scholarly journals Jurisdição Constitucional na Era Cunha: entre o Passivismo Procedimental e o Ativismo Substancialista do STF / Judicial Review in the Age of Eduardo Cunha: Between Procedural Passivism and Substantive Activism in Brazil's Federal Supreme Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (13) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Da Rosa de Bustamante ◽  
Evanilda De Godoi Bustamante
2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
Adnan Qadir

The law-making process as a whole vested in the legislative power in the presidential form of government, however in the parliamentary form of government, the executive power participates in the law-making through introducing bills along with legislative initiatives. The Constitution in Iraq grants an original authority to legislate federal laws to the Council of Representatives, however the executive power namely the President and the Council of Ministries participates in the process through introducing government bills to the Council of Representatives. Although the Constitution clearly identifies two methods through which bills shall be presented to the Council of Representatives, there have been disagreements over the constitutionality of laws legislated based legislative initiatives not government bills. The Federal Supreme Court has decided differently on different occasions by depriving the legislative power of its right to initiate in some cases or by putting restrictions in some other cases. This research analyzes the line drawn between the Council of Representatives and the executive power in the process of law-making at its first stage and then examines the Federal Supreme Court’s understanding in the light of the text of the Constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 278 (2) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Rômulo Guilherme Leitão ◽  
Alessandro Samartin de Gouveia

<p>Este artigo trata da escolha regulatória e do controle pelo Judiciário dos atos dela decorrentes à luz da Lei de Introdução às Normas do Direito Brasileiro (LINDB). O objetivo geral é verificar como deve se pautar o julgador na discussão da validade de atos normativos da agência reguladora em processos comuns e, para esse fim, analisa-se o poder regulatório da agência no Brasil, a escolha regulatória como categoria jurídica singular, sua competência normativa e o posicionamento do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre o assunto, especialmente as ADIs no 4.874 e 5.906; examina-se, ainda, a legalidade como princípio constitucional construído a partir de sua evolução, sua crise e sua definição na Constituição de 1988; e, por fim, investiga-se o controle judicial dos atos normativos consequentes de escolhas regulatórias, em hipóteses de controle concentrado e difuso de constitucionalidade, sendo este último o ambiente em que os arts. 20, 21, 23, 24 e 27 da Lei no 13.655, de 25 de abril de 2018, encontram melhor espaço para suas aplicações.</p><p> </p><p>This article deals with the regulatory choice and the Brazilian system of judicial review of the acts arising therefrom in light of the new Brazilian law´s interpretation (LINDB). The general objective is to verify how the judge should be guided in the discussion of the validity of regulatory acts of the regulatory agency in common proceedings and, for this purpose, the regulatory power of the agency in Brazil is analyzed, the regulatory choice as a unique legal category, its regulatory competence and the position of the Federal Supreme Court on the matter, especially the ADIs no. 4.874 and 5.906; it also examines legality as a constitutional principle built on its evolution, its crisis and its definition in the 1988 Constitution; and, finally, it investigates the judicial review of normative acts resulting from regulatory choices, in cases of concentrated and diffuse judicial review of constitutionality, the latter being the environment in which Articles 20, 21, 23, 24 and 27 of Law No. 13.655, of April 25, 2018, find better space for its applications.</p>


Author(s):  
Alexandre Machado De Oliveira ◽  
Celso De Barros Correia Neto

RESUMO: O artigo discute os parâmetros do controle judicial da efetivação do direito à saúde, considerando especialmente o princípio da escassez. A metodologia adotada abrange revisão bibliográfica da doutrina de direito constitucional, financeiro e sanitário, conjugada com a análise da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal. O artigo compreende oito tópicos, que envolvem uma abordagem do direito fundamental à saúde; a escassez dos recursos para a efetivação deste direito fundamental social; para, enfim, ingressar na questão do controle judicial de sua efetivação, abordando os desafios da realização de uma justiça distributiva, a necessidade de uma abordagem centrada na população, os critérios estabelecidos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, resultando na proposta de uma decisão que se afaste da regra de resgate e passível de uma audiência universal.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito Financeiro. Direito à Saúde. Princípio da Escassez. Controle Judicial. SUMMARY: This article studies the judicial control of the effetuation of the right to health considering the lack of scarce resources. The methodology includes a literature review of the constitutional, finance and health law doctrine, combined with the analysis of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence. This article comprises eight topics, which involve a fundamental right to health approach; the scarce resources for the effetuation of this fundamental social right; finally, to enter the issue of judicial review of its effectiveness, addressing the challenges of achieving distributive justice, the need for an approach based on population, the criteria established by the Supreme Court, resulting in the proposal for a decision that departs the rescue rule and be subject to an universal audience.KEYWORDS: Public Finance Law. Right to Health. Scarcity Principle. Judicial control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (57) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Paulo Gonet BRANCO ◽  
Ilton Norberto ROBL FILHO

ABSTRACT Objectives: The constitutional powers of the National Council of Justice challenge a constitutionally appropriate interpretation of its functions and constitutional consequences. This article analyzes the incidental control of constitutionality of administrative acts by such Council, based on article 37 of the Constitution of 1988, with the possibility to decline application of the law interpreted as unconstitutional. Methodology: The methodology used in this study is phenomenological-hermeneutic with literature review and analysis of the jurisprudence of the National Council of Justice and the Federal Supreme Court. Results:The thesis sustained in this paper states that the control of constitutionality of laws by administrative bodies loses relevance with the adoption of a robust system of judicial review in incidental and abstract forms, as currently observed in Brazil. On the other hand, exceptionally, due to the powers of article 103-B, I and II of § 4 of the Federal Constitution, the National Council of Justice may carry out judicial review by administrative bodies, having as its control parameter especially article 37 of Federal Constitution, but with limitations and due deference to the precedents of the Federal Supreme Court to apply the constitutional principles of government and to resolve the conflict between constitutional norms. Contributions: The study mentions the peculiarities of the National Council of Justice (instituted by Constitutional Amendment No. 45/2004) that are of special interest to analyze its institutional design and its place in rule of law, discussing the possibility of judicial review of administrative acts by the National Council of Justice with the nonapplication of laws not yet declared unconstitutional by the Courts.KEYWORDS: National Council of Justice; judicial review by administrative bodies; jurisdiction; Federal Supreme Court. RESUMO Objetivos: As competências constitucionais do Conselho Nacional de Justiça desafiam uma interpretação constitucionalmente adequada das funções e das suas consequências constitucionais. Este artigo analisa o controle incidental de constitucionalidade dos atos administrativos do mencionado Conselho, a partir do art. 37 da Constituição de 1988, com a possibilidade de afastamento da lei interpretada como inconstitucional. Metodologia: A metodologia utilizada neste estudo é fenomenológico-hermenêutica com revisão da literatura e análise da jurisprudência do Conselho Nacional de Justiça e do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Resultados:A tese sustentada neste trabalho afirma que o controle de constitucionalidade de leis por órgãos administrativos perde relevância com a adoção de robusto sistema de controle judicial de constitucionalidade nas modalidades incidental e abstrata, conforme se observa atualmente no Brasil. De outro lado, excepcionalmente em razão das competências dos incisos I e II do § 4º. do art. 103B, da Constituição de 1988, o Conselho Nacional de Justiça pode realizar controle administrativo de constitucionalidade, tendo como parâmetro de controle especialmente o art. 37 da Constituição de 1988, mas tendo limite e devendo deferência à jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal para concretizar os princípios constitucionais da administração pública e para solucionar a colisão entre normas constitucionais. Contribuições: O estudo traz as peculiaridades do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (instituído pela Emenda Constitucional nº. 45/2004), que são de especial interesse para analisar-se sua estrutura institucional e seu lugar no regramento do Direito ao discutir a possibilidade de revisão judicial de atos administrativos pel Conselho Nacional de Justiça co a não aplicação de leis ainda não declaradas inconstitucionais pelos tribunais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Conselho Nacional de Justiça; controle de constitucionalidade administrativo; jurisdição; Supremo Tribunal Federal.


Author(s):  
Fábio Carvalho Leite ◽  
Marcelo Santini Brando

Resumo: O trabalho analisa, em duas partes, o fenômeno conhecido por dispersão de fundamentos, prática decisória que por vezes marca o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) no controle de constitucionalidade. A primeira parte é descritiva e sugere que a dispersão de fundamentos é fenômeno que ocorre pela presença necessária da regra de maioria decisória simples (RMDS) associada à presença contingente do princípio da causa de pedir aberta e da indeterminação relativa do texto constitucional. A segunda parte é normativa e analisa criticamente os problemas resultantes da adoção da RMDS. Partindo-se do tradicional debate sobre a legitimidade do controle de constitucionalidade, porém não se alinhando a um modelo normativo em particular, o trabalho põe em xeque a proximidade do processo decisório do STF com a ideia de “resposta certa”, aborda a dificuldade de se formar jurisprudência capaz de uniformizar o tratamento de casos a respeito de um assunto e questiona a desconsideração da presunção de constitucionalidade nos casos difíceis do direito em que se verifiquem desacordos morais razoáveis. Por fim, a confiabilidade de intuições morais invocadas pelos ministros no processo decisório do STF é questionada a partir das ciências cognitivas e da psicologia moral.Palavras-chave: Supremo Tribunal Federal; Controle de constitucionalidade; Processo decisório; Dispersão de fundamentos. Abstract: The work analyzes, in two parts, a phenomenon known as argument scatter, a decision-making practice that sometimes characterizes judicial review in the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). The first part is descriptive, and suggests that argument scatter occurs in the necessary presence of a simple majority decision-making rule (SMDMR), associated to the contingent presence of the open cause of action principle and of the relative indeterminacy of constitutional text. The second part is normative, and critically analyzes the problems that arise from the SMDMR. Taking the traditional debate about the legitimacy of judicial review as a starting point, while avoiding commitment to any particular normative model, this work calls into question the proximity of the Supreme Court’s decision-making process with the idea of a "right answer", addresses the difficulty of generating clear precedents, and challenges the disregard of the presumption of constitutionality in hard cases in the law where reasonable moral disagreements emerge. Finally, on the basis of research in the cognitive sciences and moral psychology, it challenges the reliability of the moral intuitions Supreme Court Justices invoke in the decision-making process.Keywords: Brazilian Federal Supreme Court; Judicial review; Decision-making process; Scattered arguments.


2009 ◽  
Vol 160 (9) ◽  
pp. 263-274
Author(s):  
Alois Keel ◽  
Willi Zimmermann

With the entry into force of the new Swiss Federal Law on Forests on the 1st of January 1993, the basis of decision-making for the Federal Supreme Court concerning forestry issues has, at least formally, fundamentally changed. This article depicts the development of the Federal Supreme Court's jurisdiction during 2000–2008 concerning the legislation on forests. The analysis of about 100 decisions reveals that the federal jurisdiction has, with regard to contents, barely changed in comparison to that of the federal law on supervision of the forest police of 1902. The most frequent causes of dispute are assessments of forest status, authorizations for deforestation, and forest distance regulations. The Federal Supreme Court merely refined the jurisdiction; it did not, or did not need to disclose fundamentally new lines [benchmarks]. It rather adheres to the restrictive definition of forest and the strict conservation of forests, while the cantons do not dispose of a large scope for the deforestation jurisdiction or the definition of the term “forest”. The Federal Supreme Court grants the cantons more freedom to regulate and implement the forest distance. Obvious changes can be observed concerning the number of forest law cases that have been dealt with by the Federal Supreme Court. Compared to the 1980ies and early 1990ies, they have decreased by more than half. Among others, reasons for this decrease are the cantons' obligation to appoint courts only as last cantonal resort, the improvement of the formal and material coordination of the proceedings, and the introduction of the “static forest term” with respect to building zones in the sense of the federal law on area planning.


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