scholarly journals Attention to Prescriptive Norms Increases Dictator Game Generosity in Women but not Men: Using the 2D:4D Digit Ratio to Test the Role of Biology

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-31
Author(s):  
Esteban Freidin ◽  
◽  
Fermín Breccia ◽  
Carlos Maximiliano Senci
Keyword(s):  
2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy F. Ackert ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Xi (Jason) Kuang ◽  
Li Qi

ABSTRACT:Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110556
Author(s):  
Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen ◽  
Isabel Thielmann ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Stefan Pfattheicher

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.


Author(s):  
Nina Bandelj ◽  
Tyler Boston ◽  
Julia Elyachar ◽  
Julie Kim ◽  
Michael McBride ◽  
...  

This chapter reports findings from an interdisciplinary investigation of charitable giving. The authors studied charity contributions using a Dictator Game experimental design whereby participants are given tokens with real money value and can decide to contribute to charity or to keep the money for themselves. But to get a better sense of the role of morals and emotions, they also asked participants to explain their motivations for giving. In addition, they conducted the experiment with the same student participants at two different points in time. They found that those who contribute more to charity tend to be women, tend to evaluate themselves as less self-interested, and are more likely to have been those who gave to charity at the first point in time. The choices of particular charities are not very consistent over time but depend on participants' moral and emotional evaluations. The chapter concludes that even in abstract experimental conditions, moral judgments and emotional underpinnings are not discrete influences on how people think about and use money but are thoroughly intertwined, relationally grounded, and reinforced by practice.


2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaela Gummerum ◽  
Yaniv Hanoch ◽  
Monika Keller ◽  
Katie Parsons ◽  
Alegra Hummel
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali M. Miraghaie ◽  
Hamidreza Pouretemad ◽  
Alessandro E. P. Villa ◽  
Mohammad A. Mazaheri ◽  
Reza Khosrowabadi ◽  
...  

In the framework of neuroeconomics, Event Related Potentials (ERPs) were recorded during a combination of a Dictator Game (DG), in which the participants always played the role of Allocators, and an Ultimatum Game (UG), in which the participants always played the role of Responders. Behavioral analysis showed that the majority of participants were characterized by very low levels of altruistic decision making, which included two homogenous groups of individuals, one expressing fairness (GrpF, about 26%) and one selfish behavior (GrpS, about 20%). In the analysis of both games, an early negativity (N1) in the fronto-central cortical sites distinguished the GrpF and GrpS participants. The subsequent P2 wave component appeared more associated with the characteristics of the stimulus than with its behavioral value. During UG, we observed that a medial frontal negativity (MFN) occurred earlier and with greater amplitude in GrpS than in GrpF, which depended to a large extent to a spiteful punishment when the Responder refused offers less favorable for himself. The late positive component (LPC) of ERP recorded in posterior-parietal cortical sites was evoked earlier and with greater amplitude during UG than in DG and, in both games, LPC was evoked earlier and with greater amplitude in GrpS than in GrpF. Our results bring new evidence to the existence of different circuits activated by the evaluation of fair and unfair proposals in participants characterized by different expressions of perceived fairness, thus suggesting that particular brain dynamics could be associated with moral decisions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 86-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Friedl ◽  
Levent Neyse ◽  
Ulrich Schmidt
Keyword(s):  

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