Wittgenstein as a Common-Sense Realist

Conceptus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (101-102) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristóf Nyíri

AbstractThe later Wittgenstein is widely held to be a relativist, indeed a constructivist. By contrast, this paper argues that all appearances to the contrary Wittgenstein was a realist, and that this fact becomes almost conspicuous in his late-1940s manuscripts. His realism was a common-sense one, the only kind of realism worthy of the name. Wittgenstein’s common-sense realism has unique traits: first, an uncompromising stress on deviations from ordinary language as a source of (bad) philosophy. Secondly, his awareness of the significance of the pictorial & the motor. Thirdly, his emphasis on established use, that is, on traditions. In the later Wittgenstein, philosophical realism and social conservatism converge.

Mind ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol LXXVI (301) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD G. HENSON

1981 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph E. Luker

In the late-flowering study of religion in the South, relatively little attention has been given to its intellectual traditions. The field's rich body of literature, largely produced in the last two decades, has yielded only one serious study of theology in the region, E. Brooks Holifield'sThe Gentlemen Theologians. So great has been the historians' stress upon the heartfelt, emotional character of popular religion in the South, says Holifield, that even to inquire into a “Southern religious ‘mind’ … is to question a commonplace.” One might say that, lacking a Jonathan Edwards, the South has no call for a Perry Miller. Even Holifield felt compelled to analyze the social status of his regional divines in order to create interest in their tomes of derivative common sense theology.


Author(s):  
Bart Schultz

Henry Sidgwick was a Cambridge philosopher, psychic researcher and educational reformer, whose works in practical philosophy, especially The Methods of Ethics (1874), brought classical utilitarianism to its peak of theoretical sophistication and drew out the deep conflicts within that tradition, perhaps within the age of British imperialism itself. Sidgwick was profoundly influenced by J.S. Mill, but his version of utilitarianism – the view that those social or individual actions are right that maximize aggregate happiness – also revived certain Benthamite doctrines, though with more cogent accounts of ultimate good as pleasure, of total versus average utility, and of the analytical or deductive method. Yet Sidgwick was a cognitivist in ethics who sought both to ground utilitarianism on fundamental intuitions and to encompass within it the principles of common-sense ethics (truthfulness, fidelity, justice, etc.); his highly eclectic practical philosophy assimilated much of the rationalism, social conservatism and historical method of rival views, reflecting such influences as Butler, Clarke,Aristotle, Bagehot, Green, Whewell and Kant. Ultimately, Sidgwick’s careful academic inquiries failed to demonstrate that one ought always to promote the happiness of all rather than one’s own happiness, and this dualism of practical reason, along with his doubt about the viability of religion, led him to view his results as largely destructive and potentially deleterious in their influence.


Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (126) ◽  
pp. 221-239
Author(s):  
Alan R. White

I believe that Moore's appeal to common sense has been misunder-stood both by his defenders and his critics. Besides the mistakes of the latter, there is one enormous howler which, in my opinion, the former have committed. This is to confuse or coalesce two quite distinct appeals which he made, namely the appeal to common sense and the appeal to ordinary language.


Author(s):  
Jim Macadam

One of the most influential Oxford philosophers of the twentieth century, Prichard was White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy there from 1928 to 1937. His work combines epistemological realism and moral intuitionism. From 1906 onwards Prichard was active with the Oxford realists, who held, against idealists, that reality exists independently of mind, that knowledge is of reality, and that common-sense realism is correct. In ethics, he was the leader of the Oxford intuitionists who held, against utilitarianism, that common-sense morality is correct, its duties are known non-inferentially, and are an irreducible plurality of distinct kinds of act. His philosophical style displays concentration on specific problems, carefully using ordinary language to make precise distinctions in the absence of general theory. He influenced Oxford’s next generation of Austin, Ryle, Hart and Berlin, who attended his classes and, occasionally, his ‘philosophers’ teas’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adson Da Silva Muniz ◽  
José Francisco Dos Santos

O presente artigo busca compreender a crítica de Gilbert Keith Chesterton à filosofia moderna a partir da filosofia do senso comum. Para tal intento, primeiramente é apresentado o realismo filosófico segundo Chesterton. Em seguida, se descreve o abandono dos primeiros princípios filosóficos pela filosofia moderna e suas consequências para a sanidade mental do homem. Enfim, explicita-se a defesa da filosofia do senso comum como meio para se chegar a uma visão verdadeira da realidade. Para a construção de tal pesquisa, as principais fontes bibliográficas utilizadas foram os livros Hereges, Ortodoxia e Chesterton e o Universo, bem como obras de comentadores e estudiosos. Com a pesquisa se espera um aprofundamento no pensamento de G. K. Chesterton e na sua proposta de retorno à filosofia do senso comum, como sendo uma filosofia capaz de devolver ao homem a sanidade mental.Palavras-chave: Chesterton. Realismo. Senso comum.Abstract: The present article consists on investigation that, through bibliographic exploratory method, searches to comprehend the Gilbert Keith Chesterton’s critic to the modern philosophy from the common sense philosophy. For this intent, firstly is presented the philosophical realism according to Gilbert Keith Chesterton. After, it described the abandonment of the first philosophical principles by the modern philosophy and its consequences to the man’s mental sanity. Finally, it will be explicated (ou “exemplified”) the defense of the common sense philosophy as way to become a truly vision of reality, according to Chesterton. To the construction of this research, the main bibliographic sources used was the books: Hereges, Ortodoxia and Chesterton e o Universo, as well commentators works and students of the G. K. Chesterton’s thinking. With the research is waited a deepening in the Chesterton’s thinking in his proposal of return to the common sense philosophy, as a philosophy capable to give back to the man his mental sanity.Keywords: Chesterton. Realism. Common sense.


Mind ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol LXII (247) ◽  
pp. 301-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. D. WOOZLEY

2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Schedler

In contemporary Mexico, political elections have turned into fundamentally free, fair, competitive, and clean contests. Yet, in political debate, the idea prevails that the country's transition to democracy is still on its way. How can we explain this apparent divergence? First, as the article argues, empirical disagreements over the state of democratization persist due to the veiled nature of the Mexican transition. Second, normative disagreements over the endpoints of democratization have raised the standards a complete transition must fulfill. Third, the idea of an ongoing transition has turned into political common sense. It has become part of 'ordinary' language. Accordingly, political actors may use it in many different ways but still harbour an illusion of shared meaning and common ground. / En el México contemporáneo, las elecciones políticas se han convertido, en lo fundamental, en contiendas competitivas, libres, equitativas y limpias. Sin embargo, en el debate público prevalece la idea que el país esté todavía transitando hacia la democracia. ¿Cómo podemos explicar esta aparente incongruencia? En primer lugar, el artículo argumenta que los desacuerdos empíricos acerca del estado de la transición persisten por la naturaleza "velada" de la democratización mexicana. Luego, la existencia de concepciones diferentes de democracia ha elevado los estándares que una transición democrática "completa" debe satisfacer. Por último, la idea de una transición en marcha ha llegado a formar parte del lenguaje cotidiano y del sentido común en política. Consecuentemente, los actores políticos usan el concepto de transición de maneras muy diferentes, manteniendo sin embargo la ilusión de hablar un lenguaje común.


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