What Do Regulators Value?

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Upper Bound ◽  
Convex Combination ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Indirect Test ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
Public Interest Theory ◽  
Regulated Firm

Abstract: In a pioneering article entitled “Taxation by Regulation,” Judge Richard Posner challenged the prevailing orthodoxy that regulation emulates competition along the lines of the Public Interest Theory of regulation. He argued that regulation is best viewed as a branch of public finance in which the power of the state is leveraged to achieve non-competitive outcomes. We develop an indirect test of Posner’s theory by specifying the regulator’s welfare function as a convex combination of consumer surplus, profits shared with the regulator and profits retained by the regulated firm. The welfare weights cannot be observed directly, but can be inferred from the regulator’s behavior in equilibrium. To wit, when the regulator permits the regulated firm to earn positive profits and authorizes higher prices in response to a greater degree of profit sharing this establishes both an upper bound on the consumer surplus weight and a higher weight on shared profits than on profits retained by the regulated firm. Applying this test to the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act lends support to Posner’s theory.

Broadcasting Regulation and the Public Interest

2016 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 946-966 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avshalom Ginosar ◽  
Or Krispil
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Regulatory Policy ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
Governmental Agency ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Media Regulation ◽  
Broadcasting Regulation ◽  
Public Interest Theory

This study addresses the potential connection between media regulation and public interests. While investigating two Israeli media regulatory authorities, the study’s findings indicate that there is a difference between an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA) and a governmental agency regarding the place of public interests and that both institutional and substantive consideration affect the extent to which public interests are the core of media regulatory policy. The study’s design and findings enhance the trend of bringing back the public interest theory to the center of media regulatory agenda on the expense of the competitive theory, the private interest theory.

scholarly journals Geoblocking and geopricing

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-106
Author(s):  
Marcelo Cesar Guimarães
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Constitutional Economic ◽  
Public Interest Theory ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Market Economics

Purpose – This study aims to demonstrate that companies are not free to operate in the e-commerce field, notably with regard to geoblocking and geopricing practices, since they must duly respect constitutional economic order principles. Methodology/approach/design – The methodology of the paper is based on Mike Feintuck’s public interest theory, according to which there are values beyond those of market economics that should be preserved, often to the detriment of private interests. Furthermore, the Decolar.com case is used as an empirical case study. Findings – It has been identified that geoblocking and geopricing practices can effectively violate constitutional principles and that consumer and antitrust microsystems can suppress those conducts, shaping the performance of economic agents to the public interest. Practical implications – The results of this article indicate that consumer and competition agencies can act more actively to curb the harmful geoblocking and geopricing practices.

A conceptual framework for the Basel accords-based regulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaffar Mohammed Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Cultural Theory ◽  
New Institutionalism ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Basel Accords ◽  
Public Interest Theory

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators. Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents a review of existing literature. Findings – After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated. Originality/value – After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

scholarly journals Preventing Policy Capture and Promoting the Public Interest in Policy Making - Lessons for Botswana

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marumo Omotoye
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Review Of Literature ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Interest Theory

This is a revised version of a conference presentation that was delivered by the author. The paper is based on a review of literature on policy capture and public interest theory.

scholarly journals Preventing Policy Capture and Promoting the Public Interest in Policy Making - Lessons for Botswana

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marumo Omotoye
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Review Of Literature ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Interest Theory

This is a revised version of a conference presentation that was delivered by the author. The paper is based on a review of literature on policy capture and public interest theory.

scholarly journals Gradual Transformation of Public Interest Theory and its Status in Iranian Constitution Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
Mahdi Haddadi ◽  
Mohammad Mohseni Raad
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Interest Theory ◽  
Law And Ethics ◽  
Public Interest Theory ◽  
And Function ◽  
Gradual Transformation

Public interest theory in governance and its reflection in Constitution Law are recently emerging in public law literature. Its concept and function differs country-by-country based on governing ideology of the society. Liberal states usually construe this theory by considering individual orientation and social states by society priority. The concept of public interest and the mechanism to achieve it in law and ethics philosophy in general and in Iranian Constitution in particular is a disputing discussion. We assume that any school construes public interest by its selected ideology in law philosophy and political theory. Likewise, by Iranian Constitution Law, it is perceived that respecting expediency especially “system expediency” has broad usage in governance especially upon revolution. Although respecting customary expediency does not seem so surprising.

scholarly journals Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 831-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Seim ◽  
Joel Waldfogel
Keyword(s):  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Control Board ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Liquor Store ◽  
Government Operation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. (JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document