AbstractA problem for a circular economy, embedded in its policies, tools, technologies and models, is that it is driven by the interests and needs of producers, rather than customers and users. This opinion paper focuses on an alternative form of governance—agreements, which thanks to their bargaining approach brings actors from across the value chain into the policy process. The purpose of this opinion paper is to uncover and analyse the potential of such agreements for a circular economy. Circular agreements aim at increasing the circulation of materials and are an emerging form of political governance within the EU. These agreements have different names, involve different actors and govern in different ways. However, circular agreements seem to work when other types of regulations fail to establish circulation. These agreements bring actors together and offer a platform for negotiating how advantages and disadvantages can be redistributed between actors in a way that is more suitable for a circular economy. However, circular agreements are dependent on other policy instruments to work and can generate a free-rider problem with uninvolved actors. The agreements may also become too detailed and long term, which leads to problem shifting and lock-ins, respectively.
An empirical approach to exploring the role of selective incentives in mitigating the free rider problem
