More Than a Trace: Political Periods, Presidential Losers, and the Goldwater and McGovern Experiences

The Forum ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew E. Busch

AbstractPeriods of American politics marked by recognizable surges of ideas and activists are not driven solely by winners. Barry Goldwater and George McGovern were among the biggest losers in the history of American presidential elections, yet they produced surges that continue to affect American politics decades later. These losing candidates had three things in common: 1) Their candidacies represented more than individual attempts to gain the presidency, 2) they altered their parties’ electoral coalitions and strategies, and 3) they each made distinctive arguments that laid the groundwork for future party and movement successes.

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 194
Author(s):  
Aaron Griffith

Though several powerful explorations of modern evangelical influence in American politics and culture have appeared in recent years (many of which illumine the seeming complications of evangelical influence in the Trump era), there is more work that needs to be done on the matter of evangelical understandings of and influence in American law enforcement. This article explores evangelical interest and influence in modern American policing. Drawing upon complementary interpretations of the “antistatist statist” nature of modern evangelicalism and the carceral state, this article offers a short history of modern evangelical understandings of law enforcement and an exploration of contemporary evangelical ministry to police officers. It argues that, in their entries into debates about law enforcement’s purpose in American life, evangelicals frame policing as both a divinely sanctioned activity and a site of sentimental engagement. Both frames expand the power and reach of policing, limiting evangelicals’ abilities to see and correct problems within the profession.


2012 ◽  
pp. 41-55
Author(s):  
Marco Morini

The economy matters. This is one of the dogmas taught us by those who have studied the history of the American presidential elections. But is this collective perception of the influence of economic data on individual electoral behaviour confirmed by statistical analysis of the history of presidential elections? This study shows that the most commonly used economic indicators are poor predictors of election outcomes, and also that variation in the approval rating of the incumbent president is a variable independent from the real economic data.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 351-360
Author(s):  
Richard Schneirov

The July 2003 special issue of the Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era revisited the history of the Socialist Party of America during the Progressive Era. This second issue on “New Perspectives on Socialism” examines socialism largely outside the party context, thereby challenging the tendency of scholars and non-scholars alike to identify socialism with a party-based political movement. To the degree that the essays collected here examine party-based socialism, they focus on the gradualist or revisionist wing of the party, whose socializing and democratic reforms, programs, and ideas helped establish a context for the Progressive Era and thereafter, when a “social democratic” type of politics became intrinsic to the mainstream American politics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Olczyk ◽  
Jacek Wasilewski

The 2015 presidential election was a turning point in a history of celebritisation of politics in Poland. Rock vocalist Paweł Kukiz unexpectedly finished third with 20% of votes, the highest result of any celebrity–candidate in presidential elections. He achieved that, campaigning mostly on Facebook, without any significant power base and financial support. Kukiz set up his own political organisation, which gained a 9% backing in the parliamentary elections. He achieved that with no political platform, no media backing, and no party structure. We argue that his persona was a crucial asset in his political success. We will show how Kukiz created, managed and performed his persona, how he used it to mobilise three million voters and then to create and brand his “Kukiz’15 Movement.” Finally, we analyse limits, traps and contradictions of persona power. Analysed material includes Paweł Kukiz’s and his opponents’ Facebook posts, televised political advertisements, performances in celebrity TV shows and debates.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Jacob Weaver

In 2016, the Republican-held Senate refused to hold a hearing on President Barack Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, sparking outrage among the Democratic Party. Then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell justified his party’s actions based on what became known as the “McConnell Rule.” This controversial rule holds that during years of presidential elections, when the president and the Senate majority are of different parties, the Senate is not expected to confirm the president’s Supreme Court nominees; but, when the president and Senate majority are of the same party, vacancies may be filled. When the Senate applied this rule in 2020, the stakes were even higher. Revered liberal stalwart Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away only 46 days before the 2020 presidential election. Invoking the McConnell Rule, the Republican-held Senate moved forward with the confirmation of President Trump’s nominee Amy Coney Barrett. This contentious move again infuriated Democrats, and the presidential campaign. Now that Justice Barrett has been appointed and the presidential election has passed, it is useful to look back on the history of Supreme Court nominations during presidential election years. Such a review suggests that the so-called McConnell Rule is rooted in valid historical precedent. In fact, viewed in light of American history, even a Trump lame duck nomination and confirmation would have been valid. This blog post argues that the Senate should distill this historical precedent into an explicit Rule of the Senate that will govern the chamber going forward. The rule should obligate the Senate to either (1) hold a vote to confirm the election-year or lame duck nominee, or (2) hold a vote to postpone action on the nomination. If a vote to postpone action on the nomination fails, the rule should then compel the Senate to hold a vote to confirm the nominee. Such a rule removes all doubt about the Senate’s authority to act or refuse to act on election-year and lame duck nominees, exposes unfounded threats of retaliation by minority parties, and best conforms to the Constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-408
Author(s):  
Thomas Zimmer

Polarization is everywhere. It is, according to the Pew Research Center, “a defining feature of American politics today.” Elected officials, journalists, and political pundits seem to agree that it is a severe problem in urgent need of fixing, maybe even the root of all evil that plagues the United States, from dysfunction in Congress to the decay of social and cultural norms. Many historians, too, have embraced the concept of polarization for its explanatory power: It has emerged as the closest thing to a master narrative for recent American history. In this interpretation, the “liberal consensus” that had dominated mid-twentieth-century American politics and intellectual life—the widely shared acceptance of New Deal philosophy and broad agreement on the desirable contours of society and the pursuit of certain kinds of public good—gave way after the 1960s to an age of heightened tension, dividing Americans into two camps that since then have regarded each other with deepening distrust. Yet too few historians have reflected on the limits and potential pitfalls of using polarization as a governing historical paradigm. It is high time, therefore, to pause to consider the larger implications of approaching the past through the prism of polarization.


1928 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 224
Author(s):  
Mary Wilhelmine Williams ◽  
Charles E. Chapman

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document