Fehr on Altruism, Emotion, and Norms

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Group Selection ◽  
Irrational Belief ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Warm Glow ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Free Rider Problem

AbstractI discuss recent work by Ernst Fehr and his collaborators on cooperation and reciprocity. (i) Their work demonstrates conclusively the reality and importance of non-self-interested motivations. (ii) It allows for a useful distinction between trust and blind trust. (iii) It points to a category of quasi-moral norms, distinct both from social norms and moral norms. (iv) It demonstrates how social interactions can generate irrational belief formation. (v) It shows the potential of punishment for sustaining social norms and for overcoming the second-order free rider problem as well as obstacles to group selection. (vi) It offers a provocative experimental basis for the ‘warm-glow’ explanation of altruistic behavior. I conclude by suggesting some experiments that might allow for further developments of the theory.

The Structure Among Measures of Personality, Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 240-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lazar Stankov
Keyword(s):  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Correlation Matrix ◽  
Social Attitudes ◽  
Group Differences ◽  
Factor Scores ◽  
Ethnic Group Differences ◽  
Inside Out

Abstract. This paper presents the results of a study that employed measures of personality, social attitudes, values, and social norms that have been the focus of recent research in individual differences. These measures were given to a sample of participants (N = 1,255) who were enrolled at 25 US colleges and universities. Factor analysis of the correlation matrix produced four factors. Three of these factors corresponded to the domains of Personality/Amoral Social Attitudes, Values, and Social Norms; one factor, Conservatism, cut across the domains. Cognitive ability showed negative correlation with conservatism and amoral social attitudes. The study also examined gender and ethnic group differences on factor scores. The overall interpretation of the findings is consistent with the inside-out view of human social interactions.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

How do Optimistic Individuals Affect Insurance Advertisements?

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoichiro Fujii ◽  
Michiko Ogaku ◽  
Mahito Okura ◽  
Yusuke Osaki
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Level ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Insurance Premium ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Accident Probability ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Accident Probabilities ◽  
Equilibrium Number

AbstractSome people have optimistic expectations regarding their accident probability, and thus, refrain from purchasing adequate insurance. This study investigates how insurance firms use advertisements to lower the ratio of optimistic individuals in the market. The main results are as follows: first, the optimal level of advertisements is maximized when the insurance premium is moderate. Second, the maximum level of advertisement varies according to the degree of optimism, which is measured by the difference between accurate and optimistic accident probabilities. Third, the advertisement decision is affected by the free-rider problem, and the equilibrium number of insurance firms with advertisement is always larger than that of firms without advertisement in a competitive insurance market.

The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey

1979 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN McMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

The Battle over Patents

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Economic Surplus ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Past ◽  
Inventive Activity ◽  
Patent Systems

Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Lawyers, economists, and politicians who have staked out strong positions in this debate often attempt to validate their claims by invoking the historical record—but they typically get the history wrong. The purpose of this book is to get the history right by showing that patent systems are the product of contending interests at different points in production chains battling over economic surplus. The larger the potential surplus, the more extreme are the efforts of contending parties, now and in the past, to search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction. Patent systems, as human creations, are therefore necessarily ridden with imperfections; nirvana is not on the menu. The most interesting intellectual issue is not how patent systems are imperfect, but why historically US-style patent systems have come to dominate all other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The answer offered by the essays in this volume is that they create a temporary property right that can be traded in a market, thereby facilitating a productive division of labor and making it possible for firms to transfer technological knowledge to one another by overcoming the free-rider problem. Precisely because the value of a patent does not inhere in the award itself but rather in the market value of the resulting property right, patent systems foster a decentralized ecology of inventors and firms that ceaselessly extends the frontiers of what is economically possible.

MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL NORMS

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-236
Author(s):  
Chad Van Schoelandt
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
Reactive Attitude ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
Norm Change ◽  
Moral Demands

Abstract:This essay argues that moral accountability depends upon having a shared system of social norms. In particular, it argues that the Strawsonian reactive attitude of resentment is only fitting when people can reasonably expect a mutual recognition of the justified demands to which they are being held. Though such recognition should not typically be expected of moral demands that are thought to be independent of any social practice, social norms can ground such mutual recognition. On this account, a significant part of a society’s social norms are also properly seen as moral norms. The essay defends this overlap of social and moral norms in contrast to views on which moral norms and social norms are sharply distinguished. Lastly, the essay concludes by addressing challenges for accountability in circumstances of norm change.

scholarly journals Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 20160341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Yutaka Nakai
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Accurate Evaluation ◽  
Assessment Systems ◽  
Moral Assessment

Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

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