Pattern Explanation

Diachronica ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Anttila
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
American Social Science ◽  
Sciences Humaines ◽  
Sciences Sociales ◽  
Case Study Methods ◽  
Sciences Naturelles

SUMMARY Against the dominating position in theoretical linguistics that it is one of the natural sciences falling under covering (deductive-nomological) laws, it is argued here that linguistics is rather one of the so-called human sciences. It is further shown that the pattern explanation developed in American social science matches earlier European philology perfectly. Thus the hierarchical explanations of natural science must be replaced by concatenative links in contexts. It is particularization rather than generalization that becomes primary — in other words, case study methods come out on top. The paper concludes by presenting summaries of twelve case studies which exemplify the method. RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article l'argument est avancé — contre la position dominante dans la linguistique théorique selon laquelle la linguistique fait parti des sciences naturelles soujettée à des lois déductives-nomologiques — que la science du langage appartient plutöt à des soi-disant sciences humaines. Des plus il est démontré la 'pattern explanation' (l'explication d'après des modèles) développée dans les sciences sociales en Amérique du Nord est en conformité avec la philologie européenne traditionnelle. Par conséquent, il est proposé que les explications hiérarchiques des sciences naturelles doivent être remplacées par des liens enchaînés dans des contextes. C'est la particulisation, et non pas la généralisation, qui devient le but principal; en d'autres mots, ce sont les méthodes de case study qui priment le reste. La dernière partie de l'étude présente douze résumés des 'études de cas' pour illustrer l'argument et la méthode. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Der Aufsatz vertritt die Ansicht, da6 die Sprachwissenschaft, entgegen der gegenwärtig dominierenden Auffassung unter den Theoretikern, daß sie unter deduktiv-nomologische Gesetze falle und deshalb zu den Naturwissen-schaften gehöre, zu den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften gezählt werden müsse. Es wird der Nachweis geführt, daß das Konzept einer Erklärung nach Mustern ('pattern explanation') wie es innerhalb den amerikanischen Sozial-wissen entwickelt worden ist genau dem entspricht, was schon früher innerhalb der europäischen Philologie üblich war. Es wird deshalb argumentiert, daB die hierarchisierende Form der Erklärung der Naturwissenschaften durch kettenartige, kontextuelle Verbindungen ersetzt werden müsse. Es ist gerade die Einzelerklärung und nicht die Generalisierung, die an erster S telle steht; mit andern Worten, die Methoden der Fallstudien sollten in erster Linie angewen-det werden. Der Rest des Artikels dient dazu, in Zusammenfassungen von zwölf solcher Fallstudien die Methode zu illustrieren und das Argument zu stützen.

scholarly journals Las dimensiones psicológicas de la pedagogía a principios del siglo XX

10.14201/3238 ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesc Calvo Ortega
Keyword(s):  
Educational Practice ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Psychological Models ◽  
Sciences Humaines ◽  
Siglo Xx ◽  
Scientific Positivism ◽  
Sciences Naturelles

RESUMEN: La articulación histórica acerca de la influencia de la psicología en el campo de las ciencias humanas requiere no tanto de una periodización exacta y sin interrupciones de la formación de su campo de positividad científica como de la averiguación del proceso de racionalidad que se ha dado en la constitución teórica del conocimiento del hombre en general. Un ejemplo paradigmático de lo que ha ocurrido en ese proceso es el de la pedagogía contemporánea que en el transcurso de la formalización como disciplina científica toma de la psicología lo que ésta, a su vez, establece, especifica y delimita normativamente a partir de las contradicciones a que es expuesta tanto por las ciencias naturales como por las ciencias del espíritu. Toda una serie de modelos psicológicos son trasladados al pensamiento pedagógico y de ahí a la práctica educativa lugar donde se reproducen dichas contradicciones bajo el perfil de una ambigüedad que remite sin duda a los problemas existenciales del hombre.ABSTRACT: The historical articulation about the influence of Psychology in the field of Human Sciences requires an inquiry into the rationality process that has occurred in the theoretical constitution of human knowledge in general rather than an exact periodization without interruptions in the forming of its field of scientific positivism. A paradigmatic example of what has happened in that process is that of contemporary Pedagogy which in the course of its formalization as a scientific discipline that takes from Psychology what the latter, in turn, establishes, specifies and delimits normatively from the contradictions to which it is exposed by both Natural Sciences and Human Sciences. A whole series of psychological models is transferred to pedagogical thought and from there to educational practice where these contradictions are reproduced under the profile of an ambiguity that, without a doubt, refers to the existential problems of humanity.SOMMAIRE: L'articulation historique à propos de l'influence de la Psychologie dans le domaine des Sciences Humaines ne demande pas tant d'une périodisation précise et ininterrompue de la formation de son domaine de positivité scientifique que de l'analyse du processus de rationalité présent lors de la constitution théorique de la connaissance de l'homme en général. Un exemple paradigmatique de ce processus est celui de la Pédagogie contemporaine. En effet, au cours de sa formalisation comme discipline scientifique, cette dernière prend de la Psychologie ce que cette discipline -à son tour- établit, spécifie et délimite normativement à partir des contradictions auxquelles elle est exposée par les sciences naturelles et par les sciences de l'esprit. Toute une série de modèles psychologiques est transférée à la pensée pédagogique et par la suite à la pratique éducative où ces contradictions sont reproduites sous l'aspect d'une ambiguïté remettant sans doute aux problèmes existentiels de l'homme.

Social science, methodology of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Research Design ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Physical Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
The Social

Each of the sciences, the physical, biological, social and behavioural, have emerged from philosophy in a process that began in the time of Euclid and Plato. These sciences have left a legacy to philosophy of problems that they have been unable to deal with, either as nascent or as mature disciplines. Some of these problems are common to all sciences, some restricted to one of the four general divisions mentioned above, and some of these philosophical problems bear on only one or another of the special sciences. If the natural sciences have been of concern to philosophers longer than the social sciences, this is simply because the former are older disciplines. It is only in the last century that the social sciences have emerged as distinct subjects in their currently recognizable state. Some of the problems in the philosophy of social science are older than these disciplines, in part because these problems have their origins in nineteenth-century philosophy of history. Of course the full flowering of the philosophy of science dates from the emergence of the logical positivists in the 1920s. Although the logical positivists’ philosophy of science has often been accused of being satisfied with a one-sided diet of physics, in fact their interest in the social sciences was at least as great as their interest in physical science. Indeed, as the pre-eminent arena for the application of prescriptions drawn from the study of physics, social science always held a place of special importance for philosophers of science. Even those who reject the role of prescription from the philosophy of physics, cannot deny the relevance of epistemology and metaphysics for the social sciences. Scientific change may be the result of many factors, only some of them cognitive. However, scientific advance is driven by the interaction of data and theory. Data controls the theories we adopt and the direction in which we refine them. Theory directs and constrains both the sort of experiments that are done to collect data and the apparatus with which they are undertaken: research design is driven by theory, and so is methodological prescription. But what drives research design in disciplines that are only in their infancy, or in which for some other reason, there is a theoretical vacuum? In the absence of theory how does the scientist decide on what the discipline is trying to explain, what its standards of explanatory adequacy are, and what counts as the data that will help decide between theories? In such cases there are only two things scientists have to go on: successful theories and methods in other disciplines which are thought to be relevant to the nascent discipline, and the epistemology and metaphysics which underwrites the relevance of these theories and methods. This makes philosophy of special importance to the social sciences. The role of philosophy in guiding research in a theoretical vacuum makes the most fundamental question of the philosophy of science whether the social sciences can, do, or should employ to a greater or lesser degree the same methods as those of the natural sciences? Note that this question presupposes that we have already accurately identified the methods of natural science. If we have not yet done so, the question becomes largely academic. For many philosophers of social science the question of what the methods of natural science are was long answered by the logical positivist philosophy of physical science. And the increasing adoption of such methods by empirical, mathematical, and experimental social scientists raised a second central question for philosophers: why had these methods so apparently successful in natural science been apparently far less successful when self-consciously adapted to the research agendas of the several social sciences? One traditional answer begins with the assumption that human behaviour or action and its consequences are simply not amenable to scientific study, because they are the results of free will, or less radically, because the significant kinds or categories into which social events must be classed are unique in a way that makes non-trivial general theories about them impossible. These answers immediately raise some of the most difficult problems of metaphysics and epistemology: the nature of the mind, the thesis of determinism, and the analysis of causation. Even less radical explanations for the differences between social and natural sciences raise these fundamental questions of philosophy. Once the consensus on the adequacy of a positivist philosophy of natural science gave way in the late 1960s, these central questions of the philosophy of social science became far more difficult ones to answer. Not only was the benchmark of what counts as science lost, but the measure of progress became so obscure that it was no longer uncontroversial to claim that the social sciences’ rate of progress was any different from that of natural science.

W.E.B. Du Bois and interdisciplinarity: A comprehensive picture of the scholar’s approach to natural science

2020 ◽  
pp. 1468795X2093862
Author(s):  
Jordan Fox Besek ◽  
Patrick Trent Greiner ◽  
Brett Clark
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Scientific Racism ◽  
Sociological Approach ◽  
Du Bois ◽  
Critical Engagement ◽  
Comprehensive Picture ◽  
Socially Situated

Throughout his life, W.E.B. Du Bois actively engaged the scientific racism infecting natural sciences and popular thought. Nevertheless, he also demonstrated a sophisticated and critical engagement with natural science. He recognized that the sciences were socially situated, but also that they addressed real questions and issues. Debate remains, however, regarding exactly how and why Du Bois incorporated such natural scientific knowledge into his own thinking. In this article, we draw on archival research and Du Bois’ own scholarship to investigate his general approach to interdisciplinarity. We address how and why he fused natural scientific knowledge and the influence of physical environs into his social science, intertwining each with his broader intellectual and political aims. This investigation will offer a fuller understanding of the scope and aims of his empirical scholarship. At the same time, it will illuminate a sociological approach to natural science that can still inform scholarship today.

Le concept de science dans l’Amérique du XIXe siècle

2002 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-772
Author(s):  
James Turner ◽  
Eli Commins
Keyword(s):  
Sciences Humaines ◽  
Xixe Siecle ◽  
Sciences Sociales ◽  
Xixe Siècle ◽  
Sciences Naturelles

RésuméLes historiens des États-Unis présument que le mot «science», au XIXe siècle, signifiait, implicitement, les sciences naturelles, tout comme au XXe siècle. Il en résulte qu’ils attribuent les changements profonds dans la vie intellectuelle à l’importance grandissante des sciences naturelles. Une lecture plus attentive montre que «science», avant 1900, avait un sens plus large, comprenant les sciences humaines tout autant que les sciences naturelles. Cette reconsidération de la carte épistémologique de l’Amérique du XIXe siècle apporte un éclairage nouveau sur les traits déterminants de la vie intellectuelle des années post-1900, tels que l’essor des sciences sociales, la formation des universités consacrées à la recherche et l’origine de la modernité séculaire elle-même.

Interdisciplinary training in environmental conservation: definitions, progress and future directions

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 410-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
HELEN NEWING
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Conservation Biology ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Skills Training ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Environmental Conservation ◽  
Interdisciplinary Training ◽  
Science Content ◽  
Basic Training ◽  
Vocational Skills

SUMMARYThe development of interdisciplinary approaches to environmental conservation is obviously related to interdisciplinary training in undergraduate and postgraduate conservation-oriented degree programmes. This paper therefore examines interdisciplinary training in environmental conservation, with a focus on conservation biology. The specific objectives are: (1) to analyse debates about the nature of ‘interdisciplinarity’ in conservation biology; (2) to examine the status of interdisciplinary training in current academic programmes in conservation biology; and (3) to make recommendations in terms of interdisciplinary or other non-natural science content that should be prioritized for inclusion in the curriculum. The term ‘interdisciplinarity’ has been used in relation to conservation training to refer to (1) any social science content; (2) vocational skills training; (3) integrative or practice-based exercises, sometimes with no indication of disciplinary content; (4) the (variously defined) ‘human dimensions’ of conservation, and (5) interaction between different academic disciplines (usually crossing the natural science–social science divide). In terms of training, the natural sciences have remained predominant in almost all reported academic programmes, but there now appears to be more coverage of non-natural science issues than previously. However the lack of consistency in the use of terms makes it difficult to assess progress. Further debate about curriculum development in conservation would be aided greatly by recognizing the distinction between the different aspects of non-natural science training, and treating each of them in its own right. Most degree programmes in environment-related disciplines specialize to varying degrees either in the natural sciences or the social sciences, and a comprehensive programme covering both of these in depth is likely to be problematic. However, some understanding of different disciplinary perspectives is increasingly important in a career in environmental conservation, and it is argued that, as a minimum, a primarily natural science-based undergraduate programme in environmental conservation should include: (1) an introduction to social science perspectives on the environment; (2) basic training in social science methods, research design and science theory; (3) vocational skills training, to the extent that it can be built into existing curricular components; and (4) integrative problem-solving tasks that can be used in relation to any or all of the above. A similar list could be constructed for social science-based environmental degree programmes, incorporating some basic training in natural science perspectives. Postgraduate training programmes are more varied in what they aim to achieve in terms of disciplinary breadth; they can develop students’ existing specialist expertise, offer supplementary training to allow students to increase the disciplinary breadth of their expertise, or focus on the issue of interdisciplinarity itself.

Optimism for Naturalized Social Metaphysics: A Reply to Hawley

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Saunders
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Epidemiology ◽  
Contextual Effects ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Entities ◽  
Social Metaphysics

Metaphysics has undergone two major innovations in recent decades. First, naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that our best science provides an important source of evidence for metaphysical theories. Second, social metaphysicians have begun to explore the nature of social entities such as groups, institutions, and social categories. Surprisingly, these projects have largely kept their distance from one another. Katherine Hawley has recently argued that, unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are not sufficiently successful to provide evidence about the metaphysical nature of social entities. By contrast, I defend an optimistic view of naturalistic social metaphysics. Drawing on a case study of research into contextual effects in social epidemiology, I show that social science can provide a valuable evidence for social metaphysicians.

WISDOM LOST AND REGAINED? THE POSSIBILITY OF REINTEGRATING A FRACTURED TECHNOSCIENTIFIC CULTURE

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-144
Author(s):  
CORNEL W. DU TOIT
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Revolution ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
The Political ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Life World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Main Factors

Abstract<title> Abstract </title>Technology has taken on a life of its own and it now seems impossible to work out who manages it. Humans have created a technoscientific environment that has surpassed the guidelines of their wisdom. The question: what is it to be human? can no longer be isolated from the question: what is it to possess technology? The renewed search for wisdom is regarded as a metaphor for expressing different sentiments, such as the attempt to link values to technology; the search for unity between the different sciences, and between science and the life world; the restoration of values, especially in the realm of the natural sciences; the best way to cope in a technoscientific culture; and, finally, decisions about research policies. in this article some of the main factors responsible for the exclusivity of the natural sciences and for the division of the sciences, and the detachment of science from the life world are discussed. the detachment of natural science from values, ethics and the human sciences are traced back to the scientific revolution and the establishment by Galileo and Kepler of mathematics as the language of the natural sciences. The subject of scientific research has shifted from the scientific community to the political and economic realm. the realm of power and the prerequisites for academic accomplishment compromise the integrity of science and the wellbeing of society. The democratisation of technoscience requires some progress in the concilience of the sciences.

American Sovietology From 1917-1991: an Attempt At Diagnosis

1995 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 406-432
Author(s):  
Vladimir Shlapentokh
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Cutting Edge ◽  
Soviet Society ◽  
World War ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
American Social Science ◽  
Second World

AbstractThe goal of this article is to discuss the evolution of the views of American social scientists, particularly Sovietologists, on the origins and nature of Soviet society. The analysis of the American performance in Soviet studies is particularly interesting because American social science was considered, at least after the Second World War, on the cutting edge in research worldwide. In making such an appraisal we are, at the same time, using American Sovietology as a case study for making a judgement about the potential social science in any country has in claiming to understand developments in a foreign society..

scholarly journals Fréquence des rétractations d’articles scientifiques : ce que les études nous apprennent en éducation, sciences humaines et sciences sociales

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 938-963
Author(s):  
Maude Roy-Vallières
Keyword(s):  
Sciences Humaines ◽  
Revue De Littérature ◽  
Sciences Sociales ◽  
Sciences Naturelles

Les rétractations d’articles sont le dernier recours de la science pour assurer sa crédibilité. Cette étude souhaite identifier les raisons qui poussent les chercheurs à investiguer les rétractations dans leur champ de recherche. Pour ce faire, une revue de littérature et une analyse qualitative de celle-ci sont menées. Les résultats montrent que 70 % des études sur les rétractations ont été menées dans le domaine des sciences naturelles et médicales. Huit raisons de s’y intéresser sont identifiées, les plus fréquentes étant l’impact négatif sur la recherche et la pratique, la haute médiatisation des cas de fraude et le nombre annuel élevé de publications. Les résultats contribuent à justifier la prévalence de ces études en sciences naturelles et médicales, mais soulèvent la nécessité de réaliser des études supplémentaires et d’établir des bases de données compréhensives dans les autres champs de recherche pour assurer la qualité de la recherche scientifique.

scholarly journals Authentic Assessment Implementation in Natural and Social Science

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 534
Author(s):  
Eddy Sutadji ◽  
Herawati Susilo ◽  
Aji Prasetya Wibawa ◽  
Nidal A. M. Jabari ◽  
Syaiful Nur Rohmad
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Performance Test ◽  
Authentic Assessment ◽  
Thinking Skills ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
State University ◽  
Quantitative Descriptive ◽  
Almost All

Assessment methods are important to create qualified graduates who are ready to face the real world. Authentic assessment is considered to be the most effective method to achieve this. The application of authentic assessment is often universal. However, there is a difference between natural sciences and social sciences. If it is used for different scientific constructions, then the authentic assessment should also be different. Therefore, there is a need for authentic implementation research in these two fields of science. This research is survey research with quantitative descriptive method. This study focuses on the analysis of differences in implementation of the assessment carried out, assignment techniques, assessment components, and post-assessment at the State University of Malang in two different fields of science, namely natural sciences and social sciences. The population in this study was 1069 lecturers represented by 270 sample lecturers. There are 106 (39.26%) samples of lecturers representing 388 (36.3%) lecturer populations from 2 natural fields and 164 (60.74%) samples representing 681 (63.7%) lecturer populations from 6 social fields. The analysis is carried out by comparing the results of each aspect of the assessment implementation in the two fields. Almost all aspects of authentic assessment between the natural and social sciences had no difference. The only differences were in the assessment form and individual assignment techniques that were performed. Social science conducted non-test assessment only higher than the natural science. Measured tests were primarily used in the natural science using Higher-Order Thinking Skills questions. Performance test was mostly conducted in social science.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document