Artificial Shortage in Agricultural Supply Chains

Problem definition: Price surge of essential commodities despite inventory availability, due to artificial shortage, presents a serious threat to food security in many countries. To protect consumers’ welfare, governments intervene reactively with either (i) cash subsidy, to increase consumers’ purchasing power by directly transferring cash; or (ii) supply allocation, to increase product availability by importing the commodity from foreign markets and selling it at subsidized rates. Academic/practical relevance: This paper develops a new behavioral game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain and market dynamics that engender artificial shortage as well as to analyze the effectiveness of various government interventions in improving consumer welfare. Methodology: We analyze a three-stage dynamic game between the government and the trader. We fully characterize the market equilibrium and the resulting consumer welfare under the base scenario of no government intervention as well as under each of the interventions being studied. Results: The analysis demonstrates the disparate effects of different interventions on artificial shortage; whereas supply allocation schemes often mitigate shortage, cash subsidy can inadvertently aggravate shortage in the market. Furthermore, empirical analysis with actual data on onion prices in India shows that the proposed model explains the data well and provides specific estimates on the implied artificial shortage. A counterfactual analysis quantifies the potential impacts of government interventions on market outcomes. Managerial implications: The analysis shows that reactive government interventions with supply allocation schemes can have a preemptive effect to reduce the trader’s incentive to create artificial shortage. Although cash subsidy schemes have recently gained wide popularity in many countries, we caution governments to carefully consider the strategic responses of different stakeholders in the supply chain when implementing cash subsidy schemes.

The European Commission’s Proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act—A Critical Assessment by Members of the Robotics and AI Law Society (RAILS)

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission presented its long-awaited proposal for a Regulation “laying down harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence”, the so-called “Artificial Intelligence Act” (AIA). This article takes a critical look at the proposed regulation. After an introduction (1), the paper analyzes the unclear preemptive effect of the AIA and EU competences (2), the scope of application (3), the prohibited uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI) (4), the provisions on high-risk AI systems (5), the obligations of providers and users (6), the requirements for AI systems with limited risks (7), the enforcement system (8), the relationship of the AIA with the existing legal framework (9), and the regulatory gaps (10). The last section draws some final conclusions (11).

COURTS MARTIAL AND THE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE OF THE ROMANIAN ARMY IN WORLD WAR ONE

The century that passed over the memories of the Great War, as it was called in the era, should allow all of us, no matter what side we had chosen at that time, to think on allaspects of the day-by-day life in the frontline. And to admit as well, that not all the soldiers and officers who had taken part in, were heroes. They were normal people, with hearts and feelings, trapped in an abnormal environment, fighting for their side of “King and Country” against all destructive means of the industrial war. So, it was of great importance to maintain a proper discipline among those troops which were sent day after day in slaughter attacks. And for this reason, was used the military justice and the Code of military justice, named differently by country, but having the same role: to support the war effort. One of the supportive elements was the preemptive effect, the deterrence of any potential act of breaking the discipline. Equally counted the way this contribution came into effect.Keywords: military justice; discipline; court martial; world war; war effort.

Preemptive effect of amantadine as adjuvant in postoperative analgesia of ovaryhisterectomy in dogs

This study aimed to evaluate the preemptive analgesic effect of amantadine on postoperative pain control in female dogs that underwent ovariohysterectomy. Twenty female dog were randomly assigned to two groups of ten. The control group (CONTROL) received oral placebo capsules, while the amantadine (AMANT) group received 5 mg/kg of oral amantadine one hour before sedation. All the animals were premedicated with 3 mg/kg (IM) meperidine, induced with propofol and maintained with isofluorane. The transanesthetic physiological parameters were recorded, and postoperative pain was evaluated every hour after extubation for six hours with the Dynamic Interactive Visual Analog Scale (DIVAS) and mechanical nociceptive threshold (MNT) and when the necessary analgesic rescue was administered (morphine, 0.2 mg/kg (IM)). During the surgical procedure, there was no significant difference in the variables measured between the two groups. Regarding postoperative pain assessment, there was a significant difference in the DIVAS score (p = 0.004) between the groups, in which AMANT required fewer rescues than did CONTROL (p = 0.03). The MNT was significantly higher ​​in AMANT than in CONTROL (p = 0.03). The results suggested that the preoperative administration of amantadine decreased analgesic requirement in female dogs that underwent elective ovariohysterectomy.

Preemptive Effect of Two Different (Intracuff and Intravenous) Routes of Dexamethasone Administration on Postoperative Sore Throat and Cough

Introduction: The most common complications following anesthesia intubation include postoperative sore throat, post-extubation cough, and hoarse voice. Currently, the use of preoperative Dexamethasone has been effective in controlling these complications. Therefore, the present study aimed to compare the preemptive effect of intracuff and intravenous routes of Dexamethasone administration for postoperative sore throat and cough. Materials and Methods: In the present clinical trial, 96 patients who underwent general anesthesia intubation were randomly assigned to three groups. The first group received 4 mg intracuff Dexamethasone, the second group received 4 mg intravenous Dexamethasone, and the third group was administered a placebo. Cough frequency and severity of a sore throat after extubation were investigated in the three groups. Results: Any significant difference was not observed among the three groups regarding hemodynamic variables (P>0.01); however, the incidence of cough was significantly lower in all the three groups (P<0.01). Also, the average severity of a sore throat in PAR and 1 h after surgery in the three groups was significantly lower (P<0.05). Moreover, no difference was detected in the groups regarding the severity of a sore throat within 24 h post-surgery (P>0.01). Conclusion: The use of two methods of intravenous and intracuff Dexamethasone administration before surgery reduced the incidence of postoperative cough and the severity of sore throat in patients.

The New York Convention and the American Federal System

Virtually all American states have statutes that make arbitration agreements and awards enforceable and that set out procedures for their enforcement in state courts. A number of states, including California, Texas, and Florida, have enacted international arbitration statutes to supplement their domestic arbitration laws.2 But this extensive body of state arbitration law has had only a “marginal impact” on American arbitration practice – particularly international arbitration practice because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts conflicting state arbitration laws, even in state court. Although we know that the FAA preempts state law, the scope of that preemptive effect is not clear. Indeed, a pair of United States Supreme Court cases have suggested a possible broader role for state law in arbitration matters. In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel Inc., the Court indicated in dicta that parties might be able to contract for expanded review under state law although the FAA does not permit them to do so.5 And in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court suggested that the arbitrators might not have exceeded their powers in construing an arbitration clause to permit class arbitration if they had relied on a state default rule permitting class arbitration. Whether state law can play a broader role in international arbitration matters in the United States depends on the extent to which the New York Convention and Chapter Two of the FAA (which implements the Convention) preempt state arbitration law. This article undertakes a preliminary analysis of that broad topic by examining several legal questions central to determining the preemptive effect of the New York Convention: (1) What effect, if any, does the federal-state clause (Article XI) have on U.S. obligations under the Convention? (2) To what extent does Chapter Two of the FAA apply in state court? and (3) Is the New York Convention self-executing? Part II briefly sets out background information on the New York Convention and its implementation in the U.S. Part III describes three models of how an arbitration convention might be implemented: the “exclusive spheres” model, the “federal preemption” model, and the “access” model. Part IV analyzes the legal questions identified above and considers their implications for the models. Part V discusses the extent to which parties can contract out of the FAA and into state arbitration law. Finally, Part VI identifies some possible implications of this analysis and concludes.

The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate

Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia has challenged President Obama's signature legislative initiative of health care reform. Virginia has sought declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia has contended that the federal legislation's individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia's lawsuit has been one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet the very features of the case that have contributed to its political salience also require its dismissal for lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law-precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These statutory limits are a sea wall; they keep out, on statutory grounds, some suits that should otherwise be kept out on Article III grounds. The statutory and constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction over suits like Virginia v. Sebelius insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that follow from state statutes designed to create federal jurisdiction over constitutional challenges by states to federal law. This Article identifies previously neglected jurisdictional limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to suits of this type.