Presuppositions as pragmemes: The case of exemplification acts

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-75
Author(s):  
Alessandro Capone
Keyword(s):  
Contextual Information ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Proper Name

AbstractThis paper is an example of how contextual information interacts with the interpretation of noun phrases (NPs) in discourse. When we encounter an NP escorted by the definite article or a proper name, the expectation is triggered that the speaker is referring to some referent x that the hearer can normally identify. Strawson and Russell have agreed that a referent must be associated with a definite description so that the assertion containing it can be said to be true. In the case where a description does not refer to anything, the assertion is considered by Russell to be false, while Strawson says that the issue of truth or falsity does not arise. In this paper, we examine a case in which contextual information interacts with the interpretation of NPs in discourse and the hearer is not expected to identify a referent when hearing a proper name. In this case, the issue of truth or falsity does not arise, because the hearer does not identify the referent. In fact, s/he does not intend for the discourse to about a referent at all. These situations are primarily represented by sentences uttered during the course of a grammar lecture, in which the lecturer is explaining a rule of language and does not focus on external reality. The hearers are aware of this focus and do not process the NP (in general a proper name) to identify a specific referent. This discourse is of three types, which will be discussed at the end of this paper.

The Problem of the Missing Article in the Use of ‘God’

1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-27
Author(s):  
Rien Op Den Brouw
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrase ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Prepositional Phrase ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Third Place ◽  
The Third ◽  
Proper Nouns ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Christian Discourse

This article is concerned with the use of ‘God’ in Judaeo-Christian discourse. The debate over ‘God’ has mainly centred on the puzzling issue of whether ‘God’ is a proper name with no descriptive connotation at all or whether it is a descriptive term with unique reference. In my view four things have to be taken into account in analysing the use of this term. In the first place, the term ‘God’ is a speech or communication phenomenon. Any treatment of this term should therefore consider the intentions, purposes, beliefs that a speaker has in using this word. In the second place, in Christian theistic discourse this term occurs both with and without modification. ‘The God of Israel’ is an example of ‘God’ with modification. It can be analysed as a noun phrase in which ‘God’ fulfils the function of HEAD, ‘the’ is a definite article filling the DETERMINER slot, and ‘of Israel’ is a prepositional phrase functioning as POSTMODIFIER. The use of only the term ‘God’ is an example without modification. In the third place, when Christians use ‘God’, either with or without modification, they use it to refer to, to describe or address one particular being. In the fourth place, when they use ‘God’ without modification, they do not use this term with an (in-) definite article. In this article three accounts of the term ‘God’ will be discussed: the proper name analysis, the definite description analysis, and the title-phrase analysis. Grammatically speaking, among the defenders of any of these analyses there is an agreed consensus on the classification of ‘God’ as a noun, but there is a disagreement about whether ‘God’ belongs to the category of proper nouns or to that of common nouns. Those adopting one of the last two analyses assume that ‘God’ is a common noun. This article presents an inquiry into the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three analyses. In brief, the question we are seeking to answer is the following: what kind of term is ‘God’ and what is a Christian saying when he says ‘God’?

'God' the name

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Earl Stanley Bragado Fronda
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Descriptive Names ◽  
Jack The Ripper

The word ‘God’ is typically thought to be a proper name, a name of a defined entity. From another position it appears to be a description that is fundamentally synonymous to ‘the first of all causes’, or ‘the font et origo of the structure of possibilities’, or ‘the provenience of being’, or ‘the generator of existence’. This lends credence to the view that ‘God’ is a truncated definite description. However, this article proposes that ‘God’ is a name given to whatever is that which is the first of all causes, the font et origo of the structure of possibilities, the provenience of being, the generator of existence. If so, then it is a descriptive name. Yet even among descriptive names ‘God’ is unique, for it is neither convertible to a proper name (unlike ‘Neptune’), nor to a definite description (unlike ‘Jack the Ripper’ and ‘Deep Throat’). ‘God’ is an inveterate descriptive name.

scholarly journals The Processing of Spanish Article–Noun Gender Agreement by Monolingual and Bilingual Toddlers

2020 ◽  
pp. 002383092097705
Author(s):  
Monika Molnar ◽  
José Alemán Bañón ◽  
Simona Mancini ◽  
Sendy Caffarra
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Grammatical Gender ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Gender Agreement

We assessed monolingual Spanish and bilingual Spanish-Basque toddlers’ sensitivity to gender agreement in correct vs. incorrect Spanish noun phrases (definite article + noun), using a spontaneous preference listening paradigm. Monolingual Spanish-learning toddlers exhibited a tendency to listen longer to the grammatically correct phrases (e.g., la casa; “the house”), as opposed to the incorrect ones (e.g., * el casa). This listening preference toward correct phrases is in line with earlier results obtained from French monolingual 18-month-olds (van Heugten & Christophe, 2015). Bilingual toddlers in the current study, however, tended to listen longer to the incorrect phrases. Basque was not a source of interference in the bilingual toddler’s input as Basque does not instantiate grammatical gender agreement. Overall, our results suggest that both monolingual and bilingual toddlers can distinguish between the correct and incorrect phrases by 18 months of age; however, monolinguals and bilinguals allocate their attention differently when processing grammatically incorrect forms.

scholarly journals Definiteness

Linguistics ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus von Heusinger
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Computational Linguistics ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Personal Pronouns ◽  
Linguistic Structure ◽  
Definite Expressions

Definiteness is a semantic-pragmatic notion that is closely associated with the use of the definite article (or determiner) in languages like English, Hungarian, Hebrew, and Lakhota. The definite article can be used in different conditions: deictic, anaphoric, unique, and certain indirect uses, often also called “bridging uses.” Accordingly, there are different semantic theories of definiteness, such as the salience theory, the familiarity or identifiability theory, and the uniqueness or inclusiveness theory. Definite expressions cover personal pronouns, proper names, demonstratives, definite noun phrases, and universally quantified expressions. Noun phrases with the definite article, known as “definite descriptions,” are a key issue in semantics and analytic philosophy with respect to the interaction of reference and description in identifying an object. The research and analysis of definiteness is of great importance not only for the linguistic structure of languages but also for our understanding of reference and referring in philosophy, cognitive science, computational linguistics, and communication science.

Neurolinguistic and syntactic evidence for basic level meaning in proper names

1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willy Van Langendonck
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Proper Names ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Common Noun ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Lexical Meaning ◽  
The Status ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Basic Level

This paper is intended to be an interdisciplinary investigation of the status of proper names, although it takes linguistics as its point of departure. In this study I will define proper names in terms of the currently developing Radical Construction Grammar, as promoted by Croft (to appear). Starting from the referential and semantic functions of proper names, I discuss the opposing theses of the language philosophers John Searle and Saul Kripke, and then formulate my position that proper names are assigned an ad hoc referent in an ad hoc name-giving act, i.e. not on the basis of a concept or predication as with common nouns. This ad hoc assignment can be repeated several times, so numerous people can be called John. Proper names do not have asserted lexical meaning but do display presuppositional meanings of several kinds: categorical (basic level), associative senses (introduced either via the name-bearer or via the name-form) and grammatical meanings. Language specifically, this referential and semantic status is reflected in the occurrence of proper names in certain constructions. I thus claim that close (or 'restrictive') appositional patterns of the form [definite article + noun + noun], e.g. the poet Burns, are relevant to the definition of proper names in English and also to the categorical (often basic level) meaning of the name. From proper names we can also derive nouns that appear as a special kind of common noun, e.g. another John. From a methodological viewpoint it is imperative to distinguish here between (proprial) lexemes or lemmas in isolation (dictionary entries) and proprial lemmas in their different functions (prototypically: proper name, nonprototypically: common noun or other). To corroborate the above theses, I will adduce recent psycholinguistic and especially neurolinguistic evidence. The overall argument will be based mainly on material from Germanic languages, especially English, Dutch and German.

scholarly journals /s/-Lenition and the Preservation of Plurality in Modern Occitan

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Laurel MacKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Plural Marking ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Using Data

This paper examines the variable weakening and deletion of /s/ in the Languedocian variety of Modern Occitan, with particular attention to how it has affected the system of plural marking in noun phrases. Using data from linguistic atlases, I demonstrate that /s/-lenition in this variety involves a stage of vocalization to [j]. I find that, where /s/ on the definite article has vocalized to [j], the immediately-preceding vowel of the definite article has undergone concomitant raising to [e]. This raising appears to preserve the difference between singular and plural despite the plural’s weakening /s/. I argue that these results support Labov’s (1994) hypothesis that the meaning of a weakening element may be transferred to a stable, co-occurrent one.

Specificity and objecthood in Tagalog

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 639-688 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEPH SABBAGH
Keyword(s):  
Large Body ◽  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Semantic Function ◽  
High Position ◽  
Differential Behavior ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Direct Objects ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between the semantic function of noun phrases and the way(s) in which they are realized morphosyntactically in a clause has been a topic of intensive research in the typological literature as well as for theories concerned with the syntax–semantics interface. Considering just noun phrases that function as direct objects, it has been shown for language after language that that there is a systematic relationship between the semantic function of an object (e.g. whether it is pronominal, definite, indefinite, etc.) and its morphosyntax (e.g. whether it requires special case marking, whether it triggers agreement, whether it exhibits special distribution in terms of word order, etc.). This paper aims to contribute to the already large body of evidence documenting the relationships between form and semantic function by providing a comprehensive survey of the morphosyntax of transitive constructions in Tagalog, focussing, specifically, on the relationship between the semantic function of the theme argument and the morphosyntactic strategies by which theme arguments are realized. Contrary to what previous studies have claimed, I show that specific noun phrases are attested as direct objects of active clause in Tagalog. An exception to this is pronoun and proper name themes, which must either be oblique marked to function as a direct object or be realized as a subject. Developing and expanding upon analyses in Rackowski (2002), I propose that the differential behavior of specific themes (pronoun/proper names on the one hand versus non-pronoun/proper name specific themes on the other) follows from a clausal architecture in which there are at least two VP-external positions to which specific themes must raise – a relatively high position for pronoun and proper name themes, and a position intermediate betweenvP and VP for all other specific themes. The distribution of syntactic positions available for the theme argument is claimed to follow from a proposal in Merchant (2006), pre-figured in Jelinek & Carnie (2003) and related work, that relational hierarchies of the type familiar from typological research – in particular, the definiteness hierarchy – are directly encoded in the phrase structure.

Was Aristotle Named ‘Aristotle’?

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne C. Minas
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Proper Name ◽  
The Individual

Yes, Aristotle was named ‘Aristotle’. I want to show that since ‘Aristotle’ is a proper name, this is true by definition. My theory of proper names is a version of Russell's, a theory that a name is equivalent in meaning to definite description(s) which single out the individual, if there is one, to which the name refers. (“When I say,e.g. ‘Homer existed’, I am meaning by ‘Homer’ some description, say ‘the author of the Homeric poems’ .”) Braithwaite at one time said that the proper name ‘Aristotle’ meant the description ‘the individual named “Aristotle” ’. This theory, which makes it contradictory to suppose that Aristotle was not (the individual) named ‘Aristotle’ I will argue is the correct one. This will involve some explanation of what naming is, which I will carry out in the first two sections. My contention is that naming is an activity that can be done either explicitly or non-explicitly. And names can be conferred either (a) on the basis of acquaintance or (b) by associating the name with descriptions.

Noun phrases: logical and linguistic properties

1976 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Thomas G. Pavel
Keyword(s):  
Noun Phrases ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Natural Languages ◽  
Subordinate Clauses ◽  
Linguistic Research ◽  
Logical Notion ◽  
Logical Semantic

Recent linguistic research has explored the possibility of using standard logical analyses to explain some phenomena of natural languages. The logical notion of scope in modal contexts has yielded to the linguistic dichotomy of [±specific] indefinite NPs. Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite description has been used to extend this dichotomy to include definite NPs. The behaviour of moods in Romance subordinate clauses has been tentatively explained by the same notions.The purpose of this paper is to criticize some of these attempts to apply logical analyses to natural languages. Without denying the heuristic and even the explanatory value of standard logical analysis in linguistics, I will try to show that the correspondence between logical semantic notions and the categories of natural languages is much more approximate than is sometimes believed.

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