The Drivers and Consequences of Resource Misallocation: Exploiting Variation across Mexican Industries and States

Economía ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-96
Author(s):  
Florian Misch ◽  
Christian Saborowski
Author(s):  
Anastasios Kitsos ◽  
Antonios Proestakis

AbstractWe examine the role of political alignment and the electoral business cycle on municipality revenues in Greece for the period 2003–2010. The misallocation of resources for political gain represents a waste of resources with significant negative effects on local growth and effective decentralization. The focus of our analysis is municipality mayors since they mediate the relationship between central government and voters and hence can influence the effectiveness of any potential pork-barrelling activity. A novel panel data set combining the results of two local and three national elections with annual municipality budgets is used to run a fixed-effects econometric model. This allows us to identify whether the political alignment between mayors and central government affects municipality financing. We examine this at different stages of local and national electoral cycles, investigating both direct intergovernmental transfers (grants) and the remaining sources of local revenues (own revenues, loans). We find that total revenues are significantly higher for aligned municipalities in the run-up to elections due to higher intergovernmental transfers. We also find evidence that the 2008 crisis has reduced such pork-barrelling activity. This significant resource misallocation increases vertical networking dependency and calls for policy changes promoting greater decentralization and encouraging innovation in local revenue raising.


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 353-373
Author(s):  
Walter Block ◽  
William Barnett

What is the status of claims about the effects of minimum wage laws? Empirical or praxeological? We claim the latter. How can the effect of such legislation be best analyzed under the assumption of mis-behaving supply (backward bending) and demand (positively sloped, based on positing Giffen goods) curves? In the usual manner: resource misallocation still occurs. But this is only arguendo. More radically, such curves are themselves problematic. Even more radically, this, too, applies to «well behaved» supply and demand curves as well. Key words: Backward Bending Supply Curves, Price Controls, Praxeology, Giffen Goods, Logical Positivism. JEL Classification: D0. Resumen: ¿Cuál es el status del análisis sobre los efectos de las leyes de salario mínimo? ¿Empírico o praxeológico? Nosotros defendemos lo se gundo. ¿Pueden analizarse mejor los efectos de dichas leyes suponiendo curvas de oferta y demanda anómalas (como las de los bienes Giffen)? Como en el  nálisis tradicional se produce una mala asignación de recursos. En todo caso, tanto tales curvas, como las tradicionales son muy problemáticas. Palabras clave: Control de precios, praxeología, bienes de Giffen, positivismo lógico. Clasificación JEL: D0.


Author(s):  
Kailan Shang

Project risk management requires subject matter expertise to identify and assess relevant and sometimes unique risks. Insufficient experience data and fast evolvement of emerging risks in the field of project risk management make qualitative analysis more prevalent in project risk assessment. Therefore, expert knowledge and experience play a critical role in project risk management. On the other hand, the resulting subjectivity often leads to inconsistent risk assessment. Undesired consequences include cost underestimation, risk underestimation and resource misallocation. This chapter discusses the causes and adverse impact of subjectivity in project risk management and methods to improve objectivity. It covers common human biases in project risk management and introduces measures to improve objectivity in project risk management using expert diversification, risk culture, process mining, fuzzy logic models, and back testing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-303
Author(s):  
Phuong Thi Nguyen ◽  
Minh Khac Nguyen

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine resource misallocation among Vietnam’s small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the manufacturing sector. The paper also aims to consider selective factors on reducing the level of resource misallocation in SMEs. Design/methodology/approach Resource misallocation and efficiency gains in total factor productivity (TFP) are assessed using Vietnam’s annual enterprise survey data for the period 2000–2015 and an appropriate productivity decomposition framework. Findings Resource misallocation is found to be higher among SMEs than large scale enterprises. TFP is found to 116.3 per cent greater if there is no resource misallocation among SMEs. Smaller scale, lower market concentration, trade liberalisation and corruption control are found to be associated with lower level of resource misallocation in SMEs. Research limitations/implications The major limitation of this study is that it has only decomposed misallocation of resources arising from output and capital distortions and that it focusses on selective factors contribution to reducing misallocation level in SMEs. Originality/value Resource misallocation is attracting attention in both developed and developing countries. However, knowledge about resource misallocation among SMEs is limited, particularly in the context of developing countries. This paper assesses the level of resource misallocation among SMEs in Vietnamese manufacturing sector.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document