Environment, Market Share, and Market Power

1990 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1160-1177 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Boulding ◽  
Richard Staelin
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 002224292199456
Author(s):  
Yanwen Wang ◽  
Michael Lewis ◽  
Vishal Singh

The prevalence of strong brands such as Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Budweiser, and Marlboro in “vice” categories has important implications for regulators and consumers. While researchers in multiple disciplines have studied the effectiveness of anti-tobacco counter-marketing strategies, little attention has been given to how brand strength may moderate the efficacy of tactics such as excise taxes, usage restrictions, and educational advertising campaigns. In this research, we use a multiple discrete-continuous model to study the impact of anti-smoking techniques on smokers’ choices of brands and quantities. Our results suggest that while cigarette excise taxes decrease smoking rates, these taxes also result in a shift in market share towards stronger brands. Market leaders may be less affected by tax policies because their market power allows strong brands such as Marlboro to absorb rather than pass through increased taxes. In contrast, smoke-free restrictions cause a shift away from stronger brands. In terms of anti-smoking advertising we find minimal effects on brand choice and consumption. The findings highlight the importance of considering brand asymmetries when designing a policy portfolio cigarette tax hikes, smoke-free restrictions, and anti-smoking advertising campaigns.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 630-656 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Fohlin

Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.


2020 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2096624
Author(s):  
Marleen Willekens ◽  
Simon Dekeyser ◽  
Liesbeth Bruynseels ◽  
Wieteke Numan

This study examines whether auditor market power is associated with audit quality. Regulators around the world have repeatedly expressed concerns about the high levels of supplier concentration, the limited number of audit suppliers in the audit market, and the potential adverse consequences of their (alleged) market power. Using U.S. data from 2009 to 2017, we examine the effect on audit quality of two competing measures of auditor market power: (a) a “traditional” market concentration measure (Herfindahl index) and (b) a competing measure derived from spatial competition theory (i.e., market share distance from the closest competitor). Following Aobdia, we infer audit quality from two measures of financial reporting quality: (a) the level of absolute abnormal accruals, and (b) the incidence of financial statement restatements. Our results indicate that industry market share distance is positively associated with audit quality, but we do not find an association between market concentration and audit quality. In addition, we find that the positive association between market share distance and audit quality only holds when the incumbent auditor is a market leader, although industry leadership itself is not significantly associated with audit quality. These findings suggest that audit quality is positively affected by a market leader’s industry market share dominance over its competitors rather than by industry specialization per se. JEL Classification: M4; L0


2009 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 646-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Flandreau ◽  
Juan H. Flores

How does sovereign debt emerge? In the early nineteenth century, intermediaries' market power and prestige served to overcome information asymmetries. Relying on insights from finance theory, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries' reputations to guide their investment strategies. Intermediaries could in turn commit or else they would lose market share. This sustained the development of sovereign debt. This new perspective is backed by archival evidence and empirical data, and it suggests why strong but undemocratic states could borrow.“A good name is worth more than a gem.”Yiddish proverb


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (48) ◽  
pp. 16-33
Author(s):  
Hector Alberto Botello ◽  
Isaac Guerrero Rincón

The objective is to determine how market concentration affects firms’ decisions to innovate. With company-level data l from the 2010 Ecuadorian economic census , a probabilistic/linear model was calculated with correction for selection bias. Ecuadorian companies have a limited innovation capability and there is a persistence in market concentration. The estimates confirm the theory of market power in the propensity to innovate for both models. Consequently, increased market share leads to an increase in the likelihood of innovation, thanks to the ability to exploit the gains from these processes.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-192
Author(s):  
Arne Neukirch ◽  
Thomas Wein

Abstract Gasoline prices in Germany fluctuate significantly within one day. Price ranges of 15 euro cent per day are not uncommon. Consumers therefore often perceive that market power is exercised in the retail fuel market. Especially high surcharges in the late evening are considered to be price gouging. The German Federal Cartel Authority used these price mark-ups as evidence for oligopoly market power in four metropolitan regions between 2007 and 2010. Data for eight metropolises and 65 medium-sized cities from May 2016 to June 2019 show that the lowest price level in the day is reached in the early evening and then rises sharply. We use the well-known Lerner Index to measure market power in these evening hours. Our descriptive analysis shows that the Lerner Indices of the premium brands Aral, Shell, and Total S.A. rise after 10 p.m., that is, after a large part of the price-aggressive gas stations have closed. The results were about 0.1 for diesel and 0.08 for gasoline. Other companies achieve lower values of 0.05–0.07. Compared to other international studies that deal with the fuel market, we find a similar level of Lerner Indices, but only for few hours and not for the whole day. Multivariate estimations cannot show that a larger market share of the analyzed brand or a lower market share of price-aggressive firms increases the index. Influences of weekdays, different cities or wholesale prices cannot be proven either. Therefore, the gasoline market seems to be competitive, at least in a higher dimension as it is publicly perceived. Hence, pricing behavior in the evening and at night cannot be used as evidence of a serious abuse of market power by petrol stations, which could be relevant for the evaluation of future mergers in the petrol market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (7) ◽  
pp. 897-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hidetaka Mitani

PurposeThe purpose of the present study is to discuss the combined effect of predation risk and firms' market power on cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachThe authors tested hypotheses by using consolidated financial data in Japanese firms.FindingsThe authors find that firms' cash holdings increase with a rise in predation risk faced by firms. However, the higher the firm's market power, the weaker the above interplay becomes. Moreover, the authors find that even when firms' investments are decreased at the industry level, firms with larger cash holdings seek to mitigate predation risk by funding strategic investments with the potential to steal rivals' market share.Originality/valueThe authors recognize the importance of a firm's market power. Take a firm's market power into consideration to analyze the mechanism of a firm's cash holdings, there is a possibility that the mechanism of a firm's cash holdings as presented by the previous studies will be changed.


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