Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
AbstractIn uniform price auctions, multiple prices are sustainable in equilibrium as a result of the market power of bidders. I show that low price equilibria are removed in a framework with asymmetric bidders who cannot anticipate the seller’s rationing strategy. Attracting high cost bidders’ participation in the auction induces the low cost bidders to bid more aggressively in order to eliminate the high cost bidders. Ex-post optimal equilibria with non-increasing demand schedules only exist when the seller is allowed to use any degree of rationing.
2015 ◽
Vol 1
(1)
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pp. 96-111
2011 ◽
Vol 9
(2)
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pp. 1-18
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2016 ◽
Vol 4
(4)
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pp. 1495-1505
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