Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Eric Reinhardt
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Selection Effect ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Party Support

Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participationlowersthe prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.

scholarly journals Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining

2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Kucik ◽  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Flows ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Domestic Law

Transparency is one of the most contested aspects of international organizations. While observers frequently call for greater oversight of policy making, evidence suggests that settlement between states is more likely when negotiations are conducted behind closed doors. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) legal body provides a useful illustration of these competing perspectives. As in many courts, WTO dispute settlement is designed explicitly to facilitate settlement throughprivateconsultations. However, this study argues that the privacy of negotiations creates opportunities for states to strike deals that disadvantage others. Looking at product-level trade flows from all disputes between 1995 and 2011, it finds that private (early) settlements lead to discriminatory trade outcomes – complainant countries gain disproportionately more than the rest of the membership. When the facts of a case are made known through a ruling, these disproportional gains disappear entirely. The article also finds that third-party participation – commonly criticized for making settlement less likely – significantly reduces disparities in post-dispute trade. It then draws parallels to domestic law and concludes with a set of policy prescriptions.

Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 663-699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Johns ◽  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThird parties complicate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement by adding voices and issues to a dispute. However, complainants can limit third parties by filing cases under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rather than Article XXII. We argue that third parties create “insurance” by lowering the benefit of winning and the cost of losing a dispute. We construct a formal model in which third parties make settlement less likely. The weaker the complainant's case, the more likely the complainant is to promote third party participation and to settle. Article XXII cases are therefore more likely to settle, controlling for the realized number of third parties, and a complainant who files under Article XXIII is more likely to win a ruling and less likely to see that ruling appealed by the defendant. We provide empirical support using WTO disputes from 1995 to 2011.

scholarly journals An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 2001-2010

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 218-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

On 11 December 2001, China officially became a Member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after years of negotiations. The paper shows how a major developing country has used the WTO dispute settlement system by examining China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from its entry through 31 December 2010. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the WTO dispute cases in which China has participated as a complainant, a respondent, or a third party.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-332
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
International Adjudication ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.

Conclusions to Part II

2019 ◽  
pp. 161-166
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Other ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Rule Compliance ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
The One

When asked what, if anything, distinguishes US-Clove Cigarettes from other disputes filed with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), an Appellate Body (AB) Secretariat staff member replied: ‘A number of things and nothing at the same time’.1 This answer aptly captures the story of trade-and disputes and the DSS’s goal-attainment patterns in such cases, as revealed in this second part of the book. On the one hand, as in all WTO disputes, the DSS appears to be engaged in this class of cases in the routine legal exercise of law application and interpretation while pursuing its multiple goals, including rule-compliance and dispute resolution. On the other hand, as a WTO practitioner remarked when discussing the ‘interpretative exercise’ carried out by the DSS in trade-and disputes:...

The Aircraft Cases: Canada and Brazil

2002 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 387-431
Author(s):  
Rambod Behboodi
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Export Performance ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
Aircraft Industry ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Export Subsidies ◽  
The World ◽  
First Time

SummaryThe disputes between Canada and Brazil over subsidies to the regional aircraft industry were the first cases under Part II (covering prohibited subsidies) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PROEX case, involved the scope of the concept of “special and differential treatment” under Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, and the interpretation of the first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as set out in Annex I to the SCM Agreement. The Canada — Aircraft case involved, for the first time, Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines what practices constitute a subsidy, and Article 3, which prohibits subsidies “contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.” The case also dealt with important procedural issues relating to WTO dispute settlement. The author reviews critically these decisions with respect to both substantive and procedural issues.

Strategies and Success in Litigation and Negotiation in the WTO

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria F. Agius
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Issues

AbstractThis article analyzes linkages between litigation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and negotiation in multilateral trade rounds and develops a typology of links that can occur between the two processes. These include creating conditions where bargaining is informed by law, influencing the agenda-setting and creating momentum for negotiation on key issues, and affecting thestatus quofrom which negotiations proceed by influencing interpretation of trade rules in the DSB. The purpose is to test whether poor and inexperienced states that are disadvantaged in negotiations can improve their bargaining power in negotiation rounds by pursuing legal proceedings, to see whether links can be exploited for strategy-making to promote the interests of these states, and to discuss how the WTO as an international organization benefits from their empowerment. The strategies suggested in this article could improve the commitment and active participation of relatively non-influential member states. This could be conducive to perceptions of the WTO as a legitimate organization and to a more constructive climate for effective negotiations.

John Jackson and WTO Dispute Settlement

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-406
Author(s):  
WILLIAM J. DAVEY
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Law School ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
Trade Law ◽  
The Bible ◽  
International Trade Law ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World

John Jackson bestrode the world of international trade law like a Colossus. His 1969 treatise on World Trade and the Law of GATT was called the bible of GATT law. His 1977 casebook on Legal Problems of International Economic Relations created a new law school course and introduced thousands of students around the globe to international trade law. It was the leading international trade law casebook for decades, and his students went on to positions of responsibility throughout the world in governments, international organizations, and private practice. His analysis of GATT infirmities convinced certain influential governments to push for a new international trade organization, which eventually saw life as the World Trade Organization. It was a great honor for me to have been associated with John for over thirty years. Indeed, his 1985 invitation to join as a co-author of the casebook after my first year in law teaching undoubtedly saved me many years of drudgery as a corporate/securities law scholar. Thus, I am pleased to offer some thoughts on John's influence on dispute settlement under GATT and the WTO.

Substance and Style—How the WTO Adjudicators Legitimize their Decisions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiane Gerstetter
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Member States ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This chapter analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies legitimize their decisions and by implication also the WTO Dispute Settlement System as well as the WTO as an institution more broadly. The author argues there are two relevant dimensions for understanding how judges legitimize judicial decisions: the substantive outcomes of cases, that is who wins and loses and what interpretations are adopted, and the way a judicial decision is justified. She concludes that the WTO dispute settlement bodies act strategically in order to win the acceptance of the member states, and ultimately legitimize this dispute settlement system as a judicial entity.

scholarly journals Ask for the Moon, Settle for the Stars: What is a Reasonable Period to Comply with WTO Awards?

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ◽  
NIALL MEAGHER ◽  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
TATIANA YANGUAS
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Legal System ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Moon ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes

AbstractThe World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process allows a defending Member a ‘reasonable period of time’ (RPT) to implement any findings that its contested measures are inconsistent with WTO law. If agreement on this RPT cannot be reached, Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides for the possibility of arbitration on the length of the RPT. The DSU provides limited guidelines on the RPT, stating only that it should not normally exceed 15 months. In practice, Arbitrators have developed the standard that the RPT should reflect the shortest possible period under the domestic legal system of the defending Member to make the changes necessary to comply with the WTO rulings. Our research confirms that in practice Arbitrators have determined this period by ‘splitting the difference’ approximately between the periods suggested by the complaining and defending Member. In addition, the process appears to reward defending Members that request an RPT that exceeds the 15-month guideline in Article 21.3(c).

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