FIVE. Military Command, Control, and Force Operations

2020 ◽  
pp. 113-170
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1891
Author(s):  
Todor Kalinov

Management and Command253 are two different words and terms, but military structures use them as synonyms. Military commanders’ authorities are almost equal in meaning to civilian managers’ privileges and power. Comparison between military command and the civilian management system structure, organization, and way of work shows almost full identity and overlapping. The highest in scale and size military systems are national ministries of defense and multinational military alliances and coalitions. Military systems at this level combine military command structures with civilian political leadership and support elements. Therefore, they incorporate both military command and civilian management organizations without any complications, because their nature originated from same source and have similar framework and content. Management of organizations requires communication in order to plan, coordinate, lead, control, and conduct all routine or extraordinary activities. Immediate long-distance communications originated from telegraphy, which was firstly applied in 19th century. Later, long-distance communications included telephony, aerial transmitting, satellite, and last but not least internet data exchange. They allowed immediate exchange of letters, voice and images, bringing to new capabilities of the managers. Their sophisticated technical base brought to new area of the military command and civilian management structures. These area covered technical and operational parts of communications, and created engineer sub-field of science, that has become one of the most popular educations, worldwide. Communications were excluded from the military command and moved to separate field, named Computers and Communications. A historic overview and analysis of the command and management structures and requirements shows their relationships, common origin, and mission. They have significant differences: management and control are based on humanities, natural and social sciences, while communications are mainly based on engineering and technology. These differences do not create enough conditions for defragmentation of communications from the management structures. They exist together in symbiosis and management structures need communications in order to exist and multiply their effectiveness and efficiency. Future defragmentation between military command and communications will bring risks of worse coordination, need for more human resources, and worse end states. These risks are extremely negative for nations and should be avoided by wide appliance of the education and science among nowadays and future leaders, managers, and commanders.


1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Deckert ◽  
Elleen B. Entin ◽  
Elliot E. Entin ◽  
Jean MacMillan
Keyword(s):  

1977 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-428
Author(s):  
H. W. Kang

Confucian historians presented the first succession struggle (in 945) of the Koryŏ Dynasty as simply an abortive usurpation attempt by Wang Kyu (the influential father-in-law of King Hyejong [r. 943–945]), thwarted by the timely intervention of the king's two half-brothers, Princes Yo and So, with military backing from Wang Singnyom of the P'yongyang Regional Military Command (Tae-doho Pu). The traditional account depicted the princes as archetypal protectors who safeguarded the legitimacy of royal succession, thereby placing the responsibility for the bloody struggle solely on the alleged villain, Wang Kyu. Such a treatment was apparently derived from a politically motivated moralistic interpretation intended to impart a lesson to posterity in the tradition of Confucian historiography. In the traditional account, therefore, the issues typically advanced were those best fitted to orthodox Confucian themes: legitimacy in royal succession, and loyalty to the throne. Factors incompatible with these themes were suppressed or perforce left unexplained, resulting in an account containing inconsistencies and gaps, which—surprisingly—went unchallenged until modern times.


Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Winner ◽  
Jared T. Freeman ◽  
Nancy J. Cooke ◽  
Gerald F. Goodwin

An enduring challenge in management and in military command is ensuring that subordinates select actions as their leader would, particularly when circumstances change unexpectedly. An experiment was conducted to test a measure of shared interpretation of commander's intent and its effects on the adaptability of subordinates. Performance was measured in the context of a simulated law enforcement task. A course of action ranking procedure was used as a measure of interpretation of intent with rank order correlation reflecting shared interpretation. The study validates a measure of shared interpretation of commander's intent and supports the hypothesis that making values explicit enhances shared interpretation and adaptability. The findings indicate that when missions change in unexpected ways, a commander's intent statement that presents the values by which actions are to be prioritized produces greater agreement between commander and subordinates on action preferences than do intent statements that prescribe command preference for specific actions.


Author(s):  
С.А. Кириллина ◽  
Д.Р. Жантиев

В статье рассматриваются основные аспекты политики французского военного командования в отношении христианских общин Османского Египта и Османской Сирии во время экспедиции Бонапарта (1798–1801 гг.). Особое внимание уделено замыслам Бонапарта и его преемников на посту главнокомандующего по привлечению египетских и сирийских христиан к сотрудничеству с французской оккупационной администрацией в качестве чиновников и солдат вспомогательных военных отрядов. Также в статье рассматривается французская пропаганда в сопоставлении с практическими действиями в отношении египетских коптов и сирийских христиан наряду с ответной реакцией со стороны как христианских общин, так и мусульманского большинства населения Османского Египта и Османской Сирии. Выявлены противоречия и двойственность политики Бонапарта и его преемников на посту главнокомандующего Восточной армии – Клебера и Мену в отношении местных христиан. Французское командование рассматривало восточных христиан как потенциальных союзников, но в то же время не решалось выражать к ним особые симпатии, поскольку подобные действия могли вызвать возмущение среди мусульманского большинства населения и создать впечатление, что французы ведут религиозную войну против ислама и мусульман. В статье сделан вывод о том, что эта непоследовательность стала одной из причин неудачи египетской экспедиции Бонапарта, когда французская армия в ходе военных действий в Египте и Сирии оказалась отрезанной от Франции и в то же время не могла пополнять свои ряды добровольцами из числа местных жителей. The article examines the main aspects of the policy of the French military command in relation to the Christian communities of Ottoman Egypt and Ottoman Syria during the expedition of Bonaparte (1798–1801). Particular attention is paid to the plans of Bonaparte and his successors as commander-in-chief to attract Egyptian and Syrian Christians to cooperate with the French occupation administration as officials and soldiers of auxiliary military units. The article also examines French propaganda in comparison with practical actions towards Egyptian Copts and Syrian Christians, and the response from both Christian communities and the Muslim majority of the population of Ottoman Egypt and Ottoman Syria. The contradictions and ambiguity of the policy of Bonaparte and his successors as commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army – Kleber and Menou towards local Christians are revealed. The French command considered Eastern Christians as potential allies, but at the same time did not dare to express special sympathy for them, since such actions could cause outrage among the Muslim majority of the population and create the impression that the French are waging a religious war against Islam and Muslims. The article concludes that this inconsistency was one of the reasons for the failure of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, when the French army was cut off from France during the hostilities in Egypt and Syria and at the same time could not replenish its ranks with volunteers from among the local residents.


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