scholarly journals Pedagogika moralna Immanuela Kanta jako wyraz wychowania do odpowiedzialności

2019 ◽  
pp. 87-100
Author(s):  
Anna Nowicka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Education ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Status ◽  
Responsible Attitude ◽  
Kant's Ethics

The author discusses I. Kant’s pedagogical views and beliefs related to moral education. In particular, the author attempts to prove the thesis that, for Kant, all education and proper upbringing was ultimately linked with moral education and that moral education, in turn, was just education to responsibility. After a presentation of the main assumptions of Immanuel Kant’s ethics, the author proceeds to discuss the status of pedagogy within its framework as a science that aims at educating people and forms attitudes that were understood to involve meeting of one’s obligations expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative, and precisely based on making one to the influence of a priori moral principles and on practicing skills of making everyday use of them in different life situations. The author characterizes notions that are related in Kant’s philosophy to the problems of prospective and positive moral responsibility, and discusses how this philosophy responds to the problem of feasibility and ways of developing a responsible attitude in man. Further on, the author discusses in detail Kant’s pedagogy, i.e. attempts to discover the connective concepts necessary to understand how Kant perceived the educational reality within the context of responsibility, attempts to answer what its goal and essence are and what measures are to be taken to successfully achieve the goal. The considerations on the notion of responsibility and pedagogy in Kant’s thought are summarized in a brief presentation of its essential significance for the pedagogy of morality.

Über Gewissen und Gewissheit

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.

Immanuel Kant: Ethics

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Denis
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosophies ◽  
The Will ◽  
Kant's Ethics

The ethical theory of Immanuel Kant (b. 1724–d. 1804) exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent history of philosophy and continues to be a dominant approach to ethics, rivaling consequentialism and virtue ethics. Kant’s ethical thought continues to be studied in itself, as a part of his critical system of philosophy, in its historical context, and in relation to particular practical questions. Kant’s writings and lectures display the influence of the Stoics, Rousseau, Crusius, Wolff, Hutcheson, Hume, and others; Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bradley, Greene, Habermas, and Rawls are among the many philosophers whose moral philosophies can be read (in part) as responses to Kant. Salient foundational features of Kant’s ethics include: its a priori method, its conception of the will as autonomous, its categorical imperative, its theory of freedom, and its account of moral motivation. Kant maintained that foundational moral principles must be a priori, not based on observation or experience. Kant takes the moral law to be legislated by the will to itself. Unlike holy beings, human beings experience morality as a constraint upon our wills. For us, the moral law is a categorical imperative. All ethical duties are ultimately grounded in this supreme moral principle. If we are bound to obey the moral law, we must be capable of doing so; Kant holds that, even assuming causal determinism in the phenomenal world, morality reveals our (noumenal) freedom to us. Kant attributes moral worth only to action done from duty (i.e., from respect for the law), not from inclination. Significant aspects of Kant’s fully developed ethical theory include its rich theory of virtue and the virtues, its taxonomy of duties (which include duties to oneself as well as to others), its distinctive conceptions of the highest good and human evil, and its connections with Kant’s philosophies of history, religion, and human nature. Many of Kant’s own discussions of particular duties, virtues, and vices are controversial. For example, Kant appears to condemn all lies as violations of a duty to oneself. This entry focuses on Kant’s ethics rather than Kantian ethics more broadly. Despite that, it includes a number of pieces that apply, extend, or revise Kant’s ethics in some ways, as well as interpretations of Kant’s ethics that some commentators may object stray too far from Kant’s own stated views. Kant’s political philosophy is discussed only peripherally here, save for the section on the Doctrine of Right of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Educating the Common Agent: Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education

2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Basic Education ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Philosophical Education ◽  
The Common

Abstract:I discuss the relation between Kant’s trust in the rational capacities of ordinary agents and education. First, I show that Kant is very optimistic regarding our common moral capacities. Then I discuss what room this leaves for moral education. I argue that a discussion of Kant’s conception of moral education should distinguish between different functions of education: (i) education is necessary for agents to make the transition from a purely instrumental to a pure practical use of reason (Basic Education); (ii) education can strengthen the motivational force of the moral law by presenting the moral law in all its dignity and clarity (Motivational Education); (iii) education can instruct agents about the source of morality and offer an abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative (Philosophical Education); and (iv) education can enhance agents’ capacity to apply general moral principles to concrete cases (Education of Judgement).

Self and Selves

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph C.S. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Synthetic A Priori

Kant is committed to the reality of a subject self, outside time but active in forming experience. Timeless activity is problematic, but that can be dealt with. But he holds that the subject of experience is not an object of experience, so nothing can be known about it; this raises a problem about the status of his own theory. But he ought to allow that we can know of its existence and activity, as preconditions of experience: the Critique allows that synthetic a priori truths can be known in this way. However, its identity conditions remain unknowable. Kant’s unity of apperception shares much with Locke’s continuity of consciousness, but does not determine the identity of a thing. Personal identity is bodily identity. Only Kant’s moral philosophy justifies recognizing other selves; it could warrant ascribing a similar status to animals.

Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Formal Epistemology ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
New Developments ◽  
The Status ◽  
Important Field ◽  
Belief Justification

Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publication offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading epistemologists in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: (a) traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of skepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc.; (b) new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; (c) foundational questions in decision-theory; (d) confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; (e) topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; (f) topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and (g) work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony, the ethics of belief, etc. Topics addressed in volume 6 include the nature of perceptual justification, intentionality, modal knowledge, credences, epistemic supererogation, epistemic and rational norms, expressivism, skepticism, and pragmatic encroachment. The various writers make use of a variety of different tools and insights, including those of formal epistemology and decision theory, as well as traditional philosophical analysis and argumentation.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

scholarly journals The Necessity of Moral Principles in Moral Education

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
EJ Udokang
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analytic Method ◽  
Self Directed Learning ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Directed Learning ◽  
The One

Many well-meaning parents and teachers are hamstrung in their attempts at moral education of their children and wards. Hence they are caught in some dilemma. On the one hand, if they incline toward the code of conception, they tend to be authoritarian in their approach; if, on the other hand, they favour some variant of the romantic reaction, they may expect that children will go it alone and decide it all for themselves. To overcome this dilemma, there is need for a synthesis of both alternatives. It is precisely the synthesis of these two positions (principles and creativity) that we propose to explore in this paper as a preliminary to any discussion on moral education. With analytic method as a tool, the paper concludes that until a more adequate view of morality which embroils the proper place for both authority and self-directed learning is synthesized, a discourse on moral education will be of no good.

Animal rights – Jewish perspectives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronen Pinkas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Golden Rule ◽  
The Other ◽  
Jewish Tradition ◽  
Strict Adherence ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Face ◽  
Pain And Suffering ◽  
Paradigmatic Change

This article raises the question why is it that, despite Jewish tradition devoting much thought to the status and treatment of animals and showing strict adherence to the notion of preventing their pain and suffering, ethical attitudes to animals are not dealt with systematically in the writings of Jewish philosophers and have not received sufficient attention in the context of moral monotheism. What has prevented the expansion of the golden rule: »Love your fellow as yourself: I am the LORD« (Lev 19,18) and »That which is hateful to you do not do to another« (BT Shabbat 31a:6; JT Nedarim 30b:1) to animals? Why is it that the moral responsibility for the fellow-man, the neighbor, or the other, has been understood as referring only to a human companion? Does the demand for absolute moral responsibility spoken from the face of the other, which Emmanuel Levinas emphasized in his ethics, not radiate from the face of the non-human other as well? Levinas’s ethics explicitly negates the principle of reciprocity and moral symmetry: The ›I‹ is committed to the other, regardless of the other’s attitude towards him. Does the affinity to the eternal Thou which Martin Buber also discovers in plants and animals not require a paradigmatic change in the attitude towards animals?

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