Book Reviews

2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-136

Arthur J. Robson of Simon Fraser University reviews “The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences” by Herbert Gintis. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins, “Explores how key concepts from the behavioral sciences can complement game theory in providing insights into human behavior. Discusses decision theory and human behavior; game theory--basic concepts; game theory and human behavior; rationalizability and common knowledge of rationality; extensive for….”

Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis

Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences—from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as this book demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. The book shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a hindered enterprise. The book is a combination of a text book on game theory and a plea to use behavioral game theory as a unifying tool in all behavioral sciences. This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated. Reinvigorating game theory, the book offers innovative thinking for the behavioral sciences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Geanakoplos

Abstract Decision theory and game theory are extended to allow for information processing errors. This extended theory is then used to reexamine market speculation and consensus, both when all actions (opinions) are common knowledge and when they may not be. Five axioms of information processing are shown to be especially important to speculation and consensus. They are called nondelusion, knowing that you know (KTYK), nested, balanced, and positively balanced. We show that it is necessary and sufficient that each agent's information processing errors be (1) nondeluded and balanced so that the agents cannot agree to disagree, (2) nondeluded and positively balanced so that it cannot be common knowledge that they are speculating, and (3) nondeluded and KTYK and nested so that agents cannot speculate in equilibrium. Each condition is strictly weaker than the next one, and the last is strictly weaker than partition information.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 658-659

Arthur Robson of Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University reviews “Game Theory in Biology: Concepts and Frontiers” by John M. McNamara and Olof Leimar. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Advanced textbook for graduate-level students and professional researchers presents the central concepts and modeling approaches in biological game theory, highlighting the connection between concepts and applications, the limitations of current models, and areas for future development.”


Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis

This chapter deals with the implications of rationality in normal form games. It first explores the ramifications of the rationalizability assumption and shows that in many cases rational individuals will not play rationalizable strategies. It argues that the informal reasoning supporting rationalizability must be replaced by a more rigorous analytical framework. This framework is known as epistemic game theory. Using epistemic game theory, it presents the argument that not rationality, but rather common knowledge of rationality, implies that players will only use rationalizable strategies. The chapter concludes by showing that there is no justification of the common knowledge of rationality assumption, and hence there is no reason to believe that in general rational players will choose rationalizable strategies. It strengthens this conclusion by showing that even assuming common knowledge of rationality, there is no reason for a rational player to conform to the iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies.


Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis

Game theory is multiplayer decision theory where the choices of each player affect the payoffs to other players, and the players take this into account in their choice behavior. This chapter addresses the contribution of game theory to the design of experiments aimed at understanding the behavior of individuals engaged in strategic interaction. This is referred to as behavioral game theory. The chapter goes on to discusses charter virtues, defined as ethically desirable behavioral regularities that individuals value for their own sake, while having the property of facilitating cooperation and enhancing social efficiency. It presents two studies that illustrate the situational nature of preferences and the desire to conform to social norms. It then deals with the dark side of altruistic cooperation and norms of cooperation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Sadzik

Abstract Bayesian game theory investigates strategic interaction of players with full awareness but incomplete information about their environment. We extend the analysis to players with incomplete awareness, who might not be able to reason about all contingencies in the first place. We develop three logical systems for knowledge, probabilistic beliefs and awareness, and characterize their axiom systems. Bayesian equilibrium is extended to games with incomplete awareness and we show that it is consistent with common prior and speculative trade, when common knowledge of rationality is violated.


Author(s):  
Marcin Saar

The topic of this paper is the foundation for individual rights proposed by David Gauthier in his seminal 1986 book Morals by Agreement, and particularly the role of conception of rationality in this foundation. The foundation of rights is a part of Gauthier’s broader enterprise: to ground morals in rationality – more specifically, in the economic conception of rationality. Because of the importance of this conception for the whole of Gauthier’s project, we reconstruct first the conception of rationality which can be found in decision theory and game theory, presenting simultaneously in a relatively non-technical way some basic concepts of the aforementioned disciplines. We proceed then to reconstruction of the foundation of rights itself – it turns on Gauthier’s interpretation of the so-called “Lockean proviso.” Lastly, we turn to the connection between rationality and foundation of rights. It is to be found in the narrow compliance – the disposition to enter only into cooperation which satisfies conditions of fairness set out in part by the Lockean proviso.


This book provides an objective look into the dynamic world of debt markets, products, valuation, and analysis. It also provides an in-depth understanding about this subject from experts in the field, both practitioners and academics. The coverage extends from discussing basic concepts and their application to increasingly intricate and real-world situations. This volume spans the gamut from theoretical to practical, while attempting to offer a useful balance of detailed and user-friendly coverage. The book has several distinguishing features. It blends the contributions of a global array of scholars and practitioners into a single review of some of the most important topics in this area. The book follows an internally consistent approach in format and style. Hence, it is collectively much more than a compilation of chapters from an array of different authors. It presents theory without unnecessary abstraction, quantitative techniques using basic bond mathematics, and conventions at a useful level of detail. It also incorporates how investment professionals analyze and manage fixed income portfolios. The book emphasizes empirical evidence involving debt securities and markets so it is understandable to a wide array of readers. Each chapter contains discussion questions to help reinforce key concepts. The end of the book contains guideline answers to each question. Readers interested in a broad survey will benefit as will those looking for more in-depth presentations of specific areas within this field of study. In summary, the book provides a fresh look at this intriguing and dynamic but often complex subject.


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