scholarly journals Social Justice and Lesbian Feminism: Two Theories Applied to Homophobia

10.18060/210 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-327
Author(s):  
Denise L. Levy

Trends in contemporary social work include the use of an eclectic theory base. In an effort to incorporate multiple theories, this article will examine the social problem of homophobia using two different theoretical perspectives: John Rawls’ theory of social justice and lesbian feminist theory.Homophobia, a current social problem, can be defined as “dislike or hatred toward homosexuals, including both cultural and personal biases against homosexuals” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 2). Rawls’ theory of justice and lesbian feminist theory are especially relevant to the issue of homophobia and provide a useful lens to understanding this social problem. In this article, these two theories will be summarized, applied to the issue of homophobia, and compared and contrasted based on their utility.

Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter examines the impact of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice on the liberal audience that took it up. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls offers a defense of civil disobedience that would make politically motivated disobedience a much more acceptable part of our political life than either the U.S. Supreme Court or the English judiciary seems likely to contemplate. Furthermore, his views about the subservience of economic institutions to “social justice” place him firmly on one side of what is currently the most fiercely contested dividing line in politics in Britain today. The chapter also considers Rawls's use of the theory of the social contract to support his arguments; his principle of “the priority of liberty”; and his “difference principle.” It asserts that Rawls is safe from those critics who maintain that what purports to be a defense of liberalism actually collapses into a wholesale collectivism.


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.


2018 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Kraynak

Abstract“Social justice” is a powerful idea today, but its origins and meaning are unclear. One of the first to use the term was Antonio Rosmini, author of The Constitution under Social Justice (1848) and other works of moral philosophy. I argue that Rosmini arrived at his idea of social justice by developing Thomistic natural law theory into a novel view of the common good that balances two principles: (1) the equal rights and dignity of persons as ends-in-themselves, a version of “personalism” influenced by Kant and Christianity; and (2) unequal rewards for those who contribute most to society, a version of Aristotelian “proportionalism” based on the social nature of man. I conclude by comparing Rosmini's idea of social justice to John Rawls's “theory of justice” and Catholic social teaching.


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (7) ◽  
pp. 84-99
Author(s):  
Viturino Ribeiro da Silva

A cooperação equitativa é um conceito central da filosofia de John Rawls e possui uma estreita relação com as noções de racionalidade, razoabilidade e tolerância. Portanto, faz-se necessário ressaltar que tais temas são fundamentais para uma adequada compreensão da teoria rawlsiana de justiça. Rawls elege a justiça como virtude primária e princípio norteador na construção da sua teoria. Em virtude disso, a preocupação de Rawls é a resolução das desigualdades sociais que ocorrem nos sistemas políticos democráticos. A noção de justiça como equidade faz-se indispensável frente à necessidade de eleger a liberdade enquanto preocupação com o justo equilíbrio e ao “consenso nas sociedades plurais”. É a partir da concepção de cooperação equitativa que Rawls tenta resolver o impasse contemporâneo da convivência de diferentes doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis sejam elas, religiosas, filosóficas ou morais. Dessa forma, a teoria rawlsiana de justiça tem como proposta a “coexistência pacifica” ante essa pluralidade de doutrinas compreensivas. Assim posto, a justiça como equidade, pode plausivelmente, ser a forma mais viável de coexistência pacífica que agrupamentos sociais poderiam seguir ou se pautar. Sob essa ótica, acredita-se que a noção de cooperação equitativa rawlsiana será uma via de justiça que enfatiza os direitos individuais sem desmerecer aquilo que é próprio do coletivo. Abstract: Fair cooperation is a central concept of J. Rawls´s philosophy and keeps a close relationship with the the notions of rationality, reasonability, and tolerance. Thus it is important to claim that these notions are necessary for a correct comprehension of rawlsian theory of justice. Rawls claims justice as the primary virtue and main principle of his theory. The aim of Rawls is to solve the social inequalities that occur in democratic political systems. The concept of justice as fairness is essential before the need of electing the liberty as concerning to the just balance and to the “consensus in the plural societies”. By starting from the conception of fair cooperation Rawls tries to solve the contemporary problem of different comprehensive doctrines sharing the same political and social space, no matter they are religious, philosophical or moral ones. The rawlsian theory of justice claims to propose as “pacific cohabitation” among that plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In this way, justice as fairness may plausibility be the most viable form of pacific cohabitation that social groups can follow or be ruled. Under this perspective, we believe that the rawlsian concept of fair cooperation will be a way of justice that focus on individual rights without deprive the significance of collective. Keywords: Rawls, fair cooperation, original position, rationality, reasonability. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 417
Author(s):  
Juanrico A.S. Titahelu ◽  
Irwansyah Irwansyah ◽  
Hamid Awaludin ◽  
Muhammad Ashri

Pela-Gandong could be seen as an alliance among two or more villages in Central Maluku territory. Pela-Gandong, besides as brotherhood and friendship among them,this alliance also shared common purpose of cooperation and collective security. Conflict in the beginning of 1999 draws up public attention to the effectiveness of the principles which contains in pela-gandong alliance. Important question come forward because of the plurality condition among current Indonesian society. Should pela-gandong principles nowadays, still playing role to develope social, economy and cultural life of Maluku traditional society? The purpose of this writings is to find out the weaknesses of pela-gandong alliance(s). Based on this, it should offers some suggestion how to strengthening the principles of pela-gandong alliance into the state and the social life in Indonesia.


Author(s):  
Rodney G. Peffer

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Kimmitt ◽  
Pablo Muñoz

In the collective imagination, the practices and outcomes of social entrepreneurship seem to hold hope for a better future. So far, these practices have been largely assumed as idealised types with the ‘social’ in social entrepreneurship underexplored. Such assumed neutrality, we argue, is hampering the development of a more robust theoretical corpus for understanding the phenomenon and inspiring practices that are more effective. In this article, we analyse the sensemaking of the social in social entrepreneurship by exploring the ways in which social entrepreneurs make sense of social problems and develop solutions for addressing them. Our empirical analyses of the stories of 15 social entrepreneurs indicate two distinct types of sensemaking and sensegiving practices, aligned with Amartya Sen’s notions of social justice. Drawing on these findings, sensemaking and social justice theory, we elaborate a two-type social sensemaking model pertaining to the appreciation and assessment of circumstances and the differing problem/solution combinations emerging from alternative ontological views of what constitutes a social problem.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
Ali Mehdi

Given the backlash against the politics and practice of social justice, this chapter provides a justification for an engagement with the proactive debate in political philosophy on ‘equalisandum’—what is to be equalized across individuals in a just society—since the publication of John Rawls’ path-breaking work, A Theory of Justice, in 1971. Since injustice faced by children is the biggest blot on the promise of equality of opportunity, it makes a case for anchoring the discussion of equalisandum in the context of child survival, in India. Millions of children continue to lack the opportunity to even survive within the first five years of birth, and India has recorded not only the highest number of child deaths for decades, but also some of the worst forms of injustice. The chapter ends with a brief discussion on why Amartya Sen’s capability metric is preferable vis-à-vis its Rawlsian and resourcist counterparts, both conceptually and contextually.


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