scholarly journals Optimal Duration of Innovation Contests

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Sıdıka Tunç
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Output Uncertainty ◽  
Support Tools ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Award Scheme ◽  
Over Time

Problem definition: We study the contest duration and the award scheme of an innovation contest where an organizer elicits solutions to an innovation-related problem from a group of agents. Academic/practical relevance: Our interviews with practitioners at crowdsourcing platforms have revealed that the duration of a contest is an important operational decision. Yet, the theoretical literature has long overlooked this decision. Also, the literature fails to adequately explain why giving multiple unequal awards is so common in crowdsourcing platforms. We aim to fill these gaps between the theory and practice. We generate insights that seem consistent with both practice and empirical evidence. Methodology: We use a game-theoretic model where the organizer decides on the contest duration and the award scheme while each agent decides on her participation and determines her effort over the contest duration by considering potential changes in her productivity over time. The quality of an agent’s solution improves with her effort, but it is also subject to an output uncertainty. Results: We show that the optimal contest duration increases as the relative impact of the agent uncertainty on her output increases, and it decreases if the agent productivity increases over time. We characterize an optimal award scheme and show that giving multiple (almost always) unequal awards is optimal when the organizer’s urgency in obtaining solutions is below a certain threshold. We also show that this threshold is larger when the agent productivity increases over time. Finally, consistent with empirical findings, we show that there is a positive correlation between the optimal contest duration and the optimal total award. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that the optimal contest duration increases with the novelty or sophistication of solutions that the organizer seeks, and it decreases when the organizer can offer support tools that can increase the agent productivity over time. These insights and their drivers seem consistent with practice. Our findings also suggest that giving multiple unequal awards is advisable for an organizer who has low urgency in obtaining solutions. Finally, giving multiple awards goes hand in hand with offering support tools that increase the agent productivity over time. These results help explain why many contests on crowdsourcing platforms give multiple unequal awards.

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Arnosti ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Yash Kanoria
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Contact Potential ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Face Search ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium ◽  
Never Screened

Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Practical/academic relevance: The success of matching platforms requires designs that minimize search effort and facilitate efficient market clearing. Methodology: We study a game-theoretic model in which “applicants” and “employers” pay costs to search and screen. An important feature of our model is that both sides may waste effort: Some applications are never screened, and employers screen applicants who may have already matched. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize welfare for participants on both sides of the market. Results: We identify that the market operates in one of two regimes: It is either screening-limited or application-limited. In screening-limited markets, employer welfare is low, and some employers choose not to participate. This occurs when application costs are low and there are enough employers that most applicants match, implying that many screened applicants are unavailable. In application-limited markets, applicants face a “tragedy of the commons” and send many applications that are never read. The resulting inefficiency is worst when there is a shortage of employers. We show that simple interventions—such as limiting the number of applications that an individual can send, making it more costly to apply, or setting an appropriate market-wide wage—can significantly improve the welfare of agents on one or both sides of the market. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that platforms cannot focus exclusively on attracting participants and making it easy to contact potential match partners. A good user experience requires that participants not waste effort considering possibilities that are unlikely to be available. The operational interventions we study alleviate congestion by ensuring that potential match partners are likely to be available.

scholarly journals The Role of Problem Specification in Crowdsourcing Contests for Design Problems: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaohui (Zoey) Jiang ◽  
Yan Huang ◽  
Damian R. Beil
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Real World Data ◽  
Solution Quality ◽  
Design Problems ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Types Of Information

Problem definition: This paper studies the role of seekers’ problem specification in crowdsourcing contests for design problems. Academic/practical relevance: Platforms hosting design contests offer detailed guidance for seekers to specify their problems when launching a contest. Yet problem specification in such crowdsourcing contests is something the theoretical and empirical literature has largely overlooked. We aim to fill this gap by offering an empirically validated model to generate insights for the provision of information at contest launch. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model featuring different types of information (categorized as “conceptual objectives” or “execution guidelines”) in problem specifications and assess their impact on design processes and submission qualities. Real-world data are used to empirically test hypotheses and policy recommendations generated from the model, and a quasi-natural experiment provides further empirical validation. Results: We show theoretically and verify empirically that with more conceptual objectives disclosed in the problem specification, the number of participants in a contest eventually decreases; with more execution guidelines in the problem specification, the trial effort provision by each participant increases; and the best solution quality always increases with more execution guidelines but eventually decreases with more conceptual objectives. Managerial implications: To maximize the best solution quality in crowdsourced design problems, seekers should always provide more execution guidelines and only a moderate number of conceptual objectives.

scholarly journals Motivating Supplier Social Responsibility Under Incomplete Visibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1268-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft ◽  
León Valdés ◽  
Yanchong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Problem definition: We examine how a profit-driven firm (she) can motivate better social responsibility (SR) practices by a supplier (he) when these practices cannot be perfectly observed by the firm. We focus on the firm’s investment in the supplier’s SR capabilities. To capture the influence of consumer demands, we incorporate the potential for SR information to be disclosed by the firm or revealed by a third party. Academic/practical relevance: Most firms have limited visibility into the SR practices of their suppliers. However, there is little research on how a firm under incomplete visibility should (i) invest to improve a supplier’s SR practices and (ii) disclose SR information to consumers. We address this gap. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with asymmetric information to study a supply chain with one supplier and one firm. The firm makes her investment decision given incomplete information about the supplier’s current SR practices. We analyze and compare two settings: the firm does not disclose versus she discloses SR information to the consumers. Results: The firm should invest a high (low) amount in the supplier’s capabilities if the information she observes suggests the supplier’s current SR practices are poor (good). She should always be more aggressive with her investment when disclosing (versus not disclosing). This more aggressive strategy ensures better supplier SR practices under disclosure. When choosing between disclosing and not disclosing, the firm most likely prefers not to disclose when the supplier’s current SR practices seem to be average. Managerial implications: (i) Greater visibility helps the firm to better tailor her investment to the level of support needed. (ii) Better visibility also makes the firm more “truthful” in her disclosure, whereas increased third-party scrutiny makes her more “cautious.” (iii) Mandating disclosure is most beneficial for SR when the suppliers’ current practices seem to be average.

Dynamic Probabilistic Selling When Customers Have Boundedly Rational Expectations

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tingliang Huang ◽  
Zhe Yin
Keyword(s):  
Rational Expectations ◽  
Programming Model ◽  
Simple Game ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Lower Probability ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Over Time

Problem definition: The existing literature on probabilistic or opaque selling has largely focused on understanding why it is attractive to firms. In this paper, we intend to answer a follow-up question: How should opaque selling be managed in a firm’s operations over time? Academic/practical relevance: Answering this question is relevant yet complex, because in practice (i) the profitability of opaque selling depends on how customers respond to the firm’s product-offering strategies and (ii) the firm’s strategies have to be responsive to customers’ purchasing decisions to maximize its total profit. Methodology: We develop a simple game-theoretic framework to capture the dynamic nature of the problem in multiple periods when customers boundedly rationally expect the firm’s strategies through anecdotal reasoning. We characterize the firm’s optimal pricing and product-offering policy. Results: We find that offering the high-value product with a high probability followed by a lower probability is typically optimal over time. We finally analyze several model extensions, such as different numbers of customers, multiple anecdotes, infinitely many periods, and limited inventory, and show the robustness of our results. Managerial implications: We demonstrate the value of using a dynamic probabilistic selling policy and prove that our dynamic policy can double the firm’s profit compared with using the static policy proposed in the existing literature. In a dynamic programming model, we prove that a cycle policy oscillating between two product-offering probabilities is typically optimal in the steady state over infinitely many periods.

The Effects of Patent Extension and Take-Back Regulation on Green Pharmacy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianqin Shi ◽  
Nicholas C. Petruzzi ◽  
Dilip Chhajed
Keyword(s):  
Pharmaceutical Industry ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Technical Information ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Innovative Company ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
European Environmental Agency ◽  
Managerial Implications

Problem definition: The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. Academic/practical relevance: One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. Results: The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds a threshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. Managerial implications: By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.

Construction and Study of a Game-Theoretic Model of Interaction Between Manufacturers of SLR Cameras, Taking into Account Forecasting Demand

2021 ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Vlasov
Keyword(s):  
Demand Forecasting ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Advanced Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Technology Market ◽  
Predicted Values ◽  
Made In

The article discloses the mechanisms for constructing and researching a theoretical and game model of interaction between manufacturers of SLR cameras taking into account demand forecasting. The need for the use of theoretical and game modeling of an advanced level, taking into account the predicted values of demand for mirror photographic equipment, as well as the dynamics of demand for a new photo product, is justified. In order to study the phenomenon of competitive interaction of manufacturers of SLR cameras, a comprehensive application of econometric analysis and theoretical game modeling was implemented. It is noted that this approach can be widely used in the practice of making decisions in the field of the photo industry. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the advanced game model of the choice by the manufacturer of camera equipment of the time of bringing new photo products to the market. In the process of analyzing the game model, maximax criteria, Laplace criterion, Wald criterion, Sevij criterion, Hurwitz criterion and Hodge Lehman criterion are used. Comprehensive analysis of the game model, supplemented by meaningful interpretations, contributes to improving the quality of decisions made in the photographic technology market, including when choosing marketing strategies for the promotion of photographers in the context of mainstreaming the risks of various nature and the limitations of the pandemic.

Artificial Shortage in Agricultural Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Retsef Levi ◽  
Somya Singhvi ◽  
Yanchong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Government Interventions ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Government ◽  
Preemptive Effect

Problem definition: Price surge of essential commodities despite inventory availability, due to artificial shortage, presents a serious threat to food security in many countries. To protect consumers’ welfare, governments intervene reactively with either (i) cash subsidy, to increase consumers’ purchasing power by directly transferring cash; or (ii) supply allocation, to increase product availability by importing the commodity from foreign markets and selling it at subsidized rates. Academic/practical relevance: This paper develops a new behavioral game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain and market dynamics that engender artificial shortage as well as to analyze the effectiveness of various government interventions in improving consumer welfare. Methodology: We analyze a three-stage dynamic game between the government and the trader. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and the resulting consumer welfare under the base scenario of no government intervention as well as under each of the interventions being studied. Results: The analysis demonstrates the disparate effects of different interventions on artificial shortage; whereas supply allocation schemes often mitigate shortage, cash subsidy can inadvertently aggravate shortage in the market. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on onion prices in India shows that the proposed model explains the data well and provides specific estimates on the implied artificial shortage. A counterfactual analysis quantifies the potential impacts of government interventions on market outcomes. Managerial implications: The analysis shows that reactive government interventions with supply allocation schemes can have a preemptive effect to reduce the trader’s incentive to create artificial shortage. Although cash subsidy schemes have recently gained wide popularity in many countries, we caution governments to carefully consider the strategic responses of different stakeholders in the supply chain when implementing cash subsidy schemes.

Intertemporal Product Management with Strategic Consumers: The Value of Defective Product Returns

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Narendra Singh ◽  
Karthik Ramachandran ◽  
Ravi Subramanian
Keyword(s):  
New Product ◽  
Perceived Quality ◽  
Product Line ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Product Returns ◽  
Strategic Consumers ◽  
Defect Rate ◽  
The Future

Problem definition: An increased incidence of quality issues, resulting in defective product returns (DPRs), is a concern for firms bringing innovative products to market. Although a firm can recover value from DPRs through refurbishing, consumers are known to act strategically in anticipation of the future availability of refurbished units. We study a firm’s strategy for offering a new product and refurbished DPRs to strategic consumers across time. Academic/practical relevance: Aided by emerging shopping tools, an increasing number of consumers consider buying refurbished versions of products rather than their new counterparts. A novel contribution of our work is the recognition of the refurbishing of DPRs as a possible solution to the time inconsistency problem that arises when a firm offers products to strategic consumers across time. We characterize how the product line decisions and profit of the firm are influenced by the defect rate, the perceived quality of refurbished DPRs, and consumers’ hassle cost of returns. Methodology: We develop a two-period game-theoretic model to characterize the firm offering the new product and refurbished DPRs to strategic consumers across time. Results: The refurbishing of DPRs helps the firm implicitly commit to limiting the quantity of the new product offered in the future, allowing the firm to charge a premium for the new product today. As a result, firm profit may even increase with the defect rate. These results persist across various model extensions. Managerial implications: Whereas the firm’s profit is the highest when there are no defects, opportunities to achieve marginal reductions in defect rates may not be worth the investment and may even be counterproductive. Also, efforts toward enhancing the perceived quality of the refurbished product or decreasing the hassle cost for consumers may better serve the firm than efforts toward marginally improving defect rates.

Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Samuel ◽  
Jeremy Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Structural Parameters ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Industry Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract A long standing question is whether product market competition disciplines a firm’s incentive to engage in earnings management. This paper argues that this question cannot be investigated adequately without accounting for the quality of firms’ auditors, because auditors affect the probability of discovering earnings management. Since firms choose their auditor, a non-compliant firm can alter its own probability of being detected. Consequently, a firm’s decision to manage earnings is a function of its auditor’s quality, which is itself endogenously chosen by the firm. To study this issue we develop a game-theoretic model that captures the potential inter-relationship between industry competition, the firms’ choice of audit quality, and compliance with accounting regulations (or the degree of earnings manipulation). We show that the link between financial compliance and product market competition is affected by the endogenously chosen audit quality. We estimate this model’s structural parameters and find that greater competition reduces both compliance and the demand for high quality audits.

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