The impact of corporate governance on banks' earnings management

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Binh Nguyen ◽  
Min Ru Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals Determinan Manajemen Laba Perusahaan di Sektor Konsumsi

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fajri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this research is to provide empirical evidence on the impact of good corporate governance, free cash flow, and leverage ratio on earnings management. Good corporate governance is measured by audit committee’s size, the proportion of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership. Discretionary accrual is the proxy of earning management. This research used 28 consumer goods companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. Data were analyzed using panel data with random effect model. Based on the result of analysis concluded that all components of good corporate governance (audit committee’s size, the proportion of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership), have no significant effect on earnings management, on other hand leverage ratio has a negative effect and no significant on earning management, and free cash flow has a positve and no significant effect on earnings management

scholarly journals The impact of ownership type on the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management: An empirical study

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
Ahmed Boghdady
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Type ◽  
Moderation Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Privately Owned

This study investigates the effect of ownership type on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management. While previous literature has mainly examined the relationship between corporate governance and both accrual and real earnings management, no study to date, to the researcher’s best knowledge, focused on the moderation effect of ownership type on this relationship. Three proxies for measuring accrual and real earnings management, namely discretionary accruals (DA), abnormal cash flows (ACFO), and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADISX) are employed. Three empirical models (i.e. DA, ACFO, and ADISX) are developed in which the earnings management proxies represent the dependent variables and are tested using a sample of non-financial companies containing state-owned and privately owned companies over the period from 2010 to 2017, with 1030 firm-year observations. The results show a positive relationship between ownership type and both accruals manipulation and sales manipulation. In general, the results suggest that the ownership type moderates the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The results suggest also that corporate governance mechanisms may not play an almost the same role in monitoring and mitigating real earnings management (REM) practices as they do for accrual earnings management (AEM) in Egypt. Moreover, no evidence is found supportive of the trade-off effect which means that managers in Egyptian firms use both types of earnings management jointly to reach the target levels of earnings

The impact of corporate governance code on earnings management in listed non-financial firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 428-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erick Rading Outa ◽  
Paul Eisenberg ◽  
Peterson K. Ozili
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Explanatory Variable ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
New Institutions ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether voluntary corporate governance (CG) code issued in 2002 constrain earnings management (EM) among listed non-finance companies in Kenya. Design/methodology/approach Using a panel data of 338-firm year’s observations between 2005 and 2014, the authors test the hypothesis that CG constrains EM in non-finance firms listed in Kenya. The authors regress discretionary accruals (DA) against a developed Corporate Governance Index (CGI). Findings The overall results show that DA is not significantly related to CG suggesting the voluntary CG code does not deter EM in non-finance companies in Kenya. Practical implications Evidence of income decreasing\increasing accruals implies EM still exists among the listed firms. This suggests that policymakers may need to consider radical actions including alternative or new CG approaches and new institutions to improve the effectiveness of CG. Originality/value This study extends existing studies by including composite CG as possible explanatory variable for constraining EM. The authors contribute to the debate by demonstrating that the voluntary CG code in Kenya is not effective in constraining DA and therefore the current initiatives by the regulator to change the current CG code are appropriately directed.

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in Islamic banks in the Middle East region

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Loan Loss ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.

CEO incentive compensation and earnings management

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (10) ◽  
pp. 2447-2461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madi Almadi ◽  
Philip Lazic
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of CEO incentive-based compensation on earnings management, taking into account the influence of institutional settings and corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach Using archival data of 3,000 British, Australian, German, and Austrian firm-years between 2005 and 2014, the study applies fixed-effect estimator to reduce risks of endogeneity bias. Findings The findings reveal that institutional factors influence the relationship between CEO incentive-based compensation and earnings management. Particularly, firms from countries within the Anglo-American model (the UK and Australia), which provide greater protection for investor, stricter legal enforcement, and higher quality of corporate governance, tend to have lower level of earnings management. However, besides corporate governance quality, it is relevant to consider weaker investor protection and legal enforcement to motivate earnings management in firms from countries within the Euro-Continental model (Germany and Austria). Originality/value The study suggests that robust implementation of corporate governance, derived from either model, helps in restraining CEO opportunistic behavior. Importantly, more qualified institutions have higher impact on the relative adequacy of CEO incentive-based pay formulas in mitigating earnings management concerns. This can be extended by future research through comparative studies using other contexts or influential institutions.

scholarly journals The Impact of Governance Rules on Earnings Management: Applied Study on Industrial and Service Companies Listed on Palestine Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
pp. 103-136
Author(s):  
Yousef Alrayyes ◽  
Nahed Al Khaldy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Independence Property ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Board Directors ◽  
The Impact

The aim of the study is to analyze the impact of corporate governance rules on earnings management for companies listed on Palestine Exchange. A number of corporate governance variables was selected to achieve this aim, including size of board of directors, CEO duality, board of director’s independence, property rights, number of board directors’ meetings. Modified Jones Model has been used to detect earnings management. Panel Data Model has also been involved in the study, where the population study consists of the 48 companies listed on Palestine Exchange, and which are distributed across five main sectors. The study sample included 13 industrial and services companies listed on Palestine Exchange. This study found that there was a negative influence between board size and CEO duality, and between earnings management. The study also showed that there is a positive influence between board independence and earnings management. Moreover, it showed that no relationship between board directors meetings and internal ownership with earnings management. The study stressed on the need for continued reinforcement of the governance rules, in order to avoid the negative impacts resulted from failure to apply these rules, taking into consideration the support of board independence in their relationship with areas of executive work to avoid taking decision that may affect earnings management. It also recommended that doing other researches on the same subject should be continued, taking into account the examination of variables other than those in this study to get to the variables that have the greatest impact on earnings management for companies listed on Palestine Exchange. 

scholarly journals The Effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) Mechanism on Earnings Management Practices of The Stubben Model (Study Case on Mining Sector Companies Listed on The Indonesia Stock Exchange 2014-2019)

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fairus ◽  
Pardomuan Sihombing
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Process Data ◽  
Mining Sector ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Impact

This study was prepared with the intention of analyzing the impact of the Good Corporate Governance (GCG) Mechanism on the Stubben Model of Profit Management (analysis of Mining Sector Companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2014-2019). The population used in the study is the mining sector companies on the IDX. The sample selection method used purposive sampling technique. To process data after sample selection, compile a research model, determine the variables analyzed in the study, and propose a hypothesis, the next step is to carry out data processing procedures through regression analysis with panel data. The results of the analysis conclude that (1) Institutional Ownership has a negative and significant impact on Earnings Management, (2) Managerial Ownership has a negative and significant impact on Earnings Management, (3) The Independent Board of Commissioners has a negative and significant impact on Earnings Management, (4) The Audit Committee has a negative and significant impact on Earnings Management, and (5) Audit Quality has a negative and significant impact on Earnings Management.

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