Nine. The romantic image of the intentional structure

2020 ◽  
pp. 181-203
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Structure

Erfahrung ohne Erfahrenden

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Petr Kouba
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Work Of Art ◽  
New Beginning ◽  
Individual Structure ◽  
The World ◽  
Il Y A ◽  
Individual Existence ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Intentional Structure

This article examines the limits of Heidegger’s ontological description of emotionality from the period of Sein und Zeit and Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik along the lines outlined by Lévinas in his early work De l’existence à l’existant. On the basis of the Lévinassian concept of “il y a”, we attempt to map the sphere of the impersonal existence situated out of the structured context of the world. However the worldless facticity without individuality marks the limits of the phenomenological approach to human existence and its emotionality, it also opens a new view on the beginning and ending of the individual existence. The whole structure of the individual existence in its contingency and finitude appears here in a new light, which applies also to the temporal conditions of existence. Yet, this is not to say that Heidegger should be simply replaced by Lévinas. As shows an examination of the work of art, to which brings us our reading of Moravia’s literary exposition of boredom (the phenomenon closely examined in Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik), the view on the work of art that is entirely based on the anonymous and worldless facticity of il y a must be extended and complemented by the moment in which a new world and a new individual structure of experience are being born. To comprehend the dynamism of the work of art in its fullness, it is necessary to see it not only as an ending of the world and the correlative intentional structure of the individual existence, but also as their new beginning.

scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Pathological Development ◽  
Sense Of Reality ◽  
Intentional Structure

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

scholarly journals Hate: toward a Four-Types Model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Developmental History ◽  
Intentional Structure

AbstractDrawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.

Discourse

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimo Poesio
Keyword(s):  
Language Use ◽  
Structure Theory ◽  
Hierarchy Theory ◽  
Discourse Representation Theory ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Discourse Model ◽  
Relational Coherence ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intentional Structure

Discourse is the area of linguistics concerned with the aspects of language use that go beyond the sentence—and in particular, with the study of coherence and salience. In this chapter we present a few key theories of these phenomena. We distinguish between two main types of coherence: entity coherence, primarily established through anaphora; and relational coherence, expressed through connectives and other relational devices. Our discussion of anaphora and entity coherence covers the basic facts about anaphoric reference and introduces the dynamic approach to the semantics of anaphora implemented in theories such as Discourse Representation Theory, based on the notion of discourse model and its updates. With regards to relational coherence, we review some of the main claims about the relational structure of discourse—such as the claim that coherent discourses have a tree structure, or the right frontier hypothesis—and four main theoretical approaches: Rhetorical Structure Theory, Grosz and Sidner’s intentional structure theory, the inference-based approach developed by Hobbs and expanded in Segmented DRT, and the connective-based account. Finally we cover theories of local and global salience and its effects, including Gundel’s Activation Hierarchy theory and Grosz and Sidner’s theory of the local and global focus.

scholarly journals Metaphysics and the Existential Problematic of Human Finitude

Lumen et Vita ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Nutter
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Finite Horizon ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Working Out ◽  
Human Finitude

Rather than being of little practical importance, the metaphysical underpinnings of a given horizon determine the character of its existential problematic. With the breakdown of classical metaphysics concomitant with the modern turn to the subjective, the existential problematic of finitude as ultimate horizon arose. According to this subjective turn, the human person can no longer engage the world as though it were in itself constituted by transcendently grounded meaning and value. Standing within this genealogical lineage, Martin Heidegger undertook a phenomenological investigation into the existential constitution of the human person which defines authenticity in terms of finitude. For the early Heidegger, human life is essentially ‘guilty’. This guilt, however, is not the traditional cognizance of one’s sinfulness, but the foundational Nichtigkeit (‘nullity’) of life and its attendant possibilities in the light of the ultimate finality of death. Authenticity, then, consists of a resolute working out of one’s life in the face of such inevitable finality. For the later Heidegger, the finite horizon of a particular epochal disclosure gifts Being to thought and determines it thereby. Authenticity in this case consists of giving oneself over to be appropriated by an event of Being. In contrast, Lonergan understands authenticity as being true to that primordial love which beckons us to intellectual probity and responsibility in working out life’s possibilities. This essay will illustrate how Lonergan’s analysis of the intentional structure of human conscious operations stands as a corrective to Heidegger’s early existential analysis of human being-in-the-world and later thought about Being. While Lonergan defines authenticity as loving openness to transcendent Being, Heidegger, because of his forgetfulness of the subject in her conscious operations, does not allow for a transcendence which stands beyond any finite horizon. 

scholarly journals La estructura intencional de la Ley natural, según Vázquez (s. xvi) / The Intentional Structure of the Natural Law According to Vázquez (16th century)

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Juan CRUZ CRUZ
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
16Th Century ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Practical Judgment ◽  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Rational Nature ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Self Consistency

Gabriel Vázquez (1549-1604) explained that natural law is properly «the whole of radical or structural requirements of human nature as such, which is biological and rational at the same time». Natural law has also «self-consistency» by its own nature, and not by the consent or will of anyone, not even God. There is a double natural law: the primary one is the rational nature, and the secondary one is the judgment of our reason. This secondary natural law, based on the rational nature —which is our first moral rule—, gives a guideline, a practical judgment about the morality and immorality of human acts. The first is properly rule (mensura), the second is properly law (lex). The present study examines this dual intentional structure of natural law.

Meta-Emotions

2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Jäger ◽  
Anne Bartsch
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Emotional Communication ◽  
Survivor Guilt ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Intentional Structure

This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt.

Can Heidegger's Poetic Saying Account for More (or Less) Than Great Artworks?

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
OLIVIER MATHIEU
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Artistic Creativity ◽  
Intentional Structure

ABSTRACT:In this paper I mobilize the Heideggerian concept of poetic saying [Dichtung] to describe features that pertain to the accomplishment of an artwork in the institutional setting of an artworld. Following Binkley and Davies, I first describe performances generative of artworks as ‘piece-specification’. I argue that a condition of ‘artistic creativity’ bears upon piece-specification that is insufficiently accounted for by these authors and that Heidegger's concept of poetic saying can help flesh it out. To that end, I show that it is at least coherent with some of Heidegger's phenomenological insights to argue that (1) poetic sayings are not necessarily tied to the advent of ‘great artworks’ and that (2) poetic sayings thus lend themselves to an analysis that views them as the intentional accomplishment of a meaning-event [Sinnereignis]. I then use the intentional structure of poetic sayings to describe how one can intend to achieve piece-specification in a creative yet recognizable manner.

Selfdetermination in philosophy and factical life. Some considerations about an early Heidegger lecture

Methodus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-43
Author(s):  
Francisco Abalo
Keyword(s):  
Basic Problem ◽  
Methodological Problem ◽  
Early Period ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Relevant Issue ◽  
The One ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Intuitive Model

The main focus of this article is the methodological problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy according to the phenomenological analysis carried out by Heidegger in one of the lectures of his early period (the so called Früh Freiburger Vorlesungen). The general frame of the current paper implies a hermeneutical thesis according to which the relevance of the well-known “factical life” is not solely thematic but mainly methodological. This function explains why these “phenomenological exercises” are some sort of genetical enquiries. In consequence, the specific aim of this article is, on the one hand, to show that the problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy is the document of the more basic problem of the possibility of access to the intentional structures as such. On the other hand, this implies that the facticity as the primary horizon of comprehension constitutes in deed a redrawing of the intentional structure, in such a way that it is avoided the paradoxical consequences of the reflexive-intuitive model of access to one self and makes a relevant issue to the philosophy the problematic character of the intentionality itself.

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