified, and as a result surges of populism occur. Those assumptions concern: the political spectrum; the distribution of ideological preferences; sociological, psychological and historical factors; political party competition; and extreme political preferences. It is shown that the current peak of populism in Europe and the United States can be explained through a simultaneous change in all of these aspects, leading to a “perfect storm” of populism. 

scholarly journals Recognizing Top-Monotonic Preference Profiles in Polynomial Time

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 57-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Magiera ◽  
Piotr Faliszewski
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Polynomial Time Algorithm ◽  
Time Algorithm ◽  
Recognition Problem ◽  
Median Voter Theorem ◽  
Weak Preference ◽  
Single Peakedness ◽  
Preference Orders

We provide the first polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing if a profile of (possibly weak) preference orders is top-monotonic. Top-monotonicity is a generalization of the notions of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, defined by Barbera and Moreno. Top-monotonic profiles always have weak Condorcet winners and satisfy a variant of the median voter theorem. Our algorithm proceeds by reducing the recognition problem to the SAT-2CNF problem.

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