scholarly journals The role of corporate directors in the development of territorial clusters

2017 ◽  
pp. 53-58
Author(s):  
Ананишнев ◽  
Vladislav Ananishnev ◽  
Хафизов ◽  
Rustam Khafizov
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Regional Development ◽  
Labor Relations ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Governance Tools

Corporate governance tools allow the implementation of programs for the development of territorial clusters. At the same time, the role of corporate governance in regional development is underestimated. At the legislative level, labor relations with board members playing a key role in the company's significant corporate events are not currently regulated.

scholarly journals The influence of cultural values on the board of directors: Lessons from five corporations

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4-2) ◽  
pp. 221-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elsa Satkunasingam ◽  
Aaron Yong ◽  
Sern Cherk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cultural Values ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Differences Of Opinion ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance

The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000 emphasises the monitoring role of the Board of Directors, especially that of independent directors. It has not however taken into account the cultural values in Malaysia which do not encourage differences of opinion or criticisms and has failed to provide sufficient safeguards for directors to exercise their role effectively. As a result, it is relatively easy for dominant Chairmen or CEOs especially in government-linked companies or CEO dominated companies to control the Board or senior management with very little opposition. This paper will discuss several incidences of financial mismanagement in companies caused by dominant directors with very little opposition from the rest of the board. It will highlight that the law has to take cultural values more seriously in order to equip the Board and especially independent directors with the ability to challenge dominant Board members.

scholarly journals Strategic corporate governance in family business: A study on the board of directors’ roles and responsibilities

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
Henrique Cordeiro Martins ◽  
Carlos Alberto Gonçalves ◽  
ose Antonio de Sousa Neto ◽  
Marcio Augusto Gonçalves ◽  
Reynaldo Maia Muniz
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Practical Activity ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Qualitative Nature ◽  
The Impact

The goal of this article is to analyze the constitution of the directors boards, based on their attributes, and the impact of this configuration on the roles and responsibilities of the board members in Brazilian Family Businesses. A research of a qualitative nature was carried out in 10 big family companies in Brazil. The results found point to the strategic roles as being the most relevant, but as a practical activity focused on the role of control. The Board has been more active at some moments, but is inactive at others, especially, when the concentration of capital is greater in some companies than in others.

scholarly journals Creative Accounting Practices at Satyam Computers Limited: A Case Study of India’s Enron

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madan Lal Bhasin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Accounting Fraud ◽  
Creative Accounting ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
The Government

<p>Satyam Computers were once the crown jewel of Indian IT industry, however, the debacle of Satyam raised a debate about the role of CEO in driving a company to the heights of success and its relation with the board members and core committees. The scam brought to the light the role of corporate governance (CG) in shaping the protocols related to the working of audit committees and duties of board members. The Satyam scam was a jolt to the market, especially to Satyam stockholders.  This paper attempts an in-depth analysis of India’s Enron, Satyam Computer’s “creative-accounting” scandal. In public companies, this type of ‘creative’ accounting leading to fraud and investigations are, therefore, launched by the various governmental oversight agencies. The accounting fraud committed by the founders of Satyam in 2009 is a testament to the fact that “the science of conduct is swayed in large by human greed, ambition, and hunger for power, money, fame and glory.” Scandals have proved that “there is an urgent need for good conduct based on strong corporate governance, ethics and accounting &amp; auditing standards.” The Satyam scandal highlights the importance of securities laws and CG in emerging markets. Indeed, Satyam fraud “spurred the government of India to tighten the CG norms to prevent recurrence of similar frauds in future.” Thus, major financial reporting frauds need to be studied for ‘lessons-learned’ and ‘strategies-to-follow’ to reduce the incidents of such frauds in the future. The increasing rate of white-collar crimes “demands stiff penalties, exemplary punishments, and effective enforcement of law with the right spirit.”</p><h2> </h2>

scholarly journals Perceived qualities of a 'good' chairman: A challenge for corporate governance in South Africa

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
Mike Bendixen ◽  
Adèle Thomas
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Country Comparison ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Depth Interviews

Corporate governance is increasingly being viewed as essential to sound business practice. The recommendations of the Cadbury Committee in the United Kingdom will respect to the role of a chairman are similar to those later formulated in the King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa. In the present study, the perceived qualities of 'good' chairmen are investigated among chairmen, chief executives and main board members in the UK and South Africa. In both the UK and in South Africa the same robust methodology was used, enabling an inter-country comparison of results. The UK study comprised 60 in-depth interviews followed by a mailing of 2418 questionnaires to which 274 main-board members responded. In both cases, in the analysis, four-factor and four-cluster solutions emerged. Not surprisingly, the results for the two countries are quite different from each other and different profiles of preferred chairmen were found. In the case of the UK, the most preferred profile supports the execution of roles recommended for good governance while in South Africa, the least preferred profile appears to be the most appropriate.

scholarly journals A influência das redes de relações corporativas no desempenho das empresas do Novo Mercado da BOVESPA

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Mendes-da-Silva ◽  
Luciano Rossoni ◽  
Diógenes Leiva Martin ◽  
Roy Martelanc
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Level Density ◽  
Board Members ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Institutional Relations ◽  
Two Phases ◽  
And Performance

The role played by the board of a firm is one of the main aspects considered in literature on corporate governance around of the world. simultaneously, the social and institutional relations have been seen as preponderant factor for the happened results of the performance of such boards of big companies. However not yet research is verified that analyze the role of the boards from the Social Network Analysis (SNA) in Brazil. In this manner, this study aims to verify the existence of associations between centrality level, density and cohesion of the boards of Brazilian companies and firmperformance. Then, we evaluate 615 individuals, that had formed the boards of the 90 listed companies in the Novo Mercado of the S˜ao Paulo Stock Exchange in 2007. The analysis was lead in two phases. In the first one we present the configuration of the networks of board members, in second place, we verify associations between structure of the network and performance. It was verified that the centrality, density and the cohesion of the firms, in terms of its board members, are related with performance, some times in terms of Return Over Assets (Roa), some times in debt. Of this form, we conclude that organizations most located in the networks of corporative relations tend to present greater yield and minor debt.

Family control and ownership monitoring in Stakeholder-oriented corporate governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (7) ◽  
pp. 1712-1728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideaki Sakawa ◽  
Naoki Watanabel
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Firm Profitability

Purpose Principal–principal conflicts between family shareholders and other shareholders have been investigated in emerging economies, but fewer studies have examined the effect of concentrated ownership on firm profitability and dividend payout in stakeholder-oriented systems. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether family control leads to principal–principal conflicts resulting in wealth expropriation of minority shareholders by family owners in stakeholder-oriented systems. Design/methodology/approach This study uses large listed firms of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in Japan during 2007–2016. Using 14,991 firm year observations, the authors analyze the effect of family control on dividend payout and firm performance to test the possibility of exploitation by family owners. Findings The authors find that family board members do not exploit minority shareholders and rather behave as stewards of the firm. The authors also find that foreign shareholders interact with family control to increase firm profitability, suggesting that foreign shareholders enhance the role of family board members as stewards. Originality/value Existing research on principal–principal conflicts tends to examine expropriation by family board members in emerging markets. This research reveals that family board members behave like stewards in the presence of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, foreign shareholders strengthen the stewardship role of family controlled firms.

Banks on Board: German and American Corporate Governance, 1870–1914

2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Fear ◽  
Christopher Kobrak
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Foreign Investment ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
The United States ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Control Speculation

This examination of the foundations of German and American corporate governance highlights the role of money-centered banks, both as board members in large corporations and as intermediaries on the stock exchange. German banks, by acting as surrogate regulators, became institutional stabilizers, and German regulators encouraged banks to participate in corporate boards in order to overcome agency problems in firms and to control speculation. American investment banks, prior to 1914, often managed to overcome regulatory obstacles, which enabled them to wield more power over corporations than their legendary German counterparts. American banks had more opportunities to intervene in the event of panics, bankruptcies, foreign investment, and corporate consolidation. In contrast to Germany, the United States increasingly imposed regulations that circumscribed the supervisory role of banks as board members.

scholarly journals The role of monitoring mechanisms towards company’s performance

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romlah Jaffar ◽  
Zaleha Abdul-Shukor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism

Purpose Past studies show that companies’ connection with the government (or politically connected companies (PCCs)) contributed negatively to their financial performance. The grabbing hand theory suggests that political connection demand companies to serve political and social obligation that exhaust companies’ financial resources. The purpose of this paper is to extend the previous studies by examining the role of monitoring mechanisms, specifically corporate governance mechanism and institutional ownership (IO), whether they weaken or strengthen the financial performance of PCCs in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of all companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the year of 2004-2007. The time periods were chosen because there were no significant economic and political events that could possibly distorted the financial and non-financial data. Findings The findings show that companies’ political connection (the presence of political figure or government representative as members of board of director) has consistently showing negative relationship with performance. The result is consistent with the grabbing hand theory that argues that companies’ connection with government would actually destroy companies’ value. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the percentage of independent board members does not have any significant effect on firm’s performance. The monitoring role of corporate governance as measured by the composition of independent board members have shown a positive significant effect on the company’s performance. However the second monitoring mechanism, the percentage of institutional investors, have a tendency to weaken the company’s performance. Originality/value The findings of this study provide an additional understanding of the consequence of government intervention on companies’ performance. This study also highlights the role of monitoring mechanism (independence board members and IO) in strengthening or weakening the performance. The findings suggest that the proper appointment criteria for board members should be seriously considered to ensure better corporate governance structure. Therefore, the formation of the nomination committee as suggested by the current Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance play an important contribution to ensure candidates nominated as board members have proper credentials and qualifications to carry out responsibilities as board members.

scholarly journals Toward artificial governance? The role of artificial intelligence in shaping the future of corporate governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 851-870
Author(s):  
Michael Hilb
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Board Members ◽  
The Future ◽  
Board Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Business Technology

Abstract The article explores the impact of the ongoing progress and adaptation of artificial intelligence on the practice of the corporate governance. It applies three lenses to artificial governance—the business, technology and society lenses—to assess the desirability, feasibility and responsibility of automating board-level decision-making to ensure effective corporate governance. Based on an assessment of the potential and limitations of human and machine learning for effective board-level decision-making, the article proposes five scenarios of artificial governance, i.e. assisted, augmented, amplified, autonomous and autopoietic intelligence, that are likely to shape the governance of organizations today, tomorrow and beyond. It discusses the implications of both the governance of and the governance with artificial intelligence in the three horizons and concludes with an appeal to board members to take an active role in understanding, imagining and shaping the future of artificial governance.

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