Theory of mind and mental state discourse during book reading and story-telling tasks

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas K. Symons ◽  
Candida C. Peterson ◽  
Virginia Slaughter ◽  
Jackie Roche ◽  
Emily Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Book Reading ◽  
Story Telling

Parent–child picture-book reading, mothers' mental state language and children's theory of mind

2005 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 673-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUAN E. ADRIAN ◽  
ROSA A. CLEMENTE ◽  
LIDON VILLANUEVA ◽  
CAROLIEN RIEFFE
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Picture Book ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Book Reading ◽  
Mental State Language ◽  
Picture Book Reading ◽  
Reading At Home ◽  
State Language ◽  
Parent Child

This study focuses on parent–child book reading and its connection to the development of a theory of mind. First, parents were asked to report about frequency of parent–child storybook reading at home. Second, mothers were asked to read four picture-books to thirty-four children between 4;0 and 5;0. Both frequency of parent–child storybook reading at home, and mother's use of mental state terms in picture-books reading tasks were significantly associated with success on false belief tasks, after partialling out a number of potential mediators such as age of children, verbal IQ, paternal education, and words used by mothers in joint picture-book reading. Among the different mental state references (cognitive terms, desires, emotions and perceptions), it was found that the frequency and variety of cognitive terms, but also the frequency of emotional terms correlated positively with children's false belief performance. Relationships between mental state language and theory of mind are discussed.

Group membership and the effects on visual perspective taking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Schneider ◽  
Anne Grigutsch ◽  
Matthias Schurz ◽  
Romi Zäske ◽  
Stefan R. Schweinberger
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
Interference Effects ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
Visual Perspective Taking ◽  
Mental State Ascription ◽  
Ethnic Nationality ◽  
Level 1

It has been hypothesized that visual perspective-taking, a basic Theory of Mind mechanism, might operate quite automatically particularly in terms of ´what´ someone else sees. As such we were interested in whether different social categories of an agent (e.g., gender, race, nationality) influence this mental state ascription mechanism. We tested this assumption by investigating the Samson level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm using agents with different ethnic nationality appearances. A group of self-identified Turkish and German participants were asked to make visual perspective judgments from their own perspective (self-judgment) as well as from the perspective of a prototypical Turkish or German agent (other-judgment). The respective related interference effects - altercentric and egocentric interferences - were measured. When making other-judgments, German participants showed increased egocentric interferences for Turkish compared to German agents. Turkish participants showed no ethnic group influence for egocentric interferences and reported feeling associated with the German and Turkish nationality to a similar extent. For self-judgments, altercentric interferences were of similar magnitude for both ethnic agents in both participant groups. Overall this indicates that in level-1 visual perspective-taking, other-judgments and related egocentric interferences are sensitive to social categories and are better described as a flexible, controlled and deliberate mental state ascription mechanism. In contrast, self-judgments and related altercentric interference effects are better described as automatic, efficient and unconscious mental state ascription mechanisms. In a broader sense the current results suggest that we should stop considering automaticity an all-or-none principle when it comes theory of mind processes.

Social competence, theory of mind, and executive function in institution-reared Turkish children

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 519-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evren Etel ◽  
Bilge Yagmurlu
Keyword(s):  
Executive Function ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Competence ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
Receptive Language ◽  
Scaling Analysis ◽  
Turkish Children ◽  
The Social ◽  
Behavioral Assessments

This study had two aims. The first aim was to measure mental state understanding in institution-reared children by using a theory of mind (ToM) scale, and to examine the role of cultural context in sequencing of ToM acquisition. The other aim was to investigate ToM in relation to social competence and executive function (EF). Due to its pronounced role in mental state understanding and social interactions, we assessed receptive language as well. The participants were 107 institution-reared children aged 3 to 5 years in Turkey. Two visits were held within 2 days for behavioral assessments. In the first visit, the ToM scale was administered; in the second visit, the child was given the language test and the EF tasks. The social competence scales were completed by the child’s primary care provider in the institution. Guttman scaling analysis revealed that an understanding of diverse beliefs developed earlier than knowledge access, favoring the “individualistic pattern.” The regression analysis showed that EF was a significant predictor of ToM, but neither of them was associated with social competence when age was controlled. Receptive language predicted social competence and EF directly, and ToM indirectly through EF, pointing to the importance of this ability for early development.

Mind, child’s theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan M. Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Neurodevelopmental Disorder ◽  
Inductive Reasoning ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Preschool Period

Knowledge of other minds poses a variety of unusual problems due to the peculiarly private nature of mental states. Some current views, impressed by the contrast between the apparently direct access we have to our own mental states and the inaccessibility of others’ mental states, argue that we understand the mental states of others by imagining that they are our own by ‘simulation’. Other current views propose that we infer both our own mental states and the mental states of others by employing a set of conjectures arrived at through general inductive reasoning over experience: a ‘folk psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’. Experimental studies, by contrast, suggest that we possess an ‘instinct’ for comprehending the informational mental states of other minds. Children develop mental state concepts uniformly and rapidly in the preschool period when general reasoning powers are limited. For example, children can reason effectively about other people’s beliefs before they can reliably calculate that 2 plus 2 equals 4. In the empirical study of the ‘theory of mind’ instinct there have been three major discoveries so far: first, that normally developing 2-year-olds are able to recognize the informational state of pretending; second, that normally developing children can, by the age of 4 years, solve a variety of false belief problems; and lastly, that this instinct is specifically impaired in children with the neurodevelopmental disorder known as ‘autism’.

Neural Correlates of Mental State Decoding in Human Adults: An Event-related Potential Study

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Sabbagh ◽  
Margaret C. Moulson ◽  
Kate L. Harkness
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Human Adults ◽  
The Right

Successful negotiation of human social interactions rests on having a theory of mind—an understanding of how others' behaviors can be understood in terms of internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions. A core theory-of-mind skill is the ability to decode others' mental states on the basis of observable information, such as facial expressions. Although several recent studies have focused on the neural correlates of reasoning about mental states, no research has addressed the question of what neural systems underlie mental state decoding. We used dense-array eventrelated potentials (ERP) to show that decoding mental states from pictures of eyes is associated with an N270–400 component over inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions of the right hemisphere. Source estimation procedures suggest that orbitofrontal and medial temporal regions may underlie this ERP effect. These findings suggest that different components of everyday theory-of-mind skills may rely on dissociable neural mechanisms.

Theory of Mind

2019 ◽  
pp. 523-536
Author(s):  
Paula Rubio-Fernández
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Referential Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Infants And Children ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Experimental Pragmatics ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Belief Reasoning

Current accounts of Theory of Mind development have tried to explain the results of false-belief tasks with infants and children, but failed to account for the evidence of early belief reasoning reported in the experimental pragmatics literature. This chapter reviews a number of studies on the acquisition of the mental state verb know; toddlers’ understanding of factivity (or the difference between knowing and thinking); early referential communication and toddlers’ reliance on others’ engagement as a proxy for their knowledge, and the emergence of preschoolers’ understanding of the seeing-knowing relation. The results of these studies reveal a more nuanced picture than those of false-belief tasks, with some Theory of Mind abilities emerging earlier in conversation than in laboratory tasks, while children’s epistemic theories continue to develop beyond their passing of standard Theory of Mind tasks.

Armstrong's Materialism

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-592
Author(s):  
George S. Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Central State ◽  
The Central Nervous System ◽  
David Armstrong

Central-state materialism ( = CSM) is a very strong, but also very exciting theory of mind according to which each mental state is identical with a state of the central nervous system. CSM thus goes considerably beyond early versions of the identity theory of mind, since those early accounts (e.g., those of Place and Smart) held only that sensations are to be identified with neural events. CSM, by contrast, is a thesis about all mental states; every mental state is held to be a state of the central nervous system. In fact, as we will see shortly, CSM is an even more sweeping thesis than this formulation of it suggests, since it is not concerned simply with mental states.One prominent defender of CSM, David Armstrong, has maintained that CSM can be established by means of a two-step argument.

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