Lack of Statutory Foundation, Vagueness, and Violation of the Rule of Lenity of California Second Degree Felony Murder

Global Jurist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sira Grosso
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Penal Code ◽  
The Other ◽  
Senate Bill ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Paradoxical Results ◽  
Second Degree

AbstractRestrictions recently imposed by law on the application of felony murder in CaliforniaSenate Bill n. 1437 amending Sections 188 and 189 of, and adding Section 1170.95 to, the Penal Code. and a judgment of a split California Court of Appeal rejecting the claim that the second-degree felony murder provision is unconstitutionally vagueCal. 4th App. Dist. April 30, 2019, see note 74. offer the occasion to analyze the Californian second degree murder. Second degree Felony murder in California, which is not spelled out by statute, relies on the jurisprudential construction of an “inherently dangerous felony”. According to the California Supreme Court, this criterion was conceived to accompany its overall aim of deterrence as well as function as a limitation on the application of felony murder itself. The purpose of this article is to highlight how the jurisprudential reconstruction of “inherently dangerous felonies” does not present a suitable criterion for determining whether second degree murder has taken place. While calling into play the goal of deterrence may bring forth paradoxical results, the “inherently dangerous felony,” upon which second degree felony murder relies, represents a double-edged sword. In fact, this article argues that it expands, rather than restricts, the application of felony murder, also posing several constitutional concerns. It follows that, since the “inherently dangerous” category acts as the essential base upon which second degree felony murder stands, the “crumbling” of the one should lead to the fall of the other.

scholarly journals COMPROMISE, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND ECONOMIC DURESS Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk 2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
CJ Pretorius ◽  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The Other ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Sound Judgment

The matter of Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk (2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP)) alludes to two rather problematic aspects of the law of contract: on the one hand it demonstrates that practically speaking the question of what constitutes an enforceable agreement of compromise is still no easy matter, and despite the sound judgment delivered recently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) Ltd (2008 (3) SA 327 (SCA)), it seems that the judiciary’s interpretation as to when an offer of compromise exists remains difficult to predict. On the other hand the Gerolomou decision deals with improperly obtained consensus by way of undue influence, whereas the facts actually fit more comfortably into the niche of so-called economic duress, a form of procedural impropriety that has yet to be recognized as an independent ground for setting aside a contract in our law. This case note examines these issues against the backdrop of the manner in which the case was pleaded.

scholarly journals Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples: Impacts on the Petroleum Industry

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Fogarassy ◽  
KayLynn Litton
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Petroleum Industry ◽  
The Other ◽  
Aboriginal Peoples ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Company Limited ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The duties of consultation and accommodation with Aboriginal peoples affected by resource development were, until 2002, primarily the responsibility of the Crown. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in two related decisions involving the Haida Nation on the one hand and the Crown and Weyerhaeuser Company Limited on the other, has placed these duties squarely on to the shoulders of industry. Where the Crown fails to discharge its duties of consultation and accommodation, resource tenures such as permits, licenses or leases may be invalid and activity conducted pursuant to the tenures may result in damages awarded against industry in favour of affected Aboriginal peoples. Appeals from both decisions will be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. In the meantime, the law on industry’s duty to consult and to accommodate Aboriginal peoples continues to lack certainty.

A Note on Mandela v Executors, Estate Nelson Mandela 2018 (4) SA 86 (SCA) and the Conundrum around the Customary Marriage between Nelson and Winnie Mandela

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Eastern Cape ◽  
High Court ◽  
Nelson Mandela ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.

To Discriminate in Order to Fight Discrimination

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
The Other ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Main Technique ◽  
Antidiscrimination Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Paradoxical Results ◽  
Conflicts Of Rights

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.

Regspraak: Novasie en delegasie van skuld – hoe raak dit die versekering van die tersake skuld?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-378
Author(s):  
JC Sonnekus ◽  
EC Schlemmer
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The Other ◽  
Secured Debt ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Preferential Position ◽  
The Creation ◽  
D 20 ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Secured Creditors

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place. This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).

3. Certainty and formalities

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Macdonald ◽  
Ruth Atkins ◽  
Jens Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Case ◽  
Flexible Systems ◽  
Electronic Transactions ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
Electronic Contracting ◽  
The One ◽  
Binding Agreement

This chapter looks at the need for certainty and formalities in contracting. It explores case law which illustrates, on the one hand, that a willingness of the parties to make a contract does not necessarily amount to a legally binding agreement, whilst on the other hand, there is potential for the court to fill in any gaps to give effect to agreements. The issues surrounding an agreement which is expressed to be ‘subject to contract’ are explored in light of the recent Supreme Court case of RTS Flexible Systems Ltd. The reasons for when contract formalities may be required are also noted. There is also discussion of electronic contracting, in relation to the introduction of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Regulations (2016/696).

BANKER’S LIABILITY FOR POST-PETITION DISPOSITIONS

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-492
Author(s):  
Christopher Hare
Keyword(s):  
Current Account ◽  
The Other ◽  
Considerable Difficulty ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Court Orders ◽  
The One ◽  
A Company ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Consistent Approach

Once a petition to wind-up a company has been presented, a balance must be struck between two competing interests. On the one hand, the allegedly insolvent company must be allowed to continue trading until the court has had an opportunity to examine the bien-fondé of the petition; on the other hand, the company’s directors must be prevented from dealing with the corporate assets in a way detrimental to the interests of the general creditors. This balance is struck by the Insolvency Act 1986, s. 127, which provides that, upon the granting of a winding-up order, any “dispositions” of the company’s property in the period following the presentation of the petition are retrospectively avoided, unless the court orders otherwise. The courts have, however, had considerable difficulty in applying this provision to the post-petition operation of a company’s current account and, in particular, have failed to adopt a consistent approach to the potential liability of a bank for continuing to operate such an account. The Court of Appeal addressed this problem in Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd. v. Bank of Ireland [2001] 2 W.L.R. 290.

Toward a Contemporary Concept of Criminal Justice

1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-493
Author(s):  
Helen Silving
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Canon Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Penal Code ◽  
The Other ◽  
Model Penal Code ◽  
National Socialist ◽  
American Law ◽  
The One

The state of our “criminal law” in 1905 was described by William H. Taft as “a disgrace to our civilization”. This state had not changed much almost half a century later, when Justice Frankfurter quoted Mr. Taft's statement. Several major modern reform projects formulated since 1952 introduced some noteworthy modifications. I have in mind particularly the American Law Institute Model Penal Code, on the one hand, and the German Draft of a Penal Code, both of 1962, on the other. In the former I should like to draw attention to the serious attempt at a systematization of punishment scales, and in the latter to the effort at a systematic structuring of the “guilt principle”. The German Draft incorporated results of various revisions introduced since the collapse of the National Socialist régime, by either statutory or judicial legislation—revisions born out of the growing concern in Germany with “guilt”. Prominent among these revisions, of course, is adoption of the defence of “error of law” of ancient origin, derived from biblical, talmudic and canon law teaching. Nevertheless, these two projects have but touched the surface of the profound problems that are involved in formulating truly modern penal legislation.

scholarly journals The interpretation complying with EU law manifested in the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013 of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.

scholarly journals An Inquiry into the Limits of Judicial Intervention in the Impeachment Process of Governors in Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-156
Author(s):  
Andrea Munyao
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
County Government ◽  
Judicial Intervention ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Problematic Issue ◽  
Duty To Protect ◽  
The One

Article 181(2) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya instructs Parliament to enact a law highlighting the process of impeachment of a county governor. This has been realised through the County Government Act, Section 33. Section 33 recognises the County Assembly and the Senate as the bodies responsible for this process. However, the County Government Act fails to address at what point the courts can intervene in the impeachment process of governors. This is often a problematic issue as the doctrine of separation of powers requires each arm of government to perform their functions independently. Nonetheless, Kenyan courts have the duty to protect aggrieved parties whenever their rights are threatened. However, the point at which they can intervene is not stated under any law and this creates confusion between the role of courts of law in the impeachment process, on the one hand, and that of the County Assembly and the Senate, on the other. It is not clear which role should be discharged first. This paper, therefore, seeks to address this confusion through a critique of the Wambora case, a case that was appealed up to the Supreme Court. The paper also suggests a complimentary system whereby the Senate, County Assembly and the courts can work in harmony, and, do away with the confusion.

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