Tony Weir and the Law of Tort

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-77
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

AbstractTony Weir was a leading figure in UK tort law who sadly passed away in December 2011. This paper examines his lasting contribution to English tort law as a scholar unafraid to speak his mind and whose incisive commentaries continue to be read by students and Supreme Court justices alike. It will focus on two areas in which Weir’s contribution was particularly significant: the treatment of claims for negligently-incurred pure economic loss and the degree to which tort law should provide a remedy for injuries resulting from risks which individuals have freely incurred. Weir’s contribution was distinctive and forcefully argued, encouraging his audience to reflect on the policy choices underlying any system of tort law.

Author(s):  
Max Loubser ◽  
Tamar Gidron

Both the Israeli and the South African legal systems are classified as mixed legal systems, or mixed jurisdictions. In Israel, tort law was originally pure English common law, adopted by legislation and later developed judicially. In South Africa, the law of delict (tort) was originally Roman-Dutch but was later strongly influenced by the English common law. Under both systems, tort law is characterized by open-ended norms allowing extensive judicial development. This paper traces and compares the structural basis, methodology, policy, and trends of the judicial development of state and public-authority liability in the Israeli and South African jurisdictions. Specific factors that have impacted the development of state- and public-authority liability are: (1) constitutional values, (2) the courts’ recognition of the need for expanded protection of fundamental human rights and activism towards achieving such protection, (3) the multicultural nature of the societies, (4) problems of crime and security, and (5) worldwide trends, linked to consumerism, toward the widening of liability of the state and public authorities.Within essentially similar conceptual structures the South African courts have been much more conservative in their approach to state liability for pure economic loss than their Israeli counterparts. This can perhaps be attributed to a sense of priorities. In a developing country with huge disparities in wealth, the courts would naturally be inclined to prioritize safety and security of persons above pure economic loss. The South African courts have been similarly more conservative in cases involving administrative negligence and evidential loss.The development of the law on state and public-authority liability in Israel and South Africa is also the product of factors such as the levels of education, the effectiveness of the public service, and the history and pervasiveness of constitutional ordering. Despite important differences, the law in the two jurisdictions has developed from a broadly similar mixed background; the courts have adopted broadly similar methods and reasoning; and the outcomes show broadly similar trends.


Author(s):  
Mark P. Gergen

This chapter discusses privity rules. Privity rules in contract law prevented obligations created by a contract from protruding on third parties, while privity rules in tort law prevented obligations to third parties that might otherwise be imposed by tort law from “indenting” upon a contract. Contract no longer is an impregnable circle of obligation. But contract law still has a privity requirement that prevents a contract from protruding negatively on nonparties. Meanwhile, in tort law, the function of preventing negligence law from indenting upon a contract has devolved to rules that preclude a negligence claim for pure economic loss. Moreover, there are rules in property law and the law of restitution that perform the same functions as the old privity rules in contract law and negligence. These include bona fide purchaser rules in property law and rules in the law of restitution that preclude claims for indirect enrichment and that preserve the priority of contract as a mechanism for resolving problems of unjust enrichment.


Legal Theory ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Goudkamp ◽  
John Murphy

ABSTRACTMany scholars have offered theories that purport to explain the whole of the law of torts. At least some of these theories do not seem to be specific to a single jurisdiction. Several appear to endeavor to account for tort law in at least the major common law jurisdictions or even throughout the common law world. These include Ernest Weinrib's corrective justice theory, Robert Stevens's rights theory, and Richard Posner's economic theory. This article begins by explaining why it is appropriate to understand these three theories as universal theories of tort law and why it is important that they be so understood. This explanation draws upon various overt claims (or other strong intimations) made by the theorists themselves to the effect that this is how their respective accounts should be understood. The article then proceeds to test these theories, all of which are leading accounts of tort law, against the evidence in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The parts of tort law on which we focus are (1) the breach element of the action in negligence, (2) the law that determines when a duty of care will be owed in respect of pure economic loss, (3) the law that governs the availability of punitive damages, (4) the defense of illegality, and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its descendants. The article concludes that none of the theories is a satisfactory universal account of tort law. All of them suffer from significant problems of fit in that they cannot accommodate (often even approximately) the areas of law that we discuss. Although each of the theories contains a great many valuable insights, they all nonetheless fall well short of accomplishing that which they are held out as providing. In the course of this analysis, the article explains why this is an appropriate line of criticism and identifies the degree of lack of fit that we regard as being “significant.”


1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ευστάθιος Μπανάκας

Financial harm may be caused in many different ways. It can be said that it appears in several different ’’types", each produced in distinct factual circumstances. Different "types" of financial harm may demand a different treatment by the law. The considerations that ought to determine the policy of the law vary together with the factual . circumstances, in which each particular type offinancial harm becomes manifested. Thence the need for a separate examination of the major, or "generic", types of such harm, a need that has already been - detected by Comparative lawyers writing on the subject.(20) The present study will concentrate on the problem ' of financial harm that is not the product of a harmful intention (21) . In the Common Law of Negligence this problem is known as the "pure economic loss" problem. The solutions given to it by English Law are compared to the solutions of the French Law of Torts, and to those of the law of Torts of the German Federal Republic (West Germany)(22). The compared Tort systems not only are leadingthe major legal traditions of our age, each employing its own individual "style" (23), but, also, operate in virtually similar social and economic environments. This should allow the comparison to expose more easily the true merits of any "stylistic" idiosyncrasies, thatthey might possess in this particular connection. The problem of pure economic, loss caused by erroneous advice or information is not examined in * detail in the present study. It has been already the subject of comprehensive Comparative examination (24).


2019 ◽  
pp. 299-334
Author(s):  
Lucy Jones

This chapter discusses the difference between the law of torts and contract and criminal law. It explores the tort of negligence, considering the necessary elements for a claim of negligence, namely the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care, the defendant breached that duty of care, and reasonably foreseeable damage was caused by the breach of duty. The chapter considers the special requirements for the recovery of pure economic loss and for loss as a result of psychiatric injuries, looking at both primary and secondary victims. The principles relating to breach of a duty of care, including the standard of care, are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the final element, considering the need for a causal link between the breach of duty by the defendant and the damage suffered by the claimant.


Legal Studies ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Giles ◽  
Erika Szyszczak

It was generally accepted that the House of Lords in Anns v Merton LBC introduced an ‘entirely new type of product liability’ into the law of tort by expanding liability in negligence in relation to the construction of defective buildings. The novelty of the action was to introduce liability in tort for the construction of the defective product itself and to allow a claim for economic loss resulting from the defect. The consequence was to blur some of the traditional boundaries between contract and tort claims and to cause controversy in relation to the nature of the allowable loss recoverable from the negligent act. In particular it led to the question of whether such claims fell into the category of ‘pure economic loss’: a loss not easily accepted in conventional tort jurisprudence.


Legal Studies ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-416
Author(s):  
Carl F Stychin

In 1995, the highest courts in two Commonwealth jurisdictions - Canada and Australia - squarely faced the issue of the liability of builders of defective and, in the case of the Canadian Supreme Court, dangerous premises in tort.’ The determination in both cases that the builders were liable to the remote purchasers for the cost of repair, based on a duty of care owed to them, can be contrasted to the current state of tort law in this country dealing with defective and dangerous premises. In fact, the articulation of the reasons why a duty of care was imposed in these cases - as reflecting considerations both of principle and policy - provides a more compelling analysis than has been seen to date in the British law of negligence.


Legal Studies ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Witting

The law of negligence favours redress for damage to property interests over redress for damage to mere economic interests. The question arises whether this preference can be justified. In endeavouring to answer it, the author surveys existing reasons given by courts and commentators for maintaining a distinction between property and economic interests. Each of these reasons, which collectively focus upon the ‘problematic’ nature of economic losses, is found to be either ad hoe in nature or without substantial explanatory power. However, it is submitted that the distinction is explicable on the basis that, whereas an individual's personality is partly constituted by the property that he or she owns, so that property can be seen as essential to the ways in which individuals constitute and define themselves, no such claim can be made with respect to mere abstract holdings of wealth. Although wealth permits the acquisition of property and participation in activities and experiences which might help to constitute and define the self in the future, the very fact that wealth has not been transposed into these things precludes it from being considered as important as actual holdings of property. The protection of property interests ought, therefore, to precede the protection of mere economic interests.


Legal Studies ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula Giliker

This article examines the treatment of pure economic loss claims in England and Canada. The two jurisdictions have much in common. Starting from the same case sources, the common law of each system has struggled to deal with claims for negligently-incurred pure economic loss. Yet, the systems diverged in the 1990s when the Canadian Supreme Court refused to follow the lead of Murphy v Brentwood DC and reiterated its adherence to the Anns two-stage test. It is submitted that, in view of recent developments which suggest the gradual convergence of the two systems, English law should carefully examine the categorisation approach adopted by the Canadian courts. The current English position is far from clear, and the Canadian model is capable of bringing transparency and greater clarity to this difficult area of law.


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