scholarly journals Las dimensiones psicológicas de la pedagogía a principios del siglo XX

10.14201/3238 ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesc Calvo Ortega

RESUMEN: La articulación histórica acerca de la influencia de la psicología en el campo de las ciencias humanas requiere no tanto de una periodización exacta y sin interrupciones de la formación de su campo de positividad científica como de la averiguación del proceso de racionalidad que se ha dado en la constitución teórica del conocimiento del hombre en general. Un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que ha ocurrido en ese proceso es el de la pedagogía contemporánea que en el transcurso de la formalización como disciplina científica toma de la psicología lo que ésta, a su vez, establece, especifica y delimita normativamente a partir de las contradicciones a que es expuesta tanto por las ciencias naturales como por las ciencias del espíritu. Toda una serie de modelos psicológicos son trasladados al pensamiento pedagógico y de ahí a la práctica educativa lugar donde se reproducen dichas contradicciones bajo el perfil de una ambigüedad que remite sin duda a los problemas existenciales del hombre.ABSTRACT: The historical articulation about the influence of Psychology in the field of Human Sciences requires an inquiry into the rationality process that has occurred in the theoretical constitution of human knowledge in general rather than an exact periodization without interruptions in the forming of its field of scientific positivism. A paradigmatic example of what has happened in that process is that of contemporary Pedagogy which in the course of its formalization as a scientific discipline that takes from Psychology what the latter, in turn, establishes, specifies and delimits normatively from the contradictions to which it is exposed by both Natural Sciences and Human Sciences. A whole series of psychological models is transferred to pedagogical thought and from there to educational practice where these contradictions are reproduced under the profile of an ambiguity that, without a doubt, refers to the existential problems of humanity.SOMMAIRE: L'articulation historique à propos de l'influence de la Psychologie dans le domaine des Sciences Humaines ne demande pas tant d'une périodisation précise et ininterrompue de la formation de son domaine de positivité scientifique que de l'analyse du processus de rationalité présent lors de la constitution théorique de la connaissance de l'homme en général. Un exemple paradigmatique de ce processus est celui de la Pédagogie contemporaine. En effet, au cours de sa formalisation comme discipline scientifique, cette dernière prend de la Psychologie ce que cette discipline -à son tour- établit, spécifie et délimite normativement à partir des contradictions auxquelles elle est exposée par les sciences naturelles et par les sciences de l'esprit. Toute une série de modèles psychologiques est transférée à la pensée pédagogique et par la suite à la pratique éducative où ces contradictions sont reproduites sous l'aspect d'une ambiguïté remettant sans doute aux problèmes existentiels de l'homme.

Diachronica ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Anttila

SUMMARY Against the dominating position in theoretical linguistics that it is one of the natural sciences falling under covering (deductive-nomological) laws, it is argued here that linguistics is rather one of the so-called human sciences. It is further shown that the pattern explanation developed in American social science matches earlier European philology perfectly. Thus the hierarchical explanations of natural science must be replaced by concatenative links in contexts. It is particularization rather than generalization that becomes primary — in other words, case study methods come out on top. The paper concludes by presenting summaries of twelve case studies which exemplify the method. RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article l'argument est avancé — contre la position dominante dans la linguistique théorique selon laquelle la linguistique fait parti des sciences naturelles soujettée à des lois déductives-nomologiques — que la science du langage appartient plutöt à des soi-disant sciences humaines. Des plus il est démontré la 'pattern explanation' (l'explication d'après des modèles) développée dans les sciences sociales en Amérique du Nord est en conformité avec la philologie européenne traditionnelle. Par conséquent, il est proposé que les explications hiérarchiques des sciences naturelles doivent être remplacées par des liens enchaînés dans des contextes. C'est la particulisation, et non pas la généralisation, qui devient le but principal; en d'autres mots, ce sont les méthodes de case study qui priment le reste. La dernière partie de l'étude présente douze résumés des 'études de cas' pour illustrer l'argument et la méthode. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Der Aufsatz vertritt die Ansicht, da6 die Sprachwissenschaft, entgegen der gegenwärtig dominierenden Auffassung unter den Theoretikern, daß sie unter deduktiv-nomologische Gesetze falle und deshalb zu den Naturwissen-schaften gehöre, zu den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften gezählt werden müsse. Es wird der Nachweis geführt, daß das Konzept einer Erklärung nach Mustern ('pattern explanation') wie es innerhalb den amerikanischen Sozial-wissen entwickelt worden ist genau dem entspricht, was schon früher innerhalb der europäischen Philologie üblich war. Es wird deshalb argumentiert, daB die hierarchisierende Form der Erklärung der Naturwissenschaften durch kettenartige, kontextuelle Verbindungen ersetzt werden müsse. Es ist gerade die Einzelerklärung und nicht die Generalisierung, die an erster S telle steht; mit andern Worten, die Methoden der Fallstudien sollten in erster Linie angewen-det werden. Der Rest des Artikels dient dazu, in Zusammenfassungen von zwölf solcher Fallstudien die Methode zu illustrieren und das Argument zu stützen.


Author(s):  
Richard Drayton

The British Academy was founded in 1902. In November 1899, the Council of the Royal Society sent a letter to prominent scholars suggesting the formation of some body to represent Britain in disciplines other than the natural sciences. A meeting of the scholars gave its support for a suggestion that the Royal Society might give room to literary and human sciences in a special section, or support the foundation of a separate body. For over a year, the Royal Society deliberated, but concluded in June of 1901 that it could neither include the literary sciences within it, nor initiate the establishing of a British academy. It was thus the scientists who provided both stimulus and constraint for the mobilisation of human knowledge in the British Academy and to welcome all branches of intellectual enterprise within one temple.


Philosophy ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 62 (241) ◽  
pp. 293-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Tiles

For as long as there has been anything worthy of the name of science, there have been those who have criticized its claim to superior knowledge. With the birth and prodigious growth of modern science, the corresponding growthof critical opinion led, in the eighteenth century, to a divorce of the sciences from the humanities around which our educational institutions, and our universities in particular, have been built. It is this divorce which renders problematic the status of the social or human sciences. For the extent to which Man can be an object of scientific knowledge will be questioned by those insisting on an opposition between human knowledge and values as embodied in the humanities, and the dehumanized objective knowledge proclaimed within the natural sciences.


2005 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-577
Author(s):  
Marie-Josée Legault

On constate au Québec une tendance croissante à l'implantation de centres de recherche en sciences de l'humain et du social. Lors d'une étude ethnographique réalisée dans trois de ces centres, l'auteure a constaté que les différences dans l'organisation locale du travail pouvaient l'interpréter à la lumière du traitement de l'incertitude dans la tâche. Cette interprétation remet en cause la dichotomie traditionnelle entre les sciences de l'humain et du social et les sciences de la nature et suggère qu'il s'avère utile de mettre en rapport certaines composantes d'ordre théorique et méthodologique et les choix en matière d'organisation locale du travail de recherche.


2021 ◽  
Vol 153 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-318
Author(s):  
Alexander Fidora ◽  
Nicola Polloni

This contribution engages with the problematic position of the mechanical arts within medieval systems of knowledge. Superseding the secondary position assigned to the mechanical arts in the Early Middle Ages, the solutions proposed by Hugh of St Victor and Gundissalinus were highly influential during the thirteenth century. While Hugh’s integration of the mechanical arts into his system of knowledge betrays their still ancillary position as regards consideration of the liberal arts, Gundissalinus’s theory proposes two main novelties. On the one hand, he sets the mechanical arts alongside alchemy and the arts of prognostication and magic. On the other, however, using the theory put forward by Avicenna, he subordinates these “natural sciences” to natural philosophy itself, thereby establishing a broader architecture of knowledge hierarchically ordered. Our contribution examines the implications of such developments and their reception afforded at Paris during the thirteenth century, emphasising the relevance that the solutions offered by Gundissalinus enjoyed in terms of the ensuing discussions concerning the structure of human knowledge.


Author(s):  
Rudolf A. Makkreel

Wilhelm Dilthey saw his work as contributing to a ‘Critique of Historical Reason’ which would expand the scope of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by examining the epistemological conditions of the human sciences as well as of the natural sciences. Both kinds of science take their departure from ordinary life and experience, but whereas the natural sciences seek to focus on the way things behave independently of human involvement, the human sciences take account of this very involvement. The natural sciences use external observation and measurement to construct an objective domain of nature that is abstracted from the fullness of lived experience. The human sciences (humanities and social sciences), by contrast, help to define what Dilthey calls the historical world. By making use of inner as well as outer experience, the human sciences preserve a more direct link with our original sense of life than do the natural sciences. Whereas the natural sciences seek explanations of nature, connecting the discrete representations of outer experience through hypothetical generalizations and causal laws, the human sciences aim at an understanding that articulates the fundamental structures of historical life given in lived experience. Finding lived experience to be inherently connected and meaningful, Dilthey opposed traditional atomistic and associationist psychologies and developed a descriptive psychology that has been recognized as anticipating phenomenology. Dilthey first thought that this descriptive psychology could provide a neutral foundation for the other human sciences, but in his later hermeneutical writings he rejected the idea of a foundational discipline or method. Thus he ends by claiming that all the human sciences are interpretive and mutually dependent. Hermeneutically conceived, understanding is a process of interpreting the ‘objectifications of life’, the external expressions or manifestations of human thought and action. Interpersonal understanding is attained through these common objectifications and not, as is widely believed, through empathy. Moreover, to fully understand myself I must analyse the expressions of my life in the same way that I analyse the expressions of others. Not every aspect of life can be captured within the respective limits of the natural and the human sciences. Dilthey’s philosophy of life also leaves room for a kind of anthropological reflection whereby we attempt to do justice to the ultimate riddles of life and death. Such reflection receives its fullest expression in worldviews, which are overall perspectives on life encompassing the way we perceive and conceive the world, evaluate it aesthetically and respond to it in action. Dilthey discerned many typical worldviews in art and religion, but in Western philosophy he distinguished three recurrent types: the worldviews of naturalism, the idealism of freedom and objective idealism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-119
Author(s):  
C.S.A (Kris) van Koppen

Klintman, Mikael. 2017. Human Sciences and Human Interests: Integrating the Social, Economic, and Evolutionary Sciences. London: Routledge.Jetzkowitz, Jens. 2019. Co-evolution of Nature and Society: Foundations for Interdisciplinary Sustainability Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document