Some Philosophical Prerequisites for a Sociological Theory of Action

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
William I. Torry
Keyword(s):  
Social Determinants ◽  
Sociological Theory ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Personal Factors ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Responsibility Attribution ◽  
Theories Of Action

AbstractDrawing on the work of three prominent sociological theorists, the paper elaborates on outstanding flaws in sociological theories of action and agency. These concern a penchant for according social determinants considerably more import than intra-personal factors in explanations of action etiology. Such overly-deterministic perspectives on action, it is argued, can carry little weight in moots over moral and legal responsibility. Analytical philosophy is consulted for guidance on the task of constructing sociological theories of action properly mindful of the internal, psychological realities involved in the production of actions and in the practices of responsibility attribution.

Action without Intention: Some Remarks of Analytical Philosophy Applied to the Theory of Social Action

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4-1) ◽  
pp. 28-41
Author(s):  
Aleksander Sanzhenakov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Action ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Social Characteristic ◽  
External Context ◽  
Obvious Consequence ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Theory Of Social Action ◽  
Organically Combine

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

Reasons and Action Explanation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wald ◽  
Sergio Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem.

scholarly journals Determinantes sociales de la salud y la discapacidad, tunaja 2012. / social determinants of health and disability, tunja 2012

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Consuelo Velez alvarez ◽  
José armando Vidarte claros ◽  
Marcela Hormaza ◽  
Sandra lucía Chia
Keyword(s):  
Social Determinants Of Health ◽  
Social Determinants ◽  
Urban Areas ◽  
General System ◽  
Determinants Of Health ◽  
Study Phase ◽  
National Bureau ◽  
Personal Factors ◽  
The Social ◽  
Physical Barriers

Objetivo: establecer la relación entre los Determinantes Sociales de la salud y la Discapacidad en Tunja a partir del Registro para la Localización, Caracterización de las personas con Discapacidad según Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 2010. Materiales y Métodos: estudio descriptivo trasversal con fase correlacional, utilizó 2093 registros actualizados a septiembre 2010, el Registro, incluye factores personales, deficiencias en estructuras o funciones corporales, causas de discapacidad, características demográficas, actividades y participación. Resultados: las mayores frecuencias se encuentran en  mujeres, el grupo etáreo de mayor proporción son menores de 14  años y mayores de 60 años, no tienen educación, residen en el área urbana, pertenecen a estratos 1-2 y al régimen subsidiado, carecen de trabajo. Presentan alteraciones permanentes en los sistemas corporales que limitan actividades para pensar, ver y moverse y restringen la participación social, encuentran barreras físicas inaccesibles. Estadísticamente se encontró asociación p<0,05 entre  19 determinantes sociales de la salud con la restricción en la participación. No existe asociación entre la afiliación al Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud, barreras actitudinales, origen de la discapacidad y raza con este mismo componente  Conclusiones: Los resultados se convierten en un estudio pionero para Colombia. La discapacidad como una condición compleja multidimensional en un contexto diverso, cultural y multiétnico,requiere de una mirada integral y transversal para su estudio, reconoce en los determinantes sociales de la salud y la discapacidad una real aproximación a las inequidades de las personas.Objective: To establish the relationship between the Social Determinants of Healthand Disability in Tunja from the registry for the location, characterization of peoplewith disabilities according to the National Bureau of Statistics 2010. Materials andMethods: Descriptive and correlational study phase, used 2093 records updated inSeptember 2010, the registry, includes personal factors, deficiencies in structuresor bodily functions, causes of disability, demographic characteristics, activities andparticipation. Results: The highest frequencies are found in women, the age groupgreater proportion are under 14 and over 60 , have no education, living in urban areas, are in strata 1-2 and the subsidized regime , lack job. With permanent alterations inbody systems that limit activities to think, see and move and restrict social participation,physical barriers are inaccessible. Statistically association p < 0.05 was foundamong 19 social determinants of health with participation restriction. No associationbetween membership in the General System of Social Security in Health, attitudinalbarriers, origin of disability and race with the same component exists. Conclusions:The results become a pioneering study for Colombia. Disability as a multidimensionalcomplex condition in a diverse cultural and ethnic context, requires a comprehensiveand cross look for study recognizes the social determinants of health and disabilityapproach to real people inequities.

Empirical Evidence against a Cognitivist Theory of Desire and Action

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Neural Pathways ◽  
Cognitive Representation ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Specific Instance ◽  
Theories Of Action

This chapter considers T. M. Scanlon’s (1998) theory of action as a specific instance of cognitivist theories of action. It raises an unusual sort of objection to Scanlon’s cognitivism and its nearest philosophical neighbors: given what is known about the low-level neuroscience of action, there is no reasonable way to interpret the brain’s action-producing neural pathways consistent with this sort of theory. Interpreting the action-producing neural pathways as requiring a cognitive representation of reasons to be involved in action production meets a variety of objections, depending on just which parts of the action-producing neural pathways one interprets as these cognitions about reasons. The chapter proposes that a desire-based interpretation of the neural pathways addresses the obstacles raised to Scanlonian and related cognitivisms and suggests that a desire-based theory of action is thus preferable.

Dialectics and Difference: Negative Dialectics as a Logic of Action

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 484-499
Author(s):  
Sergio Sevilla
Keyword(s):  
Critical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Cultural Tradition ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Negative Dialectics ◽  
Logic Of Action ◽  
The Subject

AbstractThis paper argues that the different ways of facing Hegel's system, as an impossible attempt to harmonize tradition and openness to novelty, respond to an underlying malaise: that provoked by the disturbing question of “the actuality of philosophy” after Hegel. That question insistently arises with respect to different paradigms of contemporary philosophy, and is found in critical theory, in analytical philosophy of action, in Žižek's materialism, and in Derrida's deconstructive reading. Adorno's interpretation introduces the tension between universal concepts and laws, transmitted by the cultural tradition, and particular elements that the subject of the action must always take into account. As a consequence, the subject must include what is not reducible to a concept, which enables the construction of a language of experience that transcends the identifying thinking of the concept and makes negative dialectics possible as a theory of action.

Informed Consent and the Nurse

1981 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela R. Holder ◽  
John W. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Health Professionals ◽  
Medical Decision Making ◽  
Social Economic ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Medical Decision ◽  
Right To Know ◽  
Personal Factors ◽  
Value Judgments

Informed consent, as the courts define it, is the patient's right to know, before agreeing to a procedure, what the procedure entails — the hazards, the possible complications, and expected results of the treatment. The patient must understand any reasonable alternatives to the proposed procedure, including, in most cases, the results that can be predicted from nontreatment. The choice among alternative risks involves value judgments falling outside the scope of medical decision-making, including the patient's views on social, economic, and other personal factors of which health professionals cannot possibly be aware.The negotiations necessary to obtain the patient's informed consent are the responsibility of the person who will perform the procedure. If a physician is in charge, the physician may delegate the discussion to another but retains the legal responsibility to make sure the patient understands.

scholarly journals Witgenstein on intention and theory of action

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (RL. 2020. vol.1. no. 2) ◽  
pp. 88-94
Author(s):  
Kirill Rodin
Keyword(s):  
Essential Role ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
General Context ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Action Theories

In the article we examine Wittgenstein's notes on several action theories in general context of intentional states. We show (based on the articles of Michael Scott) that the kinesthetic theory of action and theories of innervation, which were the object of criticism of Wittgenstein, do not play an essential role for understanding Wittgenstein's texts and therefore in this case the influence of historical and philosophical reconstruction on the understanding of Wittgenstein's corresponding notes can be considered insignificant. Late Wittgenstein's texts are directed against comparatively universal methodological and metaphysical principles. And therefore, criticism of theories of action can only serve as an optional illustration and an optional precondition for interpretation and understanding.

XIII. Passion and Politics

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan James
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Emotional Suffering ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
The Mind

The sudden resurgence of interest in the emotions that has recently overtaken analytical philosophy has raised a range of questions about the place of the passions in established explanatory schemes. How, for example, do the emotions fit into theories of action organized around beliefs and desires? How can they be included in analyses of the mind developed to account for other mental states and capacities? Questions of this general form also arise within political philosophy, and the wish to acknowledge their importance and find a space for them has led to some fruitful developments. Among these are a new sensitivity to ways in which attributions of emotion can create and sustain unequal power relations, an interest in the underlying emotional capacities that make politics possible, a concern with the kinds of emotional suffering that politics should aim to abolish, and analyses of the emotional traits it should foster. While these and comparable explorations have enormously enriched contemporary political philosophy, a great deal of mainstream work continues to ignore or marginalize the emotions, so that their place remains uncertain and obscure. There is no consensus as to what kind of attention should be paid to them, or indeed whether they deserve any systematic attention at all. This is a curious state of affairs, because it was until quite recently taken for granted that political philosophy and psychology are intimately connected, and that political philosophy needs to be grounded on an understanding of human passion. In this essay I shall first consider why political philosophers ever rejected this set of assumptions. I shall then return to the pressing issue of how we might take account of the emotions in our own political theorizing.

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