Lexicographic Voting: Holding Parties Accountable in the Presence of Downsian Competition

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 1867-1892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Klingelhöfer

Abstract This paper combines ideas from models of electoral competition with forward-looking voters and models of electoral competition with backward-looking voters. Two political parties can commit in advance to policy platforms, but not to a maximum level of rent extraction. In the case without uncertainty, the electorate can limit rents to the same extent as in a purely backward-looking model of accountability, and the policy preferred by the voter who represents the median preferences of the electorate is implemented. In the case with uncertainty about the bliss point of the representative voter, the electorate has to accept higher rent seeking by the incumbent politician, but nonetheless retains some control over rent extraction. The policy positions of the two competing parties do not converge as they do in the case without uncertainty. I show in an example that this nonconvergence can increase the welfare of the representative voter.

2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Livio Di Lonardo

Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of electoral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that the campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can induce some voters to change their electoral decision. The weight voters place on candidates’ valence determines the incidence of uncontested elections and the degree of asymmetry in polarization of the candidates’ policy positions in contested elections. Finally, I extend the model to consider asymmetric information about individual valence levels. I show that uncontested races are still possible in equilibrium, that in contested races at least one candidate has high valence, and the valence-advantaged candidate can be the one with the more extreme policy stance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Emre Aytimur

AbstractWe study the rent-seeking behavior of political parties in a proportional representation system. In our model, the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. An extreme party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party in exchange for greater policy influence, except in some cases of unlikely distributions of parties. Moreover, political rents are not eliminated even with free entry, unless the entry cost is arbitrarily small.


Author(s):  
Russell J. Dalton

This chapter uses the cleavage positions of Candidates to the European Parliament (CEPs) to as representative of their parties’ political positions. Three surveys of CEPs track the evolution of party supply in European party systems. In 1979 parties were primarily aligned along a Left–Right economic cleavage. Gradually new left and Green parties began to compete in elections and crystallized and represented liberal cultural policies. In recent decades new far-right parties arose to represent culturally conservative positions. The cross-cutting cultural cleavage has also prompted many of the established parties to alter their policy positions. In most multiparty systems, political parties now compete in a fully populated two-dimensional space. This increases the supply of policy choices for the voters. The analyses are based on the Candidates to the European Parliament Studies in 1979, 1994, and 2009.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199363
Author(s):  
Raimondas Ibenskas ◽  
Jonathan Polk

Are political parties in young democracies responsive to the policy preferences of the public? Compared to extensive scholarship on party responsiveness in established democracies, research on party responsiveness in young democracies is limited. We argue that weaker programmatic party–voter linkages in post-communist democracies create incentives for parties to respond to their supporters rather than the more general electorate. Such responsiveness occurs in two ways. First, parties follow shifts in the mean position of their supporters. Second, drawing on the research on party–voter congruence, we argue that parties adjust their policy positions to eliminate previous incongruence between themselves and their supporters. Analyses based on a comprehensive dataset that uses expert surveys, parties’ manifestoes and election surveys to measure parties’ positions, and several cross-national and national surveys to measure voters’ preferences provide strong support for this argument.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amirul Mustofa

Political reform has occurred in Indonesia, namely when the regime transition of power from the old order to new order, and when the transition toward the new order has yet to reform the order form is of very local government councils. Local government councils according to the opinion of the writer has never showed good political performance, they simply just as political actors who seek personal gain or rent seeking, either the status quo as well as rent-seeking hunters.In connection with these conditions the local government councils is a form of democracy at local government level is very importance role in accommodating the aspirations of the community and promote development at the local level. Referring to this idea the authors approach the study of reform as the basic options that can be found those items essential for local government reform towards a quality council. Variables of important reforms that opinion writer are:  minimize the number of political parties; amendment to the constitution need to be rethinking;political education to be a prerequisite determination of local government councils; and scope of work development of local government council.Key words: local government councils, policy reform, political parties


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mihir Bhattacharya

We consider a one-dimensional model of electoral competition with national and regional parties. There are two regions and three parties—one national party and one regional party for each region. We divide the paper into two parts— homogeneous and heterogeneous regions. In the former, the policy positions of the national party and the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies coincide with the favorite policy position of the region-wide median voter. In the latter, the national party chooses a policy position in a maximal isolation set, while the two regional parties choose policies on the same side of the national party’s policy as their own respective region-wide medians. For a given outcome function, the national party performs better when the regions are heterogeneous. In the homogeneous regions case, the national party can at best do as well as the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies. Our results are broadly consistent with intuition and evidence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 135406881988470
Author(s):  
Lawrence Ezrow ◽  
Tobias Böhmelt ◽  
Roni Lehrer ◽  
Hugh Ward

Previous research suggests that political parties respond to left–right policy positions of successful foreign political parties (“foreign leaders”). We evaluate whether this is an effective electoral strategy: specifically, do political parties gain votes in elections when they respond to successful foreign parties? We argue that parties that follow foreign leaders will arrive at policy positions closer to their own (domestic) median voter, which increases their electoral support. The analysis is based on a two-stage model specification of parties’ vote shares and suggests that following foreign leaders is a beneficial election strategy in national election because it allows them to better identify the position of their own median voter. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation, parties’ election strategies, and for policy diffusion.


Author(s):  
Anne Wren ◽  
Kenneth M. McElwain

This article studies voters and parties, beginning with realignment or dealignment in the party-voter nexus. It discusses changes in the policy preferences of voters and even organizational changes to the party-voter linkage. Electoral competition, performance of traditional parties, and organizational change are discussed as well. This article determines that there are two parallel trends in the linkage between parties and voters. The first is that voters are showing weaker partisan identification with political parties, and a widening gap between the policy preferences of voters and the electoral manifestos of parties is apparent. The second trend is that improvements in educational attainment and innovations in media technology are strengthening the political capability of both parties and voters.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 27-47
Author(s):  
Daniel Hough

In the years since unification, Germany’s political parties have faceda number of formidable challenges. They range from incorporatingthe citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the FederalRepublic’s political processes, reassessing Germany’s role in thewider world, overcoming gridlock on many pressing policy questionsat home (perhaps best understood as the overcoming of the Reformstau),to finding a way out of Germany’s much maligned economicmalaise.1 Such challenges have had a not inconsiderable effect on theGerman party system, the end product of which has been that thissystem, once a bastion of cast-iron stability, has become characterizedby diversity and genuine electoral competition in a way that it hasnot been since the late 1950s. Therefore, the electoral position of themuch-vaunted Volksparteien, if perhaps not their control of the politicalprocess, has slipped considerably.


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