scholarly journals Essays in competition economics and the enforcement of competition policy

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Βασιλική Μπαγέρη
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Social Harm ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Regulatory Authorities ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

Economists have been involved a lot in recent years in considering issues of enforcement of Competition law and how enforcement can become more effective, such as legal standards, substantive standards, penalties etc. This dissertation, contributes to the above by examining two important dimensions of the enforcement of Competition law: (i) fines and (ii) the requirement of extant market power in forming a presumption that unilateral firm actions or mergers may lead to social harm. Particularly, we study some key issues concerning the calculation of optimal fines by Competition and Regulatory Authorities (Chapter 2), we introduce a new methodology for setting fines (Chapter 3) and we examine the effects of exclusion in abuse of dominance cases with product differentiation and how they depend on the source of market power (Chapter 4). At the end of each chapter we give the conclusions relating to each of the main essays.

Competition Policy and Price Fixing

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Direct Approach ◽  
Social Harm ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Error Costs ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
Desirable Behavior

Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. This book offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. The book elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, the book shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, the book explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior—and is also easier to apply.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

Exclusionary Abuses

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-112
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Pharmaceutical Sector ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Third ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
The Eu

Chapter 4 deals with exclusionary abuses under the Competition Act 1998, covering both public and private enforcement cases. The analysis concerns the approach to dominance as well as tests for abuse, focusing on retroactive rebates and bundled discounts, exclusion in multi-market settings, exclusivity, most favoured nation and equivalent clauses, discrimination, and exclusionary abuses in the pharmaceutical sector. This chapter argues that, in its second decade, modern UK competition law continued a trend that was already clear in the first decade: the prohibition of abuse of dominance is applied in a more economically robust and commercially reasonable way than it is by the EU institutions - the Commission and the EU courts - and in certain other Member States. The chapter notes that the third decade of the Competition Act 1998 will see the UK develop its competition policy free from the constraints of EU law and may allow for some divergence in the approach to exclusionary abuses in the future.

Exploitative abuses in digital markets: between competition law and data protection law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Caroline Buiten
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Data Privacy ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
Data Protection Law ◽  
Collection Practices ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

Abstract Online platforms increasingly offer consumers services ‘for free’, in exchange for collecting consumers’ personal data. This business model is highly successful, leading some online platforms to gain substantial market power. This market power can cause consumer harm—not through higher prices, but in the form of privacy harm. This article considers what role competition law and data protection law can play in mitigating this harm to privacy. The article considers how we can conceptualize exploitative abuse of dominance cases in zero-price markets. The article calls into question if data protection laws should play a role in antitrust abuse assessments, against the background of the Bundeskartellamt antitrust investigation into Facebook’s data collection practices. The article argues that, even in digital markets that unequivocally link market power with data privacy concerns, competition law and data protection law have complementary but distinct roles to play.

scholarly journals THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FAIR COMPETITION IN THE MARKET ECONOMY

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 99-106
Author(s):  
Ramona Mihaela Urziceanu ◽  
Anamaria Georgeta Popa
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Proper Functioning ◽  
And Control ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance

For proper functioning of the competitive market, Romania has regulated the Competition Act prohibit agreements, the abuse of dominance and control of economic amalgamation. Therefore, competition law establishes a set of rules applicable to the enterprises and the guarantee of compliance with competition policy, a guarantee in achieving a free and vibrant internal market.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

27. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
The Core ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful.

On the concepts of legal standards and substantive standards (and how the latter influences the choice of the former)

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yannis Katsoulacos
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Time Use ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Over Time

Abstract The substantial literature on the optimal choice of legal standards (LSs) in Competition Law enforcement concentrates on the factors that influence this choice given the Substantive (or Liability) Standard adopted by courts and competition authorities (CAs). Generally, this literature assumes that the substantive standard (SS) is welfarist. However, in reality, courts and CAs in different countries and over time use different criteria for establishing liability and, very often, these criteria are not welfarist. This article’s main objective is to clarify the relationship between legal and SSs and show the important influence of the latter on the choice of the former: our analysis shows that while efects-based LSs are compatible with non-welfarist SSs, under the latter courts and CAs will be much more likely to use Per Se LSs. This occurs as under non-welfarist SSs the strength of the presumption of illegality will be higher. This influence may be considered as being mainly responsible for differences in the LSs adopted in European Union and in North America (USA and Canada) or UK, especially in relation to abuse of dominance cases.

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