Effect of earnings management and deferred tax on tax avoidance: Evidence using modified Jones model algorithm

The paper sought to examine earnings management and deferred tax after the passage and post-adoption of the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896) on tax avoidance. This paper examines the effect of earnings management and deferred tax on tax avoidance. A probability sampling technique selected twenty-four firms from 2001 to 2020 on the Ghana Stock Exchange. A quantitative research technique is used to test five hypotheses. Panel data regression is employed to predict the effect of earnings management on tax avoidance. The study revealed that earnings management and other macroeconomic variables accounted for or explained 77.9% of tax avoidance practices of the selected firms. Furthermore, the study revealed a significant and positive relationship between earnings management, deferred tax, and leverage on tax avoidance. The study finds a decrease in the values of earnings management after 2015, signifying a reduction in tax avoidance practice after the passage of Act 896. The study concludes the need to strengthen the public interest theory of regulation to bring earnings management to its lowest point. The study recommends a revision to IAS 12 as a public interest regulation to reduce the discretions to managers on deferred tax

Compliance with the Planning Standards in Regulating Building Lines. The Case of Kisii Town, Kenya

Planning standards provide a basis for controlling land use to attain orderly spatial development. This study examined the extent to which developments in Kenya have been complying with the planning standard on building lines, having Kisii town as a case study. It also investigated the factors contributing to the observed non-compliance. The analysis was based on the public interest theory of regulation. A sample size of 364 residential developments was randomly and proportionately drawn from the seven neighbourhoods. Remote sensing and questionnaires were used to collect data and thereafter analyzed using GIS, descriptive and inferential statistics. Research findings disclosed that most residential developments did not comply with the recommended building lines. The results of hypothesis similarly confirmed low compliance that was statistically significant. Non-compliance was found to be caused by the failure of the County Government of Kisii to ensure that developers obtained the obligatory development permissions in addition to meeting other requirements namely using registered professionals and ensuring regular inspection of buildings during construction. Also, the interpretation of the applicable planning standards of building lines by the County Government when approving building plans was misleading and eventually contributed to non-compliance. These problems ensue due to insufficient development control, therefore contributing to unsustainable spatial development. This study addresses a critical issue in spatial planning practice and aims to contribute to the specialist literature by demonstrating how compliance with the planning standards that regulate building lines may be statistically and spatially evaluated.

A Critical Analysis on the Theories of Regulation

Regulation in general is literally defined as a form of government intervention in the economic activity and interference with the workings of the free-market system. According to certain views, regulation is “synonymous with government intervention in social and economic life”. Free marketeers do not like regulations because they do not like any form of intervention in which that is made by the government and prefer to feel the full power of the market. However, those who believe that the government intervention may be necessary, and then even such people should not be exposed to the full tyranny of the market on find regulation to be tolerable, even desirable. Majorly, three theories of regulation in which that is made and referred till now, as in which they are Public Interest Theory, Private Interest Theory and Institutional Theories as in which each theory flows and deals with different aspects in order to provide a proper regulation. And The current research focuses on the theories of regulation with regard to the satisfaction of the people, and the current issue analyzed with the help of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, and it is used by various kinds of researchers for complex statistical data analysis in order to produce an appropriate and an unbiased result.

Geoblocking and geopricing

Purpose – This study aims to demonstrate that companies are not free to operate in the e-commerce field, notably with regard to geoblocking and geopricing practices, since they must duly respect constitutional economic order principles. Methodology/approach/design – The methodology of the paper is based on Mike Feintuck’s public interest theory, according to which there are values beyond those of market economics that should be preserved, often to the detriment of private interests. Furthermore, the Decolar.com case is used as an empirical case study. Findings – It has been identified that geoblocking and geopricing practices can effectively violate constitutional principles and that consumer and antitrust microsystems can suppress those conducts, shaping the performance of economic agents to the public interest. Practical implications – The results of this article indicate that consumer and competition agencies can act more actively to curb the harmful geoblocking and geopricing practices.

Barriers to the Effective Regulation of the Building Construction Industry: An Empirical Analysis

This study investigates key barriers to the effective regulation of the building construction industry in Kenya, a case study of Kisii Town. It was guided by the Public Interest Theory of Regulation, which provided the underpinning elucidating why the building construction industry in Kenya needs regulation. The target population comprised 84 registered building contractors with a sample size of 66 selected using simple random sampling by application of random number table. As regards limitation, the study does not measure the extent of quality assurance within the construction industry, but rather delve on the key factors impeding its effective regulation. The research findings show that ineffective regulation of the construction industry in Kisii Town was prompted by the joint activities of building development contractors and limitations of the National Construction Authority (NCA) (the regulator). Regarding the activities of building contractors, identified barriers included failure to refer to key legislation that regulates the construction industry, failure to obtain statutory approvals of building development, and laxity to invite supervision of ongoing projects by planning authorities. Conversely, factors elucidating why NCA was not successfully regulating the construction industry included inadequate multi-sectoral coordination, inadequate surveillance, and limited sensitization of key stakeholders. Drawing from these findings, the study recommends regular monitoring and enhanced enforcement that would promote compliance and sensitization of contractors with applicable standards and regular inspections of ongoing projects. Also, establishing a coordinating committee to harmonize institutions that deal with development control. Keywords: Construction Industry, Kenya, Kisii Town, Regulation

Preventing Policy Capture and Promoting the Public Interest in Policy Making - Lessons for Botswana

This is a revised version of a conference presentation that was delivered by the author. The paper is based on a review of literature on policy capture and public interest theory.

Preventing Policy Capture and Promoting the Public Interest in Policy Making - Lessons for Botswana

This is a revised version of a conference presentation that was delivered by the author. The paper is based on a review of literature on policy capture and public interest theory.

National Business Regulations and City Entrepreneurship in Europe: A Multilevel Nested Analysis

This article provides and tests a theoretical framework with a multilevel (country–city) nested model to analyze the relationship between national business regulations (NBRs) and city level entrepreneurship. While public interest theory predicts a positive relationship between NBR and city level entrepreneurship, public choice theory predicts the opposite, a negative relationship. Based on multilevel analysis for a matched country–city panel of 228 cities across 20 European countries for the years 2004 to 2009, the empirical evidence from panel data estimation explains how changes in NBRs influence changes in city level entrepreneurial activity over time.

SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC INTEREST: THEORY AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES

The scientific article is devoted to research of the essence of category «subjective public interest», its characteristic and types, also features of its realization and judicial protection. Nature and essence of the interest were considered, as a result of which it was defined the structure of interest in the framework of «internal factor theory», its connection with need and benefit. It was highlighted that today`s legislation doesn`t consist a distinction between interest, need and benefit. It was highlighted interest`s role in legal relationship and also defined the dependence interest`s guarantee`s extend on its connection with subjective law. It is considered that in decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on 01.12.2004 № 18-рп/2004 term «law protected interest» is defined narrowly, as a result of which it was justified that there can be three types of law protected interest: 1) interest, covered by the subjective law; 2) interest, which is not covered by subjective law, but has a logically-meaning connection; 3) interest, which is not covered by subjective law and doesn`t have a logically-meaning connection. In the framework of research of conception of dividing interest on privet and public it was considered that category «public interest» should be understood in its quality meaning, and quantity should be used only to justified subjects-interest owners. It was considered that public interest has a social nature and privet – psychological. As a result, necessary features of privet interest were highlighted: its subjectivity and egocentrism. While related categories «public interest» and «state interest» it was justified the difference between their subjects, and after these we made a conclusion that public interest can be realized and protected by common citizens by use of legal form «subjective public interest». The internal structure of the subjective public interest was researched through the «internal factor» theory, as a result we highlighted two types of subjective public interest: subjectified public interest and publicized subjective interest. In addition, we justified features of legal embody of each interests type. In the framework of research of subjective public interest`s court protection were highlighted deficiencies of criteria to understand which legal interest can be court protected. Ways to address the problem were proposed and was concluded that today administrative procedure is more universal and effective in order to realize and protect subjective public interest.

What Do Regulators Value?

In a pioneering article entitled “Taxation by Regulation,” Judge Richard Posner challenged the prevailing orthodoxy that regulation emulates competition along the lines of the Public Interest Theory of regulation. He argued that regulation is best viewed as a branch of public finance in which the power of the state is leveraged to achieve non-competitive outcomes. We develop an indirect test of Posner’s theory by specifying the regulator’s welfare function as a convex combination of consumer surplus, profits shared with the regulator and profits retained by the regulated firm. The welfare weights cannot be observed directly, but can be inferred from the regulator’s behavior in equilibrium. To wit, when the regulator permits the regulated firm to earn positive profits and authorizes higher prices in response to a greater degree of profit sharing this establishes both an upper bound on the consumer surplus weight and a higher weight on shared profits than on profits retained by the regulated firm. Applying this test to the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act lends support to Posner’s theory.